The limits of Chinese and Russian military cooperation after the end of the Cold War. by Tsai, Ming-Yen
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








The limits of Chinese and Russian military cooperation after the end of the Cold War.
Tsai, Ming-Yen
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
The Limits of Sino-Russian Military Cooperation




A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the degree of




This thesis investigates the limits of Sino-Russian military cooperation after the end
of the Cold War. This study argues that the development of Sino-Russian
'partnership' has been strained and has yet to create a stable political foundation for
close military cooperation. To achieve their own state interests, China and Russia
have attempted to pursue military cooperation at two levels: first, defusing remaining
points of tension through confidence-building measures (CBMs); and second,
developing new areas of cooperation, including arms transfers and military-technical
cooperation. Although progress has been made in improving bilateral military-
security relations, many limits have remained. Lingering mutual distrust and
conflicts of interest have obstructed the furthering of their military cooperation. The
nature of Chinese and Russian military cooperation has remained fragile. CBMs,
anns transfers, and military-technical cooperation may underscore the existence of a
limited cooperative security relationship. However, the sense of mutual distrust, and
contradictions of geopolitical and security interests, could eventually become major
sources of tension in their military relationship. In order to develop these arguments,
this thesis reviews these two countries' military relationship from the point of view of
history, and examines the political foundations and major components of Chinese and
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Introduction: Research Objectives and Methods
During the Cold War, the major focus of the Sino-Soviet relationship had been the
possibility of military confrontation along their common border. By contrast, after
the end of the Cold War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian
Federation have sought to strengthen their military cooperation and to develop
friendly exchanges between their military forces at various levels.' A detailed
analysis of Sino-Russian military cooperation has been neglected in the academic
literature. Given this gap, this thesis seeks to examine the political foundations and
major components of Chinese and Russian military cooperation in the new era in an
attempt to reveal the nature of this relationship. This chapter will clarify the research
objectives and methods of this study. It opens by reviewing the literature and
specifying the research objectives. It then defines the scope of the topic. It goes on
to present the propositions behind the study and the organisation of this thesis.
Finally, this chapter identifies the research methods and data used in this study.
A) Literature Review and Research Objectives
This chapter begins with a review of the existing literature. It seeks to explore the
main research issues, analytical methods, and the definitions relevant to this research
topic which have been identified in the literature. To date, the literature on Sino-
Russian military cooperation has been dominated by three types of subjects: first,
Sino-Russian bilateral relations and strategic cooperation; second, arms transfers; and
'Russia and China Issue Joint Statement', Xinhua news agency (Beijing), 25 April 1996, in the BBC
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third, Chinese increasing military threats to regional security.
In the first group are works which concentrate on Chinese and Russian bilateral
relations and strategic cooperation. A dividing line in this group of works concerns
different views about the nature of Chinese and Russian 'partnership'. The question
of whether Chinese and Russian cooperation represents 'strategic convergence' or a
limited 'partnership' has been a concern in this group of works.
In his 1993 article on 'Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo',
Hung P. Nguyen argued that Chinese and Russian cooperation could be seen as 'a
pact between two continental powers united by their real and imagined grievances
against the West'. 2
 In 1997, Rajan Menon, a Visiting Scholar at the Harriman
Institute of Columbia University, published an article entitled 'The Strategic
Convergence between Russia and China'. In this, Menon described the Chinese and
Russian relationship as 'one of strategic convergence, involving multifaceted
cooperation and a convergence of views and interests on important questions of
international security'. 3
 According to Menon, the strategic convergence between
China and Russia led to bilateral cooperation on confidence-building measures
(CBMs) and arms sales.4
 This argument, that these two states' bilateral relationship
has been consolidated by their common interests in a broad range of fields, can also
be found in the general literature which has been published by Chinese and Russian
diplomats and scholars.5
Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter SWB), SU 2596,26 April 1996, p.B 2.
2 Hung P. Nguyen, 'Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo', Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 3
(March 1993), p.286.
Rajan Menon, 'The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China', Survival, vol. 39, no. 2
(Summer 1997), p.101.
Ibid., pp.107-1 14.
See, for example, Yevgeny Afanasiev and Grigory Logvinov, 'Russia and China: Girding for the
Third Millennium', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 1112 (1995), pp.45-53; lgor Rogachev,
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By contrast, while commenting on Chinese and Russian 'partnership', other
observers have outlined its limits. For example, in her 1996 paper on 'The Limits of
Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership', Jennifer Anderson, argued that Chinese and
Russian cooperation in various fields did not always work well because their
priorities did not coincide. 6
 In 1998, Sherman W. Garnett, of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, published a report on 'Limited Partnership:
Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia'. He concluded that in spite of continued
improvements in mutual understanding, bilateral trade, and military cooperation,
China and Russia had unequal stakes in such issues as demographic imbalances and
economic cooperation. 7
 Other skeptics of the harmony of Sino-Russian cooperation
have included James Clay Moltz, Pi Ying-hsien, Ya-chun Chang, Eugene Bazhanov,
and Vladimir S. Miasnikov.8
Despite different views about the nature of Chinese and Russian cooperation, the
issues explored in this group of works have covered the Chinese and Russian
relationship in the political, economic, and military fields. On military issues, these
'Russia-China: Cooperation Projected into the 21 Century, Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 3
(1996), pp.3-12; Leonid Moiseev, 'Russian-Chinese Partnership: New Horizons', Far Eastern Affairs
(Moscow), no. 3 (1997), pp.3-8; Li Jingie, 'The Progress of Chinese-Russian Relations: From
Friendship to Strategic Partnership', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 3 (1997), pp.13-SI; Vladimir
Lukin, 'Russia-China Strategic Partnership: A Predictable Reality', Far Eastern Affafrs (Moscow), no.
3 (1997), pp.58-65; Grigorii Karasin, 'Russia and China: A New Partnership', International Affairs
(Moscow), vol. 43, no. 3 (1997), pp.23-29.
6 Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adelphi Paper no. 315 (London:
IISS, 1997), p.80.
Sherman W. Garnett, Limited Partnership: Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia (Washington,
D C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), pp.30-40.
James Clay Moltz, 'From Military Adversaries to Economic Partners: Russia and China in the New
Asia', Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 9, no. I (Winter 1995), pp.176-179; P1 Ying-hsien, 'The
Dynamics of Sino-Russian Relations', Issues and Studies, vol. 32, no. 1 (January 1996), pp.25-28; Ya-
chun Chang, 'Peking-Moscow Relations in the Post-Soviet Era', Issues and Studies, vol. 30, no. I
(January 1994), pp.96-99; Eugene Bazhanov, 'Russian Policy Toward China', in Peter Shearman (ed.),
Russian Foreign Policy since 1990 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1995), pp.I74-178;
Vladimir S. Miasnikov, 'Russia and China', in Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov (eds),
Damage Limitations or Crisis?: Russia and the Outside World (London: Brassey's, Inc., 1995),
pp.227-240.
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works only briefly comment on disarmament, CBMs, or arms transfers. 9
 For example,
while addressing Sino-Russian CBMs, some works merely mention the signature of
the 'Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in Border Areas
between China and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan' in April 1996.10
They fail to provide detailed analysis of the content of this agreement, or to explore
the major approaches developed by the parties to achieve confidence-building." Also,
these works do not examine the details of arms transfers, and only cite Chinese
purchases of Russian arms to prove the improvement of the two countries' bilateral
relationship.' 2
 The focus of this group of works is the general Sino-Russian bilateral
relationship. They do not provide in-depth analyses of military affairs. Given this,
these works have not produced a satisfactory explanation of the development and the
nature of Chinese and Russian military cooperation.
The second group of works has concentrated on Russian and Chinese arms
transfers, and, in particular, the rationales for these transfers and their implications for
regional security. In his 1993 article on 'Sino-Russian Military Relations:
Implications for Asian-Pacific Security', Bin Yu, Assistant Professor in the
Department of Political Science at Wittenberg University, pointed out that the
Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989 led to the interruption of military cooperation
Chang, 'Peking-Moscow Relations in the Post-Soviet Era', pp.91-93; Moltz, 'From Military
Adversaries to Economic Partners', pp 168-172; Pi, 'The Dynamics of Sino-Russian Relations', pp.22-
25; Menon, 'The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China', pp.10 1-125; Anderson, The Limits
of Sino-Rusian Strategic Partnership pp 38-42, and pp 69-73 Garnett Limited Partnership pp 18-19
and pp.25-26; Nguyen, 'Russia and China. The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo', p.30!.
'° See, for example, Menon, 'The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China', pp.107-109; Pi,
'The Dynamics of Sino-Russian Relations', pp.22-23; Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic
Partnership, pp.38-42; Gamett, Limited Partnership, pp.1 8-19.
"Ibid.
12 Nguyen, 'Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo', p.301; Chang, 'Peking-Moscow
Relations in the Post-Soviet Era', pp.91-93; Moltz, 'From Military Adversaries to Economic Partners',
p.170; Pi, 'The Dynamics of Sino-Russian Relations', p.24; Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian
Strategic Partnership, pp.69-73; Garnett, Limited Partnership, pp.25-27.
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between China and the Western countries.' 3
 Moreover, the U.S. high-level
technology on display in the Gulf War increased Chinese eagerness to modernise its
armed forces.' 4
 Russia's economic difficulties and defence conversion problems
opened the possibility of the sales of Russian arms to China.' 5
 In the context of
regional security, Yu argued that the Chinese purchase of Russian weapons had
caused other Asian countries to upgrade their military forces, in particular their air
forces. Although this article touched upon many issues relevant to Russian-Chinese
arms transfers, most of the arguments made were based on brief statements and not
supported by sufficient evidence.'6
In 1994, Taeho Kim, research associate at the Mershon Center of Ohio State
University, published a paper entitled 'The Dynamics of Sino-Russian Military
Relations: An Asian Perspective'. Kim stressed that Russian and Chinese arms
transfers had provided these two states with strategic counterweight to the USA.'7
While exploring the rationale behind Russian-Chinese arms transfers, Kim focused on
the study of Chinese needs for Russian weapons.' 8
 He did not explain why Russia
was willing to supply arms to China. Considerable attention was given to the types of
weapons which the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had bought from Russia.' 9
 Kim
predicted that:
The reopening of Sino-Russian military ties, especially the sale of advanced
weapon systems and military technology, would have far-reaching
implications on the regional balance of power in the form of enhanced
Bin Yu, 'Sino-Russian Military Relations: Implications for Asian-Pacific Security', Asian Survey, vol.




' Taeho Kim, The Dynamics of Sino-Russian M:litaiy Relations: An Asian Perspective (Taipei:




Chinese power projection capabilities. Longer strategic reach for the PLA,
backed by advanced Russian weapons, is also likely to increase the
possibility that China will translate its growing military muscle into
concrete political gains when opportunities present themselves.20
In 1998, in their article on 'Sino-Russian Military Technical Cooperation: A
Russian View', Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, two Professors in
the Department of Political Science at the University of Nizhniy Novgorod, explored
the motives and development of Russian-Chinese arms transfers. They stressed that
the first and most obvious rationale for Russia in seeking arms exports was to provide
financial support to the defence industry. 2 ' The two Russian scholars gained some
insights into Russian arms exports by conducting interviews with Russian defence
industrialists. In addition, this article provided information on arms prices and
payment arrangements in some of the deals. 22 Like Kim, Sergounin and Subbotin
paid special attention to the performance of the weapons systems that China had
bought from Russia, and concluded that Russian-Chinese arms deals would have a
destabilising effect on regional security.23
Stephen J. Blank, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, stressed that Russian
arms sales to China resulted from commercial considerations and the Russian
government's incapability to monitor its own arms exports. 24
 In his opinion, Russian
defence industries perceived arms exports to China as an essential source of income.
20 Ibid., p.23.
21 Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, 'Sino-Russian Military Technical Cooperation: A
Russian View', in Ian Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade (Oxford S




24 Stephen Blank, 'Challenging the New World Order: The Arms Transfer Policies of the Russian
Republic', The Journal of Slavic M litary Studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (June 1993), pp.253-254; Stephen Blank,
Why Russian Policy Is Failing in Asia (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997), pp.6-7;
Stephen J. Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War
College, 1997), pp.5-9; Stephen J. Blank, 'Russia-Chinese Military Relations and Asian Security',
Issues and Studies, vol. 33, no. 11 (November 1997), p.60.
19
In particular, these industries were able to influence the state's arms export policy for
their own commercial interests. He wrote:
Because Moscow has neither devised a viable defense program, anticipated
its arsenal's impending block obsolescence, nor controlled its defense
industry, the latter's captains have conducted their own policies toward
China and other Asian states regardless of the outcome.25
This argument was built on Blank's criticism of Russia's sale of the licence for Su-27
production to China - a deal in which, according to Blank, Russia failed to take
account of its own security interests. 26
 Accordingly, Blank argued that Russian arms
would encourage Chinese coercive diplomacy, degrade Asian security, and spur a
brisk regional arms race.27
The main research focus in this group of works has been on the rationales behind
Russian-Chinese arms transfers and the impact of the transfers on regional security.
Their common argument is that Russian arms sales to China have been driven by
commercial profits. Also, these transfers have created uncertainties for regional
security in the Asia-Pacific region (APR). However, while they outlined the
influence of the defence industry on Russian arms exports, these works neglected
other internal factors influencing Russian policy decision-making such as the security
and defence agencies. 28
 Geopolitical and security considerations have been ignored
in these studies of Russian arms transfers to China.
In the third group are works which cite Chinese purchases of Russian arms to
25 Blank, 'Russia-Chinese Military Relations and Asian Security', p.60.
26 Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China, pp.6-7; Blank, Why Russian Policy Is
Failing in Asia, pp.6-7 and p.18.
27 Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China, pp.27-28; Blank, Challenging the New
World Order, pp.252-253; Blank, Why Russian Policy Is Failing in Asia, pp.22-23.
28 According to Roy Allison, in post-Soviet Russia, the military has exerted a significant influence on
the formation of foreign policy. See Roy Allison, 'Military Factor in Foreign Policy', in Neil Malcolm,
Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light (eds), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.230-285.
20
prove an increasing Chinese military threat to the security of the APR. These works
have accounted for the most of the literature. 29
 A good example is Robert G. Sutter
and Shirley Kan's report to the U.S. Congress by the Congressional Research Service
in 1994. In this paper, Sutter and Kan explored the possibility that China would pose
a threat to the U.S. interest in peace and stability in the APR by assessing China's
intentions and capabilities. In examining China's military capability, they stressed
that Russian weapons had formed important elements in upgrading the military forces
of the PLA. 3° This group of works has addressed China's military threat to the U.S.
and regional security, and only briefly cites Chinese arms purchases from Russia to
show China's steady buildup of forces. Like the first group of literature, this third
group of works provides very limited discussion on issues concerning Sino-Russian
military cooperation.
There are three major problems with the current state of knowledge on Sino-
Russian military cooperation. These concern the definitions of research topics,
research issues, and analytical methods.
First, none of the literature offers explicit definitions of its research topics. This
29 See, for example, Nicholas D. Kristof, 'The Rise of China', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5
(November/December 1993), p.66; David Shambaugh, 'Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian
Security', Survival, vol. 36, no. 2 (Summer 1994), pp.51-52; Larry M. Wortzel, 'China Pursues
Traditional Great-Power Status', Orbis, vol. 38, no. 2 (Spring 1994), pp.169-170; Robert G. Sutter and
Shirley Kan, China as a Security Concern in Asia: Perceptions, Assessment and US. Options, CRS
Report for Congress 94-32s (5 January 1994), p.CRS1O; Col. Tohn Caldwell, China's Conventional
Military Capabilities, 1994-2004 (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 1994), pp.10-11 and p.2!; United States General Accounting Office, Impact of China's
Military Modernization in the Pac/lc Region (Washington, D C: United States General Accounting
Office, 1995), p.21 and 23, Arthur S. Ding, 'The PRCs Mili ary Modernization and a Security
Mechanism for the Asia-Pacific', Issues and Studies, vol. 31, no. 8 (August 1995), pp.9-1 0; Jing-dong
Yuan, 'China's Defence Modernization: Implications for Asia-Pacific Security', Contemporary
Southeast Asia, vol. 17, no. 2 (September 1995), pp.71-74; Lucian W. Pye, 'China: Not Your Typical
Superpower', Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 43, no. 4 (July August 1996), pp.1 1-12; Fleis K.
Chang, 'Beijing Reach in the South China Sea', Orbis, vol. 40, no. 3 (Summer 1996), pp.159-363; Paul
H. B. Godwin, 'Uncertainty, Insecurity, and China's Military Power', Current History, vol. 96, no. 611
(September 1997), pp.255-256; David Shambaugh, 'China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent
Security', International Security, vol.24, no. 3 (Winter 1999 2000), p.72.
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has led to confusion in the literature. For example, the second group of works has
sought to explore the development of Sino-Russian military relations. However, due
to a failure to offer a proper definition for the research topic, these works have merely
addressed the two states' arms transfers. Arms transfers are not the only component
of Sino-Russian military cooperation and cannot present a full picture of this
relationship. An examination of other important components of Sino-Russian
military cooperation, such as CBMs and military-technical cooperation, is absent
from the literature. These works on Sino-Russian military cooperation do not present
a complete picture.
Second, the major research issues and arguments explored in these three groups
of literature focus on the causes which led to the possibility of Sino-Russian military
cooperation and the impact on regional security. As a consequence, the focus is on
the 'terrifying effects' of Sino-Russian military ties. Important research issues, such
as the problems and limitations in the Sino-Russian military cooperation relationship,
are neglected.
The third problem is the lack of in-depth analysis in the literature. All of the
literature is article length. Given this, relevant events in Sino-Russian military
cooperation are described only briefly. Most of the literature fails to use sufficient
data for supporting its arguments and statements. This has led to a problem that the
patterns and course of Sino-Russian military cooperation are not explored or
explained satisfactorily in the literature.
In brief, the general literature does not provide a thorough examination of Sino-
Russian military cooperation. There have been numerous studies of the Sino-Russian
Sutter and Kan, China As a Security Concern in Asia, pp.CRS9- 10.
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bilateral relationship but none of them has provided in-depth analysis of military
affairs. There have also been many works discussing Sino-Russian arms transfers but
none of them has evaluated the overall development of Sino-Russian military
cooperation. There exist obvious gaps in the existing state of knowledge on this
research topic.
This thesis aims to contribute to a wider understanding on Chinese and Russian
military cooperation at three levels. First, it seeks to determine whether the
establishment of a 'partnership' has created a stable political environment for Sino-
Russian military cooperation. Second, it intends to investigate the limits of Chinese
and Russian military cooperation by examining the major components of bilateral
cooperation. Finally, it aims to outline the nature of Chinese and Russian military
cooperation. As such, it will be possible to compensate for the insufficiencies of the
literature, and produce an original contribution to our knowledge of Chinese and
Russian military cooperation after the end of the Cold War.
B) The Scope of the Topic
The Russian Federation formally became an independent country on 31 December
1991. The time boundaries of this study range from 1 January 1992 to 31 December
1999. This research period covers an important stage of the Sino-Russian
relationship from the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the period provides a steady
state focus. From 1992 to 1999, Jiang Zemin was the state leader in China. He has
occupied the most influential posts in the Party-military arena, including Secretary-
General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chairman of the CCP Central
Military Commission (CMC), and the President of the country. In Russia, Boris
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Yeltsin was the President of the country. There are therefore no problems raising
from leadership transition in either China or Russia during this period.
This study is original in substance because it will examine the main components
of Sino-Russian military cooperation thoroughly so as to reveal the full picture of the
relationship. As stated earlier, one of the problems in the literature has been its
failure to provide a proper definition for 'military cooperation'. In the international
system, 'cooperation' is a situation of interactions between the states: K. J. Holsti
stated that 'most collaborative transactions and interactions occur directly between
two governments facing some problem or matter of common interest'. 3 ' 'Military
cooperation' is defined in this study as collaborative transactions and interactions
between the Chinese and Russian govermnents for resolving problems and achieving
state interests in military and security affairs. In accordance with this definition, from
1992 to 1999, three major components of Sino-Russian cooperation in the military
and security affairs can be identified: CBMs; arms transfers; and military-technical
cooperation.
CBMs are defined as 'arrangements designed to enhance such assurance of mind
and belief in the trustworthiness of states and the facts they create'. 32
 The first major
application of CBMs occurred in Europe during the Cold War. Five basic types of
CBMs can be identified from the European experience: first, communication
measures; second, transparency measures; third, constraint measures; fourth,
verification measures; and finally, declaratory measures. 33
 These five types constitute
K. J. Hoisti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hail, Inc., 1983), p.439.
32 Johan Jørgen Hoist, 'Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework', Survival, vol. 25,
no. 1 (January February 1983), p.2.
James Macintosh, 'Confidence- and Security-Building Measures: A Sceptical Look', in UN
Department for Disarmament Affairs (ed.), Confidence and Security-building Measures in Asia (New
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the dimensions for the analysis of Sino-Russian CBMs in this study. In addition,
China and Russia have attempted to resolve disputes over territorial issues, which
were not covered by the European model of CBMs but showed a major effort at
confidence and security building. These will be examined also.
Arms transfers represent 'the international transfer (under terms of grant, credit,
barter or cash) of military equipment, usually referred to as "conventional", including
weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other
commodities designed for military use'. 34
 Financial modes, agreements, deliveries,
and payments are usually included in this area of study.35
As for military-technical cooperation, this study focuses on Sino-Russian
'commissioned and joint research and development of new models of weapons and
military hardware', and Russian 'technical assistance in the creation of military
facilities and defence industry enterprises' in China. 36 In addition, China's
acquisitions of 'dual-use' technologies from Russia are included in this study because
technical cooperation in such areas as nuclear power engineering and space science
may be applied by China to pursue the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA).37
Finally, Chinese access to Russian military technology through illicit routes, a factor
which can undermine military-technical cooperation between the two governments, is
York: The United Nations, 1990), p.85; The Henry L. Stimson Center, Confidence-Building Measures
Project, Website http://www.stimson.org/cbm/cbmef.htm
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p.144.
Chri tian Catrina, Arms Transfe s andD pendence (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1988), pp.10 11.
36 For forms of Russia's military-technical cooperation with foreign states, see "'Detailed Account" of
Russian Military Doctrine', Rossiyskiye Vesti (Moscow), 18 November 1993, pp.1-2, in SWB,
SU 1858, 29 November 1993, p.S1 10.
The RMA 'depends on the interaction between systems that collect, process, fuse and communicate
information and those that apply military force'. This concept represents 'a rapid and radical increase
in the effectiveness of military units that alters the nature of warfare and changes the strategic
environment'. For further discussion, see Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs,




After the Cold War, China and Russia announced a 'partnership'. When they set up a
'strategic partnership' in April 1996, both sides declared that they would 'further
develop friendly exchanges between their military forces at various levels and further
strengthen their cooperation on (sic) military technology'. 38
 Most of the literature has
focused on analysing the reasons for and implications of Sino-Russian military
cooperation. In contrast, this thesis aims to examine the problems and limits of this
relationship.
Before starting this study, it is necessary to address the general concerns and
characteristics of the major actors as well as the factors influencing policy-making in
both China and Russia. This discussion can provide background understanding of
these two parties' concerns and objectives in pursuing military cooperation.
In China, the process of decision-making has been extremely centralised and has
been an elite exercise. The way to examine domestic forces that shape Chinese
foreign policy has to begin at the top. 39
 As the CCP enjoys absolute control of this
country's policy decision-making, overall control of the policy formulation process
lies in the hands of the Political Bureau (Politburo). 40
 The members of the Politburo
include twenty-plus top leaders. They consist of supreme leader Jiang Zemin and top
leaders of the party, government, and army bureaucracies. The Politburo retains the
Revolution in Military Affairs', Current History, vol. 96, no. 609 (April 1997), pp.184-188.
38 
'Russia and China Issue Joint Statement', p.B12.
David L. Shambaugh, 'Elite Politics and Perceptions', in Gerald Segal (ed.), Chinese Politics and
Foreign Policy Reform (London: Kegan Paul International for the RIIA, 1990), p.100.
Shaun Breslin, 'The Foreign Policy Bureaucracy', in Segal (ed.), Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy
Reform, p.117. Also see Andrew i. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty
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power of defining the fundamental purposes of China's national strategy (guojia
zhanlue) guiding not only foreign and defence policy but also critical domestic realms
concerned with national construction and internal order.4'
The structure and process of military decision-making has also been premised on
centralised command and control. The supreme decision-making authority of the
Chinese military system is vested in the CMC under the CCP Central Committee.42
In China, the supreme leaders' most important positional source of power has been
the chairmanship of the CMC. Chinese supreme leaders, first Mao Zedong, then
Deng Xiaoping, and now Jiang Zemin, have occupied the chairmanship of the CMC.
The CMC retains the power of appointment to and dismissal from senior military
posts.4
 The supreme leader (as CMC Chairman) and two military leaders (as CMC
Vice Chairmen) have exercised sole decision-making authority over most critical
defence policy issues.44
An examination of important issues which concern the Chinese leadership has
been the crucial approach to understand the rationale behind this country's policy
decision-making.45
 Four important issues have been of concern to the Chinese
leadership.	 These are economic prosperity, territorial integrity, defence
modernisation, and global influence. Since the end of the Cold War, these four issues
Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p.125.
41 Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), p.7.
42 Jonathan D. Pollack, 'Structure and Process in the Chinese Military System', in Kenneth G.
Lieberthal and David M. Lampton (ed), Bureau racy, P lit: s, and D C! iofl Making in Post Mao
China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Ltd., 1992), p.160.
' Pollack, 'Structure and Process in the Chinese Military System', pp.151-180.
The CMC is charged with formulating and implementing defence or security-related activities in
support of national security policy and broader national strategic objectives. These have included
military doctrine, force structure, force deployments, force training, military threat analysis, arms sales,
and policies concerning arms control and military-related acquisitions. See Swaine, The Role of the
Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, pp.37-55.
Gerald Segal, 'Foreign Policy', in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segat (eds), China in the
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have constituted the Chinese national strategy guiding defence and foreign policy.46
These four goals are interlinked. The rationale for these was rooted in a sense of
Chinese national identity, that is, ensuring China's status as a 'great nation' (da guo).47
Military cooperation with Russia has followed some of the lines of these
objectives. Alleviating tensions along the common border with Russia was expected
to create a stable external environment conducive to Chinese economic
development.48 Developing arms trade and military-technical cooperation with
Russia was expected to upgrade Chinese national defence capability, which was
viewed by the Chinese leadership as 'both an important component and an important
reflection of a country's comprehensive national strength'. 49 Also, enhanced military
capacity might allow China to ensure its sovereignty claims over Taiwan and the
Spratlys through coercive strategies.5°
The historical lesson of the unilateral Soviet termination of military ties with
China in 1960 led the Chinese leadership to vigilance about dependence on foreign
sources, in particular, a single source, for supplies of military equipment and
Nineties: Crisis Management and Beyond (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1991), p.164.
46 Ibid., pp.16 1-182. Also see Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security
Policymaking, p.7
For the Chinese emphasis on the notion of 'great nation', see Steven I. Levine, 'Perception and
Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy', in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), Chinese
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.43-44.
The author's interviews with Shi Ze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies, the
Chinese Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1998, Beijing. Also see Shi Ze, 'Chinese and Russian Partnership
Growing', Beijing Review, 29 April - 5 May 1996, p 12.
Fan Juwei and Liu Cheng, 'Liu Huaqing Stresses Need to Further Raise Overall Level of Science,
Technology, and Industry for National Defense at National Conference of Directors of Offices of
Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense', Jiefang/un Bao (Beijing), 23 December 1995,
p.1, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (hereafter called as FBES-CHI),
FBIS-CHI-96-008, 11 January 1996, p 36.
50 Kim, The Dynamics of Sino-Russian Military Relations, p.35; Sergounin and Subbotin, 'Sino-
Russian Military Technical Cooperation', p.216; Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to
China, pp.27-28; Blank, Challenging the New World Order, pp.252-253; Blank, Why Russian Policy Is
Failing in Asia, pp.22-23.
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technology. 5 ' On 6 August 1993, General Liu Huaqing, then CMC Vice Chairman
and member of the CCP Politburo, outlined the basic principle of national defence
modernisation as the need to integrate self-reliance with the import of advanced
technology from abroad. He pointed out:
To modernize weapons and equipment, our foothold must be on our own
strength. A big developing socialist country like ours cannot buy
modernization of the whole Army, whereas other countries will not sell us
the most advanced things and, even if we can buy those things, we will still
be under the control of others... One of the basic principles of
modernization of weapons and equipment in our Army is to mainly rely on
our own strength for regeneration, while selectively importing advanced
technology from abroad, centering on some areas.52
Since the Tiananmen events of 1989, China has been placed under a Western
arms embargo, and has faced very limited alternative sources for modern military
equipment and technology. (see 5.A) Military cooperation with Russia has been seen
as an important means to achieve Chinese strategic goals. Accordingly, if Russia was
reluctant to release advanced weapons and technology to China, Chinese desires to
pursue arms trade and military-technical cooperation with Russia would be affected.
In such a situation, China might pursue defence modernisation through other channels,
including alternative sources, illicit routes, and indigenous research and development
(R&D). This thesis will elucidate these potential uncertainties in the Sino-Russian
military relationship.
In Russia, the policy-making process has been characterised by the influence of
public opinion and especially of various political and economic groups. 51
 In the
Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, SIPRI Research Report no. I I
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.34.
52 Liu Huaqing, 'Unswervingly Advance along the Road of Building a Modern Army with Chinese
Characteristics', Jiefangjun Bao (Beijing), 6 August 1993, pp.1-2, in FBIS-Cl-1I-93-158, 18 August
1993, p.19.
" For further discussion, see Malcolm, Pravda, Allison, and Light (eds), Internal Factors in Russian
Foreign Policy.
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formal structure of the decision-making process, the President plays a decisive role in
terms of the country's foreign and security policy decision-making. In accordance
with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the President has the right to 'define
the basic domestic and foreign policy guidelines of the state'. 54
 However, given the
weakness of central authority and the general political instability, Russian foreign
policy matters have been influenced by different internal factors such as political
elites, the military, economic groups, and public opinion.55
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia lost its role as the principal military and
political centre of power opposing the USA, and its economy has stood on the verge
of breakdown. 56
 Initially, the Yeltsin leadership adopted a pro-Western diplomatic
line. In late 1992, a change of mood occurred in Russia and she started to seek
enhanced relations with China so as to balance its exclusive pro-Western line. 57 Most
political groups in Russia recognised the need for a stable relationship with China.58
However, unlike bilateral cooperation in other fields, military cooperation with China
has been a concern in Russia. The view that China is a security threat to Russia can
be found uniting representatives of different political groups who have different
positions on other political and diplomatic issues.59
The defence industries and local governments in regions where defence
The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Chapter 4: Article 80, Website http://www.bucknell.edu
departments/russian/const.ch4.htm
Malcolm, Pravda, Allison, and Light (eds), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy. Those
'political elites' who may influence Russian foreign policy-making include parliamentarians, academic
specialists, journalists, and diplomats. See Margot Light, 'Foreign Policy Thinking', in Malcolm, Alex
Pravda, Allison, and Light (eds), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p.41.
56 Natalia Narochnitskaya, 'Russia's National Interest', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 4 5 (1992),
p.105.
" For further discussion, see 3.A.
Bazhanov, 'Russian Policy toward China', p.166; 'Yeltsin Says Russia United on Need for
Cooperation with China', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 18 December 1992, in SWB, FE 1569, 21 December
1992, p.Al17.
Alexander Lukin, 'Russia's Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations, East Asia, vol. 17, no. I
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industries are concentrated have been interested in increasing arms exports to China.60
On the other hand, many Russian political elites have called upon the Russian
government to take account of the fact that China could become a potential enemy
while developing military cooperation with China. 6 ' Vassily Likhachev, Vice-
Chairman of the Federation Council of Russia, warned in 1997 that China was the
only country among Russian neighbours to possess the military capability to commit
an act of aggression against Russia. 62
 Among the internal actors influencing Russian
policy-making, the military have been particularly concerned about a security threat
from China. Even though these two states announced a 'strategic partnership' in April
1996, in December 1996 the then Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov still
included China on the list of countries which were of potential threat to Russia. 63
 In
the military's view, due to geopolitical and demographic factors, China could pose a
(Spring 1999), pp.5-39.
60 For further discussion, see 5.B.
61 See, for example, Sergei Rogov, 'Military Interests and the Interests of the Military', in Stephen
Sestanonvich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interests (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1994), p.73; Alexei G. Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests', in Blackwill and
Karaganov (eds), Damage Limitation or Crisis?, p.72; Sergei Repko, 'To the People's Republic of
China, Russia Is an "Unquestionable Enemy" or "Belligerent Force", Nezavisimoye voyennoe
obozreniye (Moscow), 25 July, pp.1 -2, in The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press (hereafter called
as CDPSP), vol. 48, no. 30 (21 August 1996), p.22; Victor Larin, 'Russia and China on the Threshold
of the Third Millennium: So Who Is Going to Defend Our National Interests?', Far Eastern Affairs
(Moscow), no. 1 (1997), p.24; Iurii Fedorov, 'Interest Group and Russia's Foreign Policy',
International Affairs (Moscow),vol. 44, no. 6(1998), p.178.
62 Vassily Likhachev, 'Russia-China Strategic Partnership', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 2 (1997),
p.39.
63 In order to maintain a stable relationship with China, Russian foreign policy institutions have never
publicly questioned the needs for cooperation with China. To avoid offending China, Russian
Presidential Press Secretary Sergei Yaszhembsky and the Foreign Ministry ascribed Rodionov's
statement as only his personal reflections on 'hypothetical threats to Russia's security'. Under pressure
from the government, Rodionov later recanted this view. See Igor Korotchenko, 'Igor Rodionov
Advocates Creation of Defense Alliance of CIS Countries', Nezaviszmaya gazeta (Moscow), 26
December 1996, p.1, in CDPSP, vol. 48, no. 52 (22 January 1997), p.16; 'Igor Rodionov Wasn't
Reporting on Military Doctrine But Expressing His Personal Opinion', Segodnya (Moscow), 28
December 1996, p.1, in CDPSP, vol. 48, no. 52 (22 January 1997), p.17; Yury Savenkov, 'China
Decides Not to Take Offense at Rodionov', !zvestzya (Moscow), 28 December 1996, p.3, in CDPSP,
vol. 48, no. 52 (22 January 1997), p.18.
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threat to Russian security. TM
 This was reflected in the military's concerns about arms
reduction along the common border with China. 65
 More fervent opposition to close
cooperation with China has been expressed by local authorities of Primorskiy and
Khabarovsk Krays. They have repeatedly warned of Chinese ambitions over the
Russian territories and Chinese ethnic 'expansion' in the Russian Far East.66
These domestic views have led the Russian leadership to take a cautious attitude
towards military cooperation with China. The basic principle guiding Russian
military cooperation with China has been to ensure that Russian security interests are
not undermined. 67 During his first visit to China in December 1992, Yeltsin himself
articulated Russian policy on military cooperation with China: 'We based it on
principles of not harming our own security'. 68 In contrast to Blank's argument that the
Russian government has lost its control over its arms exports, this thesis will show
that, while pursuing military cooperation with China, Russia has tried to safeguard its
security interests.69
This thesis will posit that while China and Russia have attempted to pursue
64 See, for example, General Mahmut Gareyev, 'Russia's Priority Interests', International Affairs
(Moscow), no. 6 (1993), p.8; Cot. Gen. V. M. Baryenkin, 'Military Threats Facing Russia and
Problems of Advancement of Its Armed Forces', Military Thought (Moscow), vol. 8, no. 1 (1999), p.3.
65 Colonel N. M. Maslyayev, 'On the Question of Russia's Military Security in the Asian Pacific
Region', Military Thought (Moscow), no. 7 (July August 1994), pp.3-4; 'Defence Ministers Discuss
Border Issues', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 16 May 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-094, 16 May 1995, pp.9-10.
Alexander Lukin, 'The Image of China in Russian Border Regions', Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 9
(September 1998), pp.824-828; Vladimir V. Portyakov, 'Are the Chinese Coming? Migration
Processes in Russia's Far East', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 1 (January February 1996),
p.136. This issue is discussed in detail in 4.D.
67 Vladimir Rakhmanin, Deputy Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign
Ministry, 'Russia and China: Strategic Cooperation', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 1(1997), p.14.
'Yeltsin Says Russia United on Need for Cooperation with China', p.A1/7. For the principles of
selling arms to China, also see 'Shokhin: Military Cooperation with PRC Purely "Defensive", ITAR-
TASS (Moscow), 18 December 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-244, 18 December 1992, p.9; Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin, 'Long-Term Strategy for Russian-Chinese Partnership', Far Eastern
Affairs (Moscow), no. 2 (1997), pp.32-33.
Blank, 'Challenging the New World Order', pp.253-254; Blank, Why Russian Policy Is Failing in
Asia, pp.6-7; Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China, pp.5-9; Blank, 'Russia-Chinese
Military Relations and Asian Security', p.60.
32
military cooperation, many problems and limits have arisen. After the Cold War,
these two states have sought to have a more stable relationship. This has led to the
possibility of bilateral military cooperation, including CBMs, arms transfers, and
military-technical cooperation. Although progress has been made in lessening
military tensions in the border areas, the level of mutual trust has not become solid.
Lingering mutual distrust and conflicts of interest have limited the furthering of their
military cooperation. The nature of Sino-Russian military cooperation has remained
fragile.
D) Study Propositions and Study Organisation
This study has followed three propositions. These represent a logical set of
statements to specify the research direction of the thesis and identify relevant
information and data on key issues. The first proposition is that the historical
experience of Sino-Soviet relations may offer useful reference for the observation of
present and future military cooperation. Second, this thesis posits that a stable
political foundation would be important if these two previously hostile neighbours
were to attempt to develop close military cooperation. The third proposition is that
the sense of distrust and the presence of conflicts of interest have obstructed the
development of military cooperation between China and Russia.
Guided by these three propositions, this thesis is organised into three main
sections. First, it focuses on the study of the historical legacies of Sino-Soviet
military relations. Second, it explores the political foundations of Sino-Russian
military cooperation after the end of the Cold War. Third, it examines the limitations
on areas of Sino-Russian military cooperation, including CBMs, arms transfers, and
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military-technical cooperation.
Section 1 provides a review of Sino-Soviet military relations during the Cold
War period. This historical review can help to understand major changes in these two
countries' military relationship since the Cold War and to comprehend potential
conflicts in this relationship. Chapter 2 elucidates the historical legacies in the two
parties' military and security relationship. Throughout the Cold War period, Sino-
Russian military relations were unstable. Four different periods in their military
relations are identified in this chapter. These are: (1) fraternal ties in the 1950s; (2)
the breakdown of the bilateral relationship after 1956; (3) the military confrontation
in the late 1 960s; and (4) détente in the 1 980s. This chapter argues that historical
legacies, such as territorial disputes and mutual threats against each other's territories,
have been important problems in their military-security relationship. In addition, the
Chinese and Soviet military relationship was uneasy and was repeatedly transformed
by their political relations.
Section 2 examines the political foundations of Sino-Russian military
cooperation after the end of the Cold War. Historically, these two states' military
relations have reflected changes in their political relations and the wider political
environment. To detennine whether there exists a solid political foundation for
military cooperation, Chapter 3 explores the development of Sino-Russian
'partnership' by examining shared interests, the nature of their bilateral cooperation,
and the limits of this cooperation in the realm of international diplomacy, regional
security, and economic issues. It argues that limited cooperation in various fields has
highlighted divergent geopolitical and economic interests between China and Russia.
The future of their 'partnership' remains uncertain. This has resulted in unstable
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political foundations for close military cooperation.
Section 3 is divided into three chapters. Chapter 4 investigates the CBMs
developed by China and Russia during the post-Cold War period. This chapter starts
by reviewing the evolution and major types of CBMs developed in Europe. Also, it
explores the dynamics of Sino-Russian CBMs. It then analyses the key provisions of
Sino-Russian CBMs from a comparative perspective in an attempt to reveal
similarities and differences between European and Sino-Russian CBMs. Finally, this
chapter explores Chinese and Russian cooperation in resolving disputes concerning
territorial security issues. It concludes that although Chinese and Russian
cooperation on CBMs has contributed to the normalisation of bilateral relations, the
level of trust between them has not become solid.
Chapter 5 focuses on the evaluation of Russian arms transfers to China. It opens
with the rationale behind these transfers through examining demand-side factors
which concerned China and led to the possibility of the sales of Russian arms to
China. Also, it explores supply-side factors which encouraged Russia to supply arms
to China. It then argues that the Russian policy on arms transfers to China has been
based on the principle of not harming Russian security. This chapter goes on to
investigate the existing problems in the Russian-Chinese arms transfer relationship.
Following this, it explores the potentiai uncertainties for this relationship. In
conclusion, this chapter argues that the nature of the Russian-Chinese arms transfer
relationship has remained fragile and that it has failed to fully meet their objectives.
Chapter 6 investigates Chinas military-technical acquisitions from Russia. This
examination focuses on Chinese efforts to upgrade its technological capabilities to
develop and design new weapons through Russian expertise. It starts by exploring
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the priorities of China's defence technology modernisation, and the rationale behind
Sino-Russian military-technical ties. It proceeds to examine three major routes by
which China has obtained modem military technology from Russia. In studying
legitimate routes, this chapter investigates the case of Russian technical assistance for
Chinese warplanes R&D projects, and the case of the sale of the Su-27 production
licence. In exploring China's acquisition of 'dual-use' technologies from Russia, it
examines bilateral cooperation on nuclear power engineering and space science.
Following this, it addresses Chinese illicit acquisition of Russian defence
technologies. Finally, this chapter analyses the effectiveness of the three routes, and
concludes that there has remained mutual distrust while these two parties have still
pursued military-technical cooperation.
E) Research Methods and Sources
A major limitation on this study of Sino-Russian military cooperation is that the
details of policy-making procedures and cooperation projects have been inaccessible.
Despite the post-Cold War increase in information about military affairs in China and
Russia, bilateral agreements on military cooperation are not to be wholly reported in
the open literature. In order to collect evidence relevant to Sino-Russian military
cooperation, two major research methods have been used for this study: (1)
documentary research and (2) interviewing. These have provided the necessary
empirical materials required for this study.
(1) Documentary Research
This thesis has extensively examined important Chinese and Russian documents
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relevant to this research topic. These materials have offered sufficient information
and data on issues of concern. The categories of documents are identified in the
following paragraphs.
Primary sources used in the study include: first, official documents, laws,
treaties and communiqués; second, public speeches, statements and comments made
by leaders and high-level ranking diplomats and military officers; and third, articles
published by high-level diplomats and military officers. (see Bibliography: Part I)
These official documents, speeches, and comments have illustrated Chinese and
Russian official stances on issues relevant to the concerns of this study. Also, these
materials have been a significant means of corroborating other sources of evidence.
For instance, this thesis has used the information from documents such as the Joint
Communiqués concluded by China and Russia to corroborate information from other
sources. In the case that information from Chinese and Russian Joint Communiqués
has contradicted other sources of evidence, this study has inquired further into the
topic and sought more evidence to explain the issue in question. In this way, this
study has checked the case for the existence of Chinese and Russian cooperation in
the realms of international diplomacy, regional security and economic affairs.
Some secondary sources, such as the analyses of Chinese and Russian specialists,
have also been used in this study. The Chinese literature published by Chinese
military experts has been cited for this study. (see Bibliography: Part II, 1) In
addition, this study contains information from Chinese academic periodicals such as:
Guoji wenti luntan [International Review], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies],
Dongou zhongya yanjiu [East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies], and
Heping yu fazhan [Peace and Development]. (see Bibliography: Part II, 2) These
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Chinese materials were collected in China and translated by the author. 7° As a result,
Chinese academic and military opinions - which are difficult to obtain in English -
will be presented in this study. These opinions have included the priorities of
Chinese defence modernisation, Chinese concerns about U.S.-Japanese security
alliance, Chinese fears of a potential security threat from Japan, and Chinese
disagreement with U.S. hegemony.
On the Russian side, Far Eastern Affairs, International Affairs (Moscow),
Military Thought, and Military News Bulletin have been significant sources used to
understand Russian civilian and military opinions on military and security affairs.
Moreover, during his visit to Russia, the author collected important papers presented
by Russian analysts at seminars, and unpublished works from the Carnegie Moscow
Center. (see Bibliography: Part II, 2) These secondary sources have provided useful
information and comments on such issues as Russian worries about NATO
enlargement, the military's concerns about a potential security threat from China, and
the evolution of Chinese and Russian partnership and military cooperation.
Further secondary sources in this study include information and data on arms
transfers and military-technical cooperation issued by Western research institutes.
Although the United Nations (UN) Register of Conventional Arms was created in
1992, the information provided is far too limited for the purposes of this study. For
example, the number of weapons is given by the states, but details of their type and
characteristics are only provided voluntarily. Meanwhile, there are vast discrepancies
in how states have reported their arms imports and exports. 7 ' Thus, further data on
' The Pinyin system of transliteration has been used for Chinese names and places, except where
familiar names might be confused if changed.
Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, Taking Stock: The UN Register after Two Years, Bradford
Arms Register Studies no. 5 (West Yorkshire: Department of Peace Studies at University of Bradford,
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arms transfers assessed by some Western institutions has been an important source in
the study of arms transfers. These sources, which are seen to be reliable, include the
SIPRI Yearbooks, The Military Balance, and data issued by the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. 72
 In addition, data on arms transfers and military-
technical cooperation provided by professional journals and newspapers are also used
in this thesis. (see Bibliography: Part II, 3) These secondary sources have been used
in this thesis to show the evolution of Chinese and Russian talks on arms deals, both
disputes over payment issues and weaponry pricing, the development of their
technology cooperation projects, and China's acquisitions of Russian defence
technology through illicit routes.
(2) Interviewing
Another originality in the research method of this thesis is that extensive interviews
have been conducted by the author in both China and Russia. To collect more
information and gain insights into this research topic, the author selected groups of
Chinese and Russian experts for interviewing. Most of these had official connections.
(see Appendix) They have provided important data requisite for this study.
Three forms of interview were applied in this study: (a) 'the open-ended
interview', (b) 'the focused interview', and (c) 'the group discussion'. 71
 In conducting
'open-ended interviews', the author asked respondents for information about specific
1995), Chapter 4, pp.57-75.
72 Andrew J. Pierre, 'Toward An International Regime for Conventional Arms Sales', in Andrew J.
Pierre (ed.), Cascade of Arms: Managing Conventional Weapons Prolferatzon (Washington, D.C.:
Brooking Institution Press, 1997), pp.383-388.
Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1994),
pp.8'I-85; Peter H. Mann, Methods of Social Investigation (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1985), pp.96-
118; Tim May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process (Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open
University Press, 1997), pp.1 09-131.
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areas as well as for their comments on events. In some cases, respondents played the
role of an 'informant' and proposed insights into certain occurrences. Some first-hand
information that has never been revealed from written sources has been acquired
through this technique of collecting data. This has included information on Chinese
deployments of jet fighters which it has bought from Russia, Chinese complaints
about Russian refusals to supply the latest weapons to China, Russian intentions to
channel China's expansion towards Taiwan and the South China Sea, and Russian
delays in the installation of the Su-27 production line in China.
The second form was the focused interview. In some cases, the author
conducted focused interviews with interviewees, particularly, those who have official
connections, for corroboratory purposes. The author applied this technique of
interviewing to gain answers to questions about Chinese and Russian objectives in
setting up their 'partnership', Chinese security concerns after the Cold War, the
rationales for Sino-Russian CBMs, and the dynamics behind arms transfers and
military-technical cooperation.
The third form of interview consisted of group discussion. In a group discussion
in January 1998, the author discussed issues relevant to this research topic with four
research fellows of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies in China. 74 This
helped the author to acquire additional information as the participants reacted to
views with which they disagreed. For instance, the definition of'strategic partnership'
- viewed from the Chinese standpoint - was clarified in these discussions.
Given the secrecy of military affairs, some problems in relations to data
14 For the participants of the group discussion in Shanghai, see Appendix: (10) - (13).
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collection remain unresolved. 75
 Even so, documents and interviews have provided
the author with enough evidence to answer the central questions of this study. The
analysis and presentation of data and information collected from written documents
and interviews have been undertaken through qualitative content analysis. 76
 In this
study, the analysis of evidence has been conducted at two levels. First, it has been
used in describing variables affecting the parties' choice and those actions employed
to achieve objectives. However, due to the fact that the analyst is unlikely to gain
access to all the details of military policy-making procedures, the second level of
analysis is needed. The second level of analysis focuses on the process of interaction
between China and Russia in pursuing military cooperation, including patterns of
actions taken by one and reactions or responses by the other, in an attempt to show
these two parties' concerns and the problems of this relationship. Through these two
levels of analysis, the patterns of behaviours in Sino-Russian military cooperation can
be revealed, and the nature of this relationship can be discerned.
F) Conclusions
This thesis is original in substance. Unlike the literature that addresses the reasons
for and implications of Sino-Russian military cooperation, this thesis focuses on the
problems and limits of this relationship. In order to understand the limits of Sino-
Russian military cooperation, this study reviews these two countries' military
For example, information and data on the impact of Russian dual-use technology on Chinese defence
modernisation, and the real picture of Chinese recruitment of Russian technicians, have been
inaccessible. Also, although the key provisions of the Chinese and Russian agreements on CBMs have
been collected, little information is available on the negotiating history and the implementation of
Sino-Russian CBMs.
76 The qualitative content analysis seeks to apply data for describing and explaining relationships,
tendencies, sequences, and patterns of behaviours. See Martyn Denscombe, The Good Research Guide
(Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1998), p.111.
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relationship from the point of view of history, and explores the political foundations
of their military cooperation in the new era. It also thoroughly examines the main
components of Sino-Russian military cooperation so as to reveal the nature of the
relationship.
Also, this study gains some originality from its research methods. This thesis
has extensively examined important primary and secondary sources relevant to this
research topic and the author has collected unique insights into this area by
conducting extensive interviews with Chinese and Russian officials and strategists.
This thesis brings forth new interpretation and evidence on the limits of Sino-Russian
military cooperation. It will compensate for gaps in the existing state of knowledge
on military cooperation between China and Russia after the end of the Cold War.
The thesis now turns to the first proposition underlying this study; that the
historical experience of Sino-Soviet military relations may offer useful reference for
understanding the contemporary and future Sino-Russian military cooperation.
Section 1 investigates the validity of this through an examination of these two states'
military relations during the Cold War.
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SECTION 1 HISTORICAL LEGACIES:
Chapter 2
Sino-Soviet Military Relations during the Cold War
This chapter reviews Sino-Soviet military relations during the Cold War in an attempt
to understand the long-term patterns of military interaction between these two states.
Throughout the Cold War period, Sino-Soviet military relations were unstable,
swinging from military alliance, armed clashes, confrontation, military containment,
to détente. Between 1949 and 1991, four different periods in Sino-Soviet military
relations are identified in this study.
The first period, between 1949 and 1956, was a period of 'honeymoon' in the
relationship. Guided by the 'Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance' of
1950, the two states developed cooperation in the areas of economics, military, and
science.' The second period started in 1956 when the Soviet General Secretary,
Nikita S. Khrushchev (1953-1964), pursued reforms in the Soviet political system.
Following this, the Chinese and Soviet political relationship became tense, bilateral
cooperation in various fields was terminated, and relations were exacerbated by
territorial disputes. After armed clashes in the border areas in 1969, the Sino-Soviet
relationship entered into the third period characterised by an overall military build-up
in the border areas, and Soviet military containment against China. The fourth period,
in which both sides sought a limited détente, started in 1982 when the first Reagan
Administration (1981-1985) strengthened U.S. ties with Taiwan and China started to
'Document: Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of
China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Feb. 14, 1950', in Sergei N. Goncharov, John W.
Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993), p.260.
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reassess its relationship with the U.S.. By the mid-1980s, attempts to achieve
domestic economic reform further pushed Beijing and Moscow to normalise relations,
including the resumption of military cooperation.
Although the dividing lines between these four periods are not absolutely precise,
this delimitation highlights the unstable nature of Sino-Soviet military relations.
History can influence a state's behaviour in at least two ways: as process and as
memory.2
 As process, history may create physical and social realities for a state. As
memory, history may influence public perceptions in a state and society. 3
 Historical
legacies, such as territorial disputes and the sense of mutual threat, have presented
crucial problems in these two countries' military-security relations. This will offer
useful background for the study of Sino-Russian military cooperation after the end of
the Cold War.
A) Alliance Ties (1949 - 1956)
In February 1950, China and the USSR announced an alliance relationship. In this
period, two phases can be identified: first, the limited alliance relationship before
Stalin's death in 1953; and second, close cooperation in various fields after Stalin's
death. During the Cold War, this period accounted for the closest military ties
between the two parties. This section addresses the development of this relationship
so as to reveal the features of military cooperation between them.
The Limited Alliance Relationship
2 Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), p.23.
Ibid.
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Since the period of the CCP's revolution, Mao Zedong and the Soviet leader I. V.
Stalin had been often suspicious of each other. 4 During China's war against Japan
from 1937 to 1945, Mao and Stalin frequently disagreed over how the CCP should
carry out the policy of a united front. 5
 When the CCP was struggling with the
Kuomintang, Moscow still kept good relations with the latter. Stalin's attempt to
maintain friendly relations with the United States and repeated requests to the CCP to
compromise with the Kuomintang irritated Mao. 6 Given the increasing intensification
of the civil war with the Kuomintang, Mao sought to coordinate with Stalin in order
to win the struggle against 'Mei-Chiang' (the United States and Chiang Kai-shek).7
On 1 October 1949, the PRC was established. In addressing the issue of the new
Communist China's diplomatic direction, Mao stressed that China had to pursue a
policy of 'leaning to one side', that is, building close cooperation with the Soviet
Union. 8 Mao maintained that close unity with the USSR could prevent the
international isolation of the PRC. 9 Also, he argued that the experience of Soviet
' Since the period of the CCP's revolution, Mao had sought an autonomous Chinese Communist role.
In the late 1920s, Mao developed his own revolutionary movement, emphasising the importance of
peasants, workers and lower middle classes in this country. This developing approach differed from
that of the Soviet Union, and led to Moscow's dissatisfaction. See Roy Medvedev, China and the
Superpowers, Translated by Harold Shukman (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1986), pp.9- 1 1.
Niu Jun, 'The Origin of the Sino-Soviet Alliance', in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms. The
Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1 945-1963 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1998), pp.48-52.
6 For Mao's criticism over Stalin's policy towards China's revolution, see 'Archives: Transcript of the
Conversation with Comrade Mao Zedong, March 31, 1956', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 4 5
(1994), pp.134-144.
For a detailed study on coordination between Mao and Stalin during the period of the CCP's
revolution, see Michael M. Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997).
'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship. In Commemoration of the Twenty-eighth Anniversary of
the Communist Party of China, June 30 1949', in Selected Workr of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 4 (Peking:
Foreign Language Press, 1975), p.415.
Mao Zedong, 'Opening Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CPPCC (21 September 1949)', in
Michael Y. M. Kau (ed), The Writings of Mao Zedong 1946-1976, vol. 1 (New York: ME. Shame,
Inc., 1986), pp.3-7.
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economic development could offer China a good model for its modernisation.'°
In December 1949, Mao visited Moscow, where he spent two months
negotiating Soviet assistance to China. According to Mao, Stalin characterised
Chinese communism as nationalistic and predicted that Chinese nationalism would
lead to a 'dangerous result'. 11
 This was reflected in the facts that during Mao's two-
month stay in Moscow both leaders bargained hard, and Stalin's haughtiness caused
Mao to be embarrassed by being made to assume a humiliating role as petitioner.'2
Partly in order to prevent Mao from adopting a pro-Western line, Stalin
eventually agreed to sign the 'Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance
between the PRC and the USSR' with Mao on 14 February 195O.' This agreement
declared their intention to develop good neighbourly relations and to jointly prevent
the resurgence of Japanese imperialism and renewed aggression by Japan or any other
states that would align with Japan. This showed these two communist countries'
common concern about a threat from Japan and probable military cooperation
'° At the first session of the first National People's Congress, Mao stated his admiration for the
successful Soviet model of national development. He argued that the Chinese people should
energetically learn from the experiences of the Soviet Union to become a great state that was
industrialised and that had a high standard of modem culture. See Mao Zedong, 'Opening Speech at
the First Session of the First NPC (15 September 1954)', in Kau (ed.), The Writings of Mao Zedong
1946-1976, p.475.
' C. B. Borisov, Iz lstorii Sovetsko-Kitaiskikb Otnoshenii v 5Okh Godakb CK Diskussii v KNR o Mao
Tsedone [From the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations in the l950s toward the Discussion in the PRC
about Mao Zedong] (Moscow: , 1981), pp.55-56, cited in Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain
Partners, p.105.
12 Li Dan-hui, 'Mao Zedong duisu renrhi yu zhongsu guanxi di yanbian 1945-196U [Mao Zedong's
Perception towards the Soviet Union and the Development of Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1960], in
Chinese Council of Sino-Russian Relationship Studies (ed.), Zhanhou zhongsu guanxi zouxiang 1945-
1960 [The Development of Sino-Soviet Relations after the War, 1945-1960] (Beijing: The Social
Science Document Publishing House, 1997), p.65. (author's translation)
During his stay in Moscow, Mao stressed that China might adopt a pro-Western diplomatic line. On
6 January 1950, China set up diplomatic relations with the U.K.. On 7 January 1950, Mao cabled the
CCP Central Committee from Moscow, arguing that China should assess the possibility of developing
trade relations with Western states. See Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p.94;
'Document: Mao Cable from Moscow re. Export-Import Trade, Jan. 7, 1950', in Goncharov, Lewis,
and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p.245.
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between Japan and the USA.'4
Nevertheless, different assessments of Chinese and Soviet state interests were
vividly illustrated in the Korean War, which erupted on 25 June 1950. Mao
perceived American actions to intervene in Korea as a serious security threat to
Communist China and decided to dispatch Chinese troops to Korea.' 5 After U.S.
troops landed at Inchon on 15 September 1950, Stalin's primary concern was to avoid
a direct military confrontation with the United States.' 6 Therefore, although it
provided China with large amounts of ammunition and military equipment during the
war years, the Soviet Union rejected to provide air cover for the Chinese land troop
operating in Korea. This angered Mao and his comrades.' 7 More importantly, Stalin
requested that China pay for all the military support Beijing had received during the
war. This demand could increase China's long-term financial burden. As Chen Jian
and Yang Kuisong stated: 'To the Chinese, Stalin's stinginess made the Soviets seem
more like arms merchants than genuine Communist internationalists'.'8
Due to Stalin's mistrust, the 'Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
Assistance between the PRC and the USSR' did not lead to a deepening of military
cooperation. The USSR did start to supply China with armaments, such as MiG-1 5
jet fighters and Tu-2 bombers, in the early 1950s. However, while helping China to
build its defence capability, Stalin sought to keep China dependent on the Soviet
Union.' 9
 From 1949 to 1953, by supplying China with weapons, the USSR prevented
Document: Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance', p.260
" Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of Sino-American Confrontation (New
York Columbia University Press, 1994), pp 126-157.
16 Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong, 'Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance', in
Westad (ed ), Brothers in Arms, p 252
Chen, China's Road to the Korean War, pp.190-209.
Chen and Yang, 'Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance', p 257.
19 Raymond L. Garthoff, 'Sino-Soviet Military Relations, 1945-66', in Raymond L. Garthoff (ed.),
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the Chinese from building an independent military establishment, and did not assist
China in its arms production. 2° (see Table 1)
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Sino-Soviet Military Relations (New York: Fredrick, A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), p.86.
20Ibid
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For China, the Soviet military aid programme was essential, but expensive.
China was compelled to purchase all the materiel, and incurred heavy debts in the
process. 2 ' According to Ivan Arkhipov, who was sent by Moscow to China to work
as Chief Economic Advisor to the State Council during 1950-5 1 and 1953-58, the
total amount of Soviet credit granted in the 1950s was about U.S.$ 2 billion, of which
half was covered by Soviet credit for the delivery of military equipment. 22
 In sum, in
this phase, Stalin's personal perceptions created limitations on the development of the
Sino-Soviet alliance relationship, including military cooperation. This was not
improved until after Stalin's death in March 1953.
The Warming up of the Sino-Soviet Alliance Relationship
After Stalin's death in March 1953, the USSR entered into a period of so-called
'collective leadership': G. M. Malenkov assumed the Chainnanship of the Council of
Ministers; Khrushchev, the most junior of the leading politicians, was the First
Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU); and Lavrenti Beria was
head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. While concerned with leadership transition,
the new Soviet leadership expressed a willingness to strengthen Soviet relations with
China. In addition, the new Soviet leadership wanted to use Mao to strengthen its
authority in the post-Stalin communist world. 23
 In March 1954, Khrushchev claimed




'Interview with Ivan Arkhipov', in Galina Yezhova, Viacheslav Lyubov and Yuri Filatov (eds),
USSR-China: in the Changing World (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1989),
pp.42-43. Also see Garthoff, 'Sino-Soviet Military Relations, 1945-66', p.85.
23 Sergei Goncharenko, 'Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation', in Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms, p.146.
24 John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent
In October 1954, Khrushchev headed a delegation visiting Beijing in an attempt
to boost cooperation. As the new Soviet leadership increased assistance to China in
various fields, the Soviet-Chinese alliance relationship reached a peak. During the
first Chinese five-year plan, from 1953 to 1957, considerable economic assistance
was delivered from the USSR. Both sides signed a series of bilateral agreements and
treaties, which provided Soviet assistance for nearly 300 Chinese industrial
enterprises and other facilities. By the end of 1953, China accounted for 20 per cent
of the USSR's total external trade, while the USSR accounted for 55.6 per cent of the
total volume of Chinese exports.25
In this accommodating political climate, military cooperation was strengthened
as well. In early 1955, Beijing officially requested that the Soviet Union increase and
accelerate aid to China in a number of industrial and defence construction projects.26
The new Soviet leadership supplied China with better weapons and technological
know-how. China was authorised licences, blueprints, and prototypes to produce
Soviet weapon systems, such as jet fighters, bombers, surface-to-air missiles, tanks,
frigates, and diesel submarines. (see Table 1) According to official Russian data,
released in 1993, during the alliance period of the 1 950s Moscow assisted Beijing in
building 256 armaments plants in China. 27
 With Soviet technical assistance for
assembly, spare-parts production, and co-production under licences, China started to
develop a military-industrial complex that produced arms in almost all categories?8
During the 1950s, China sent a great number of technicians on personnel
Polemics 1963-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.57.
25 Medvedev, China and the Superpowers, p.25.
26 Goncharenko, 'Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation', pp.152-159.
27 
'Says Russia Seeks "Close Ties", Agence France Presse (AFP) (Hong Kong), 11 November 1993, in
FBIS-CHI-93-217, 12 November 1993, p.2.
28 John F. Copper, 'China's Military Assistance', in John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp (eds),
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exchanges for training in the USSR. More than 8,000 Chinese specialists and 11,000
Chinese students were trained at Soviet research units and training institutions.
Around 900 specialists from various institutes of China's Academy of Sciences
studied at the institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences. 29
 In addition, over 10,000
highly skilled Soviet specialists in many fields were sent to China to help this new
socialist country to develop its economic and military infrastructure.30
Soviet military-technical assistance to China also covered research into nuclear
physics. To counter U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower's (1953-1961) 'Atoms for
Peace' proposal, in January 1955 Khrushchev launched a scientific and technical
assistance programme for communist-bloc countries, including China, to develop
'atomic energy for peaceful purposes'. 3 ' On 15 October 1957, in order to ensure
undisputed recognition of Soviet leadership of the world communist camp, Moscow
signed an agreement with Beijing on new technology for national defence. Guided
by this agreement, Moscow agreed to help Beijing to develop its weapons and missile
systems, and promised to continue the initial nuclear aid programmes of 1955. In
1957, an experimental reactor, a cyclotron, and modem radiophysical, chemical and
other laboratories were commissioned at a research centre built in China.32
B) The Chinese-Soviet Rift (1956 - 1969)
From February 1956 onwards, tensions developed between the PRC and the USSR.
In a tense political atmosphere, such historical problems as territorial disputes and the
Communist Nations' Military Assistance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p.! 02.
29 
'Interview with Ivan Arkhipov', p.44.
30Ibid.
31 Walter C. Clemens, Jr., The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations (Stanford, California: The Hoover
Institution Publications, 1968), p.1 5.
32 Interview with Ivan Arkhipov', p.44.
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sense of mutual threat started to become serious issues in Chinese and Soviet
military-security relations. This discussion examines the development of the rift from
1956 to 1969. It starts by exploring the breakdown of the Chinese and Soviet
political relationship. It proceeds to discuss the termination of Chinese and Soviet
military cooperation. Finally, it examines the resulting territorial disputes and armed
clashes along the border areas.
The Breakdown of the Political Relationship
After gaining supremacy over his political rivals in the mid-1950s, Khrushchev
started to reform Soviet domestic and foreign policy. 33
 At the 20th Congress of the
CPSU in February 1956, Khrushchev redefined the developmental approach of the
Party by debunking the cult of Stalin and arguing for the end of the class struggle.34
Following this, Beijing criticised Khrushchev's new approach for betraying orthodox
communism. Beijing argued that all states were class states until the final
establishment of communism, and labelled Khrushchev's assertions at the 20th
Congress of the CPSU as 'revisionism'. At the Eighth National Congress in
September 1956, the CCP emphasised that it would develop China through Mao's
theories and combine Marxism-Leninism with the experience of the Chinese
revolution.35
The 20th Congress of the CPSU was indeed the turning point in the Sino-Soviet
" After Stalin's death, the new Soviet leadership entered into a succession struggle. In July 1953,
Beria, then Minister of Internal Affairs, was removed by Khrushchev. In February 1955, Khrushchev
appointed his ally Nikolai Bulganin to replace Malenkov as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
For further details on the political struggle, see Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev (London: Collins
Clear-Type Press, 1966), pp 175-201.
'Document: Secret Speech on the Stalin Cult', in Thomas P. Whitney (ed.), Khrushchev Speaks:
Selected Speeches, Articles, and Press Conferences, 1949-1961 (Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press, 1963), pp.204-265.
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relationship. In Beijing's view, 'the 20th Congress of the CPSU is the root from
which stems all the evils done by the Khrushchov (Khrushchev) revisionists'. 36
 Many
analysts have argued that the Sino-Soviet ideological rift resulted from Mao's attempt
to obtain leadership of the communist world and his contempt for Khrushchev, whom
he saw as junior in this movement. 37
 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
ideological debate focused on two issues: debates over the relationship between the
communist camp and the U.S.; and the competition for a dominant place in the Third
World. Frictions over these two issues concerned not only ideological beliefs, but
also produced negative impacts on the Sino-Soviet military and security relationship.
First, Khrushchev placed emphasis on the importance of 'peaceful coexistence'
between states with different social systems and postulated the need to avert a new
world war. In September 1959, Khrushchev visited the USA and upheld Soviet-U.S.
cooperation for the settlement of international problems. 38
 At that time, China was
still economically and politically isolated in the international system, led by the
USA.39
 The improvement of Soviet-American relations caused China to worry that
its interests and security would be sacrificed in the name of a friendly political
climate between the USSR and the USA.
Such anxieties were deepened by the Quemoy event in August 1958 when
The Editorial Department of Remin Ribao, The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchov's
Revisionism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p.12.
36 
'Chinese Publisher's Note on the 20th Congress as the Root of all Evils', in Gittings, Survey of the
Sino-Soviet Dispute, p 63.
' See, for example, Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polemics (Cranbury,
New Jersey, Associated University Press, Inc., 1976), p.16; Harold C. Hinton, The Sino-Soviet
Confrontation: Implications for the Future (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976), pp.4-5;
Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956 -1961 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1962), pp.15-16.
'Speech by N. S. Khrushchev, Moscow, September 28, 1959', in Whitney (ed.), Khrushchev Speaks,
pp.360-374.
Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), pp.52-64.
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Khrushchev refused to support Mao's military actions against the Quemoy islands
controlled by Kuomintang troops in the Taiwan Strait. In this crisis, Khrushchev
maintained a cautious stance. He worried that the incident would drag the Soviet
Union into a military conflict and imperil relations with Washington. The Soviet
position led China to no longer regard the USSR as a reliable 'ally' of the world
communist camp.4° Moreover, in order to improve its relations with the USA, on the
eve of Khrushchev's visit to Washington in September 1959, the Soviet Union
terminated assistance to Chinese nuclear physics programmes. In June 1959,
Moscow formally notified Beijing that the USSR would not provide China with the
technical details of atomic bombs, and recalled its specialists who worked in nuclear
physics plants in China.4 ' Chinese anxiety over the improved relationship between
the USSR and the USA was reflected in its criticism of Soviet concessions to the
USA in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. In the aftermath of this incident,
Beijing strongly condemned Moscow for betraying communist allies:
The leadership of the CPSU has become increasingly anxious to strike
political bargains with U.S. imperialism and has been bent on forming a
reactionary alliance with Kennedy, even at the expense of the interests of
the socialist camp and the international communist movement.42
A second major issue in the Sino-Soviet political dispute concerned revolutions
in the Third World. Coupled with its criticism of Khrushchev's 'peaceful coexistence'
policy, China condemned the USSR for collaborating with U.S. imperialism to
dominate the world and for undermining the revolutionary struggle in Asia, Africa,
° Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and
Diplomacy (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p.88; Martin L.
Lasater, The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Strategic Relations (Boulder and London: Westview
Press, 1984), p.26.
' The Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, The Origin and Development of the
Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves (Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1963), p.26.
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and Latin America. 43
 Due to its distrust of the Soviet Union, China started to prepare
to struggle with 'Soviet revisionism' and 'American imperialism' at the same time.44
In order to cope with the improved Soviet-U.S. relationship and seek international
support, China strengthened its relations with the Third World countries and supplied
arms to revolutionary groups.
The main recipients of Chinese arms included neighbouring states, such as North
Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Cambodia, and Laos. In addition, China offered
arms to support 'wars of national liberation' in Asian and African countries such as
Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Malaya (now Malaysia), Indonesia, the Philippines,
Algeria, the Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Tanzania. The weapons systems which
China delivered included MiG-1 5 and MiG-17 jet fighters, anti-aircraft guns, T-34
and T-59 tanks, and rifles.45
According to John F. Copper, of the Department of International Studies at
Southwestern University, 'China's military assistance reflected an independent foreign
policy, and, in some instances, anti-Soviet aims'. 46
 The Chinese challenge to Soviet
leadership in the Third World and the communist camp led to rivalry between them in
South Asia and Africa, and exacerbated their military and security relationship.
These developments were reflected in the Sino-Indian border conflict in October
1962, when the USSR took a neutral position, sympathising with India rather than
China. Moscow's offering of four MiG fighter planes to India sharpened China's
42 Ibid., p.48.
The Editorial Departments of Renmin Rzbao and Hongqi, Refutation of the New Leaders of the
CPSUon 'UnitedAction' (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965).
Gerald Segal, 'China and the Great Power Triangle', The China Quarterly, no. 83 (September 1980),
p.494.
Copper, 'China's Military Assistance', pp.103-122.
Ibid., p.124.
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anxieties about the USSR. 47
 In the words of China's official Renmin Ribao and
Hongqi:
They (The CPSU's leaders) have speeded up their plans for military aid to
India and are working hand in glove with the United States to help India's
arms expansion, so that the Indian reactionaries are able to use Soviet-made
weapons against China and other neighbouring countries.48
The Termination of Military Ties
As a consequence of their political and ideological rift, military cooperation between
China and the USSR was suspended. Mutual distrust caused both sides to explain
events as the result of the other's deliberate conspiracy.
In May 1959, the USSR's delivery of SS-2 missiles to China was followed by a
demand to set up a joint military command in the Far East. In the same year, the
USSR proposed to build a special radio station on Chinese territory, develop a joint
Sino-Soviet navy fleet under Soviet control, and convert Chinese Port Arthur into a
Soviet naval base. China perceived these proposals as an attempt to bring China
under Soviet military control, and rejected them all. Mao complained that these were
not based on the assumption of 'equal' status between the two states and violated
Chinese sovereignty.49
Chinese nationalist sentiment gradually played an important part in explaining
the deepened distrust between the two communist powers. Given the split in their
political relationship, the Chinese side increasingly complained about the 'unequal
William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rfi (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1964),
pp.58-59.
The Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, Refutation of the New Leaders of the
CPSUon 'UnitedAction p.13.
" Shi Zhi-Fu (ed.), Zhonghua ren,nin gongheguo duiwai guanxishi 1940. 10 - 1989. 10 [History of
Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China 1940. 10 - 1989. 10] (Beijing: Peking University
Press, 1996), pp.156-157 (author's translation), Li, 'Mao Zedong's Perception towards the Soviet Union
and the Development of Sino-Soviet Relations 1954-1960', p.84.
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status' between the two countries. In an interview in 1998, Baoxu Zhao, current Vice
President of the Chinese Association of Political Science, pointed out that the issue of
'unequal standing' was one of the main problems in Chinese-Soviet bilateral relations
at that time. He stressed that the Chinese leaders could never accept that the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union saw the CCP as its 'son party' (erzi dang).5°
The formal termination of Chinese-Soviet military cooperation occurred in 1960.
In April 1960, Beijing published a series of articles condemning Khrushchev for
renouncing Leninist beliefs. 5 ' In retaliation, Moscow announced a recall of all 1,390
specialists working in China on 16 July 1960. The withdrawal of Soviet specialists
left 257 scientific and technological cooperation programmes incomplete and 343
technical aid contracts cancelled. 52 This seriously obstructed the development of
Chinese defence industries. China's production of jet fighters, submarines, and jet
medium bombers was suspended. 53 The Chinese Air Force had admitted that 'the
Soviet unilateral termination of its technological assistance contracts with China's
aviation industries led to a serious impact on the development of Chinese aviation
weapon equipment'. 54 These lessons led the Chinese leadership to recognise the
dangers of over-reliance on a single supplier of weapons and defence technology.55
In August 1962, Moscow notified Beijing that it would conclude an agreement
with the USA and the U.K. on the prevention of nuclear proliferation through limiting
nuclear testing. China complained that this agreement was 'a joint Soviet-U.S. plot to
° Informal statement. The author's interview with Prof. Baoxu Zhao, Vice President of the Chinese
Association of Political Science, 6 January 1998, Beijing.
These articles were printed in Peking Review, 16 April 1960.
52 The Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest
Splitters of Our Times (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p.1 8.
Garthoff, 'Sino-Soviet Military Relations, 1945-66', p.94.
' The PLAAF Headquarters Education and Research Office, Kong/un Shi [History of Air Force]
(Beijing: The PLA Press, 1989), p.135. (author's translation)
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monopolise nuclear weapons' and that the major aim of the agreement was to deprive
China of the right to possess nuclear weapons to resist the U.S. nuclear threat. 56
 In
response, to ensure its security and improve its global status, China invested
enormous capital and resources into nuclear weapon design and construction even
though it was experiencing serious economic hardship." In October 1964, China
exploded its first nuclear test. Although Chinese nuclear capabilities were inferior to
those of the USA and the USSR, the advent of Chinese nuclear status dramatically
altered the international power structure.58
Territorial Disputes and Armed Clashes along the Common Border
Since the 19th century, territorial disputes had been a major problem in bilateral
relations between the Chinese and Russians. Before the establishment of the PRC, on
10 March 1949, Mao had requested Stalin to establish markers along Chinese-Soviet
border rivers. 59 Along with the deterioration in their political and military relations,
this historical legacy became a major source of friction between these two neighbours.
In 1959, incidents occurred along the Sino-Soviet border and gradually sharpened as
political relations deteriorated.60
Gill and Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, p.34.
56 The Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, The Origin and Development of the
Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, p.47. On 5 August 1963, the 'Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water' (Partial Test Ban
Treat) was signed by the USSR, the USA, and the U.K.. Partial texts of this treaty was printed in
SIPRI Yearbook 1983 (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1983), p.617
' For a discussion of the development of China's nuclear weapons see Foot The Practice of Power
Chapter 7, pp.167-193; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Ch na Builds the Bomb (Stanford,
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58 Leo Yueh-Yun Liu, China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.,
1972), pp.83-89.
'Document: Mao Cable to Stalin re. Markers on the Border Rivers, March 10, 1949', in Goncharov,
Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p.230.
o Thomas W. Robinson, 'The Sino-Soviet Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969
Clashes', The American P litical Science Review, vol. 66, no. 4 (December 1972), p.' 177.
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On 8 March 1963, China's official newspaper Remin Ribao accused Tsarist
Russia of depriving the Chinese of territory in the unequal treaties of Aigun (1858),
Peking (1860), and Iii (1881), signed by the Qing Dynasty China with Tsarist Russia
under the latter's pressure. 6 ' (see Map 1) On 10 July 1964, Mao himself pointed out:
About a hundred years ago, the area to the east of [Lake] Baikal became
Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and
other areas have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our
account for this list.62
Chinese positions on territorial issues were ftwofold. First, the USSR had to
admit that the treaties of Aigun, Peking, and Iii were unequal treaties imposed by
Tsarist Russia on China. Second, in the case of border rivers (the Amur and the
Ussuri), the border line had to follow the main channel. 63
 Beijing argued that Soviet
possession of the entire border river was unfair, and that 600 of the Ussuri river's 700
islands should be Chinese, including Chenpao Island (called Damansky Island in
Russian).64
The tense political atmosphere caused these two parties to perceive territorial
disputes as direct threats to their interests and security. In the words of the Soviet
official newspaper Pravda on 2 September 1964:
Mao Tse-tung's (Mao Zedong) pronouncements on the territorial issue show
clearly how far the Chinese leaders have gone in the 'Cold War' against the
Soviet Union.65
61 
'Editorial: A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A.', Remin Ribao
(Peking), 8 March 1963, in Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict:
Documents andAnalysis (Stanford: The Hoover Institution of Stanford University, 1965) pp.29-31.
62 Document: Mao's Statement to the Japanese Sociali t Delegation', in Doolin, Territorial Claimc in
the Sino-Soviet Conflict, p.44.
Information Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Chenpao Island Has Always Been
Chinese Territory', Peking Review, 14 March 1969, p.15; Statement of the Government of the People's
Republic of China, October 7, 1969 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1974), p.9, p.19, and pp.24-26.
According to international laws, based on the Thaiweg Principle, where a navigation river divides
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Also, Moscow moved seven to eight divisions from Central Asia to the east of Lake
Baikal.67
From the Chinese point of view, the Soviet leader Leonid I. Brehnev's (1964-
1982) decision to interfere in Czechoslovakia in the Summer 1968 was taken as
evidence that the USSR would not hesitate to interfere in China's domestic affairs
even using military force.68
 To deter a possible military attack from the Soviet Union,
China took pre-emptive military action, at a point when Chinese nuclear capability
was becoming operational. 69
 In March 1969, Chinese soldiers attacked Soviet
frontier guards on Chenpao Island in the Ussuri River. In April 1969, the Chinese
troops tried to occupy the island of Kultuk in the Amur River. From the start of June
to the middle of August 1969, no less than 488 infringements of the border and armed
incidents occurred along the Chinese-Soviet border.7°
According to Roy Medvedev, the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war was created by
the Chinese leadership to divert the Chinese people's attention from the serious
domestic economic situation. 7 ' After the armed clashes of 1969, Mao launched a
series of campaigns to prepare for a war against 'Soviet revisionism'. He declared
that 'we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly
counter-attack and will defend to the last man the sacred territory of our great
67 Gurtov and Hwang, China under Threat, p.212.
68 In 1968, the USSR sent troops to Czechoslovakia and claimed that the right revisionist elements in
the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Government were 'anti-Socialist forces'.
Moscow stressed that the defence of Socialism in Czechoslovakia was not only an internal affair of the
people of that country, but a problem of defending the position of World Socia ism. See 'Editorial: In
Defence of Socialism and Peace', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 9 (1968), pp.3-6.
Lawrence Freedman, 'The Military Dimension of Soviet Policy', in Gerald Segal (ed.), The Soviet
Union in East Asia: Predicament of Power (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p.93.
Medvedev, China and the Superpowers, p.49. For a detailed discussion of the Soviet-Chinese
border clashes in 1969, see Robinson, 'The Sino-Soviet Dispute', pp.1175-1202.
71 Medvedev, China and the Superpowers, p.55. In Mao's view, 'war is the continuation of politics...
war itself is a political action', and 'war can only be abolished through war'. See Quotation from
Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp.58-71.
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motherland'.72
 As a result, the sense of mutual threat deepened between these two
neighbours.
C) Preparing for Confrontation (1969-1982)
After these border clashes, the deep-rooted sense of reciprocal threat pushed China
and the Soviet Union into an increasing military build-up along their common border.
At the same time, in order to develop a more favourable international position, China
started to seek a united front with Japan and the USA. Following this, the Soviet
Union sought to create a form of military containment against China. Based upon a
common strategic interest of coping with the Soviet threat, China sought military
cooperation with the West in the late 1970s. This section will discuss these issues in
turn.
The Military Build-Up in Border Areas
The 1969 armed clashes sharpened the sense of mutual threat between China and the
USSR, and brought their relationship to a peak of military tension. The USSR
viewed China as a genuine security threat, particularly because of Chinese claims on
Soviet territory, its possession of nuclear weapons, and its growing nationalist
resentment. Such fears led the USSR to undertake a military build-up along its
border with China to prevent any surprise attack. As Seweryn Bialer concluded:
Sino-Soviet relations of the 1 970s commenced in the aftermath of the
bloody clashes on the border near Chenpao Island. Those clashes, in all
probability precipitated and provoked by the Chinese side, elevated tensions
from a political and an ideological struggle into the realm of a military
conflict. From the moment on, Chinese behavior became a key Soviet
- Armed with Mao Tse-tungs Thought. The Chinese People Are Invincible', Peking Review, 7 March
1969, p.'1.
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security concern; Soviet middle-range hopes for change in Chinese behavior
disappeared as the Soviet Union started to view the conflict from a long-
range strategic perspective.73
More importantly, the worsening relationship with China deepened Soviet
geographic vulnerability in the Far East. In the analysis of Cohn S. Gray:
In order to control its Far East, and even Central Asian, holdings, the Soviet
Union needs a strong forward position in defense of the dual-track railroad
lifeline of those holdings (the Trans-Siberian Railroad). The Inner Asian
frontier zone that separates Soviet from Chinese power (in Manchuria,
Mongolia, and Sinkiang [Xinjiang]) comprises continuous, virtually
featureless steppes and desert to depths varying between 200 and 400 miles.
The Trans-Siberian Railroad parallels the Sino-Soviet frontier along the
Amur and Ussuri Rivers, while - in addition - for 800 miles it is less than
150 miles from the border of Mongolia. Soviet deployment of 43 divisions
along the frontier zone abutting Chinese territory (including three in
Mongolia) speaks to a justified anxiety.74
From 1969 to 1978, the build-up of Soviet troops along the Chinese-Soviet
border accounted for 80 per cent of the total increase in Soviet military manpower.75
In 1973, Soviet ground troops along the Soviet-Chinese frontier were increased from
23 divisions in 1968 to about 45 divisions - including 8 tank divisions. (see Figure 1)
In the I 970s, the Soviet Pacific Fleet developed into one of the largest fleets in the
Soviet Navy, possessing around 65 major surface combatants, 70 submarines, and
two naval infantry divisions. 76 In 1970, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM)
and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) were deployed near the eastern border
of the USSR, and covered 70 targets in China and Japan. 77
 By 1977, the Soviet
' Seweryn Bialer, 'The Sino-Soviet Conflict: The Soviet Dimension', in Donald S Zagoria (ed.),
Soviet Policy in East Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p.94.
Cohn S. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc.,
1977), pp.37-38.
" Gerald Segal, 'The Soviet Union and the Great Power Triangle', in Gerald Segal (ed.), The China
Factor Peking and the Superpowers (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1982), p.52.
76 The Military Balance 1978 79 (London: IISS, 1978), p.10.
The Military Balance 1970 71 (London: IISS, 1970), p.6.
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Throughout the 1 970s, Soviet proposals to hold talks on the normalisation of
bilateral relations were rejected by China. The Chinese side insisted on first
resolving border disputes with the Soviet Union. 8° Due to this stalemate and its
geographic vulnerability in the Far East, Moscow continued its military build-up in
order to deter any surprise attack from China. As a result, the Chinese-Soviet border
area became the most militarised region in the world, exceeding the scale of the
military build-up of Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) forces in Europe.
Chinese 'United Front' with the USA and Japan
Throughout the 1 960s, China had adopted an independent foreign policy to struggle
with 'Soviet revisionism' and 'American imperialism' simultaneously. After its armed
conflict with the USSR in 1969, Mao found China increasingly isolated in
international politics. In order to avoid the potential danger of a Soviet-American
alliance to contain China, Mao began to seek an improved relationship with the USA
even though he faced problems in explaining a rapprochement with 'U.S. Imperialism'
to China's domestic political elite.8'
Mao's modified policy roughly coincided with the U.S. Nixon Administration's
intention to 'open a door' to China. The Nixon Administration was convinced that
ties with China could restore new perspective to U.S. diplomacy and increase U.S.
maneuverability in its relationship with the Soviet Union. 82
 The improvement of
80 For Soviet proposals on the normalisation of bilateral relations, see Chi Su, 'U.S.-China Relations:
Soviet Views and Policies', Asian Survey, vol. 23, no. 5 (May 1983), pp.558-562, in particular, Table 1.
Harold C. Hinton, The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking under Soviet Pressure (Washington,
D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971), pp.1-6.
82 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (New York: Little, Brown and Company Limited, 1979),
pp.684-787.
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Chinese-American relations was reflected in the USA's withdrawal of previous
objections to China's membership of the United Nations in 1971 and President
Nixon's visit to China in 1972.83 In the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, both sides
declared their intention to promote a normalisation of bilateral relations and the
strengthening of ties in the fields of economics, culture, science, and technology.84
After Deng Xiaoping came to power in the late 1970s, 'pragmatism' became one
of the main characteristics in the Chinese decision-making process, and the role of
ideology was reduced. 85 In order to cope with the military threat from the USSR,
Deng made further efforts to seek a united front with Japan and the USA. In August
1978, the 'Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the PRC and Japan' was signed.
An 'anti-hegemony' clause targeted at the USSR was included in this document. 86
 On
1 January 1979, China established formal diplomatic ties with the USA. 87
 On 3 April
1979, Beijing notified Moscow of the formal abrogation of the 1950 'Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance', which had long ceased to exist except in
name.88
In the early I 970s, Moscow pursued a policy of détente with the USA, partly to
For a discussion of the American attitude towards the PRC's representation at the UN, see Foot, The
Practice of Power, pp.22-S I.
The text of Shanghai Communiqué was reprinted in Beijing Review, 29 June - 5 July 998, pp.1 8-20.
85 Simon Long, 'Political Refonn', in Gerald Segal (ed.), Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform,
p.37.
86 Document: Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the People's Republic of China and Japan',
Peking Review, 18 August 1978, pp 7-8.
87 The improvement of Chinese relations with the USA and Japan was also helpful for Chinese
economic development. At its Fifth National Congress on 26 February 1978, the CCP announced to
build 120 large-scale projects in 8 years. These included 10 iron and steel complexes, 9 non-ferrous
metal complexes, 8 coal mines, 10 oil and gas fields, 30 power stations, 6 new trunk railways, and 5
key harbours. Most of the equipment needed for these projects would be imported from Western
countries. In 1978, China signed contracts worth U.S.$ 6.4 billion with Western countries. See
Zongli Tang, China's Foreign Economic Policy in Post-Mao Time (New York: Nova Science
Publishers, Inc., 1996), pp.12-14.
88 
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offset the danger of a Sino-American alliance. 89 At that time, the USA seemed to
have obtained a favorable rapprochement with both the PRC and the USSR, and to
enjoy a better place in the triangle of relations by taking advantage of the two
communist countries' rivalry. However, Moscow's policy of détente changed in the
late 1970s when Beijing and Washington began to highlight the strategic interests of
Sino-American ties. During his visit to Beijing in May 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
U.S. National Security Adviser, announced that the USA shared 'China's resolve to
resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global or regional
hegemonyY° These Washington-Beijing strategic ties pushed Moscow to harden its
policy towards both the USA and China. After Deng Xiaoping's denunciation of
'Soviet hegemonism' during his visit to the USA in early 1979, Brezhnev refused to
go to the USA for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) summit.9'
The Chinese 'united front' with the USA led to a situation where the Soviet
Union faced a threatening encirclement, with NATO in the West and a Beijing-
Washington-Tokyo entente in the east. As Gerald Segal concluded, China's move to
the West - China was called NATO's '16th member' - not only gave the West a
strategic advantage, but was the most important change in the strategic balance since
World War 11.92
Soviet Military Containment against China
As a result, in Asia, the USSR regarded containing China as a more important task
89 Su, 'U.S.-China Relations: Soviet Views and Policies'. p.562.
'Dr. Brzezinski in Peking', Peking Review, 26 May 1978, pp.4-6.
'Interview of Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping by U.S. TV Commentators', Beying Review, 16 February
1979, pp.17-20; Segal, 'China and the Great Power Triangle', p.504.
Gerald Segal, Sino-Soviet Relations after Mao (London: IISS, 1985), p.4.
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than weakening U.S. influence in the region. 93
 In 1978, Moscow supported Vietnam's
invasion of Kampuchea to overthrow the pro-Beijing Pol Pot regime. Vietnamese
military actions in Kampuchea led to the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict in February
and March 1979. Due to Soviet support to Vietnam, China suffered a defacto defeat
in its attempt to 'teach Vietnam a lesson'.94
In late December 1979, Moscow dispatched an invasion force to Afghanistan to
support the pro-Moscow regime of Babrak Karmal. Combined with the Soviet-
backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, this Soviet action heightened Chinese
fears about a Soviet plan to encircle China The Chinese government issued a
statement on 30 December 1979, strongly condemning the Soviet military invasion of
Afghanistan:
This armed intervention wantonly violates all norms of international
relations. It not only encroaches upon the sovereignty and independence of
Afghanistan but poses a grave threat to peace and security in Asia and the
whole world...95
The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan led to strengthened military ties between
China and the West. Soon after this event, U.S. Secretary of Defence Harold Brown
visited Beijing on 5 January 1980. This visit marked the first formal contact between
the military leaders of the USA and China. Both sides agreed to strengthen military
cooperation to counter Soviet expansion.96
Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, a major problem in the national defence
03 Paul Kelemen, 'Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia', Asian Survey vol. 24, no 3 (March 1984) p.339.
During the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, the USSR supplied Hanoi with military equipment,
including armoured vehicles, tanks, ships, and MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters. From January to May
1979, Hanoi received some 74,000 tons of armaments from Moscow. Meanwhile, the Soviet Pacific
Fleet sent a 15 ship contingent to the Vietnamese coast to intercept Chinese battlefield communications
and pass them on to Vietnam. See SIPRJ Yearbook 1980 (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1980),
pp.105-106; Sheldon W. Simon, 'Southeast Asia in Soviet Perspective', in Walter R. Duncan (ed.),
Soviet Policy in the Third World (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p.241.
'China Condemns Soviet Military Invasion of Afghanistan', Bejjing Review, 7 January 1980, pp.3-4.
'Talks between Chinese and U.S. Military Leaders', Beying Review, 21 January 1980, pp.7-8.
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structure of China was that too much emphasis placed on nuclear weapon
programmes had led to a neglect of conventional force modernisation. 97
 By the late
I 970s, Chinese conventional weapon systems were at least two or three decades
behind those of Western countries. Its defacto defeat in the war against Vietnam in
1979 alerted China to the inadequacy of the PLA's conventional forces in a limited
conflict. In its report to the National People's Congress in June 1979, the Chinese
government listed defence modemisation among the strategies of 'Four
Modernisations'. 98
 To modernise its armed force, China started to develop further
military cooperation with the West and to import military equipment from the West.
The weapons systems obtained from the West included French SA-321 Super
Frelon helicopters, British Rolls Royce Apey aircraft engines and Watchman
surveillance radars, Italian Aspide air-to-air missile, and U.S. S-70C helicopters and
AN / TPQ-37 tracking radars. 99 China also obtained Japanese advanced computer
and electronics that could be applied to Chinese space and guided missile systems.'°°
Although the volume of weaponry was very limited, enhanced military ties between
China and the West increased Soviet anxiety. In 1981, Moscow called the Sino-U.S.
political and military relationship a 'dangerous alliance'.'°'
D) Détente (1982-1991)
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In 1982, changes in China's relations with the USA led to a limited détente between
China and the USSR. To understand this, this discussion will address the rationale
for Chinese and Russian limited détente in the early 1980s. It will then explore the
re-assessment of Chinese and Soviet interests in the mid-1980s and the normalisation
of their relationship in late I 980s. Finally, it will explore the resumption of Sino-
Soviet military cooperation.
Limited Détente in the Early 1980s
Although Sino-Soviet relations remained at a standstill, the friendly political climate
between China and the USA gradually faded in the early 1980s. On becoming the
U.S. President in 1981, Ronald Reagan sought to strengthen U.S. ties with Taiwan.
The Reagan Administration's military aid to Taiwan grew significantly, rising from
U.S.$ 330 million in 1981 to U.S.$ 800 million in 1983.102 Beijing strongly
condemned the USA for violating the Sino-American Joint Communiqué of August
1982 in which Washington promised to gradually reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan.'°1
This development led to a recognition in China that it needed to reassess its relations
with the USA and to de-escalate the confrontation with the USSR. From then on,
China started to tone down its anti-Soviet rhetoric and to view the two superpowers
more equally so that it could 'achieve much greater maneuverability and flexibility in
the great-power triangle'.'04
Moscow saw Beijing's changed policy as an opportunity for a better relationship
pp.30-37.
102 For the increase in the Reagan Administration's arms sales to Taiwan and the friction between the
USA and China on this issue, see SIPRI Yearbook 1983 (London: Tay!or & Francis Ltd., 1983),
pp.274-275.
103 The text of this Joint Communiqué was reprinted in Beijing Review, 29 June -5 July 1998, pp.20-21.
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with China and an improved position in the great-power triangle. In his speech in
Tashkent on 23 March 1982, Brezhnev expressed a willingness to discuss possible
CBMs in the region of the common border with China.' 05
 He also stressed that the
Soviet Union had never interfered in Chinese internal affairs, and had always
recognised the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan.'°6
	Soon after the Reagan
Administration's decision to sell arms to Taiwan in August 1982, the first round of
Chinese-Soviet negotiations since the Afghanistan invasion took place in October
1982.107
In these talks, China and the USSR failed to solve existing disputes. China was
particularly concerned about Soviet military containment. The Chinese side insisted
that the normal isation of Sino-Soviet relations had to involve the solution of 'three
obstacles' - the presence of Soviet military forces along the common border, the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the Vietnamese military occupation of
Kampuchea.'° 8 Talks were slowed by Brezhnev's death in late 1982, and his
successors, Yuri Andropov (1983-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985),
were so short-lived that they failed to deal with the China issue seriously.' 09
 The
improvement of Sino-Soviet relations was limited, with only exchanges of science,
culture, and sport restored. Also, a trade agreement was signed on 10 February 1984
Foreign Policy in a Changing World (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1986), p.686.
'Speech at the Ceremony in Tashkent When the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Was Awarded the
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71
to facilitate commodity circulation between
Assessments of National Interests in the Mid-1980s
In the mid-1980s, Sino-Soviet relations further improved, resulting from changes in
their domestic situations.
On the Chinese side, the pursuit of domestic economic reform accounted for a
greater willingness to reassess its policies toward its rivals. In early 1985, Deng
Xiaoping called economic reform a 'second revolution', and announced that 'China is
determined to carry through its current reforms and is firm on its internal and external
open policies'." The normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union was seen to
benefit China by creating a peaceful external environment to facilitate the country's
economic development." 2
 In early 1986, the Chinese military started to assert that 'a
world war is by no means imminent, and there may be no major war within this
century or for even longer than that'." 3
 This position highlighted a re-evaluation of
China's external security environment. It also provided the theoretical basis for
détente with the USSR in the military and security sphere."4
On the Soviet side, after Mikhail S. Gorbachev became the leader of the CPSU
in March 1985, the establishment of a peaceful international environment to benefit
domestic reform became the priority of Soviet foreign policy. To achieve this,
110 Medvedev, China and the Superpowers, p.164.
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Gorbachev initiated 'new thinking' in foreign and security policy in an attempt to
improve Soviet relations with foreign countries.' 15
 Applied to Asia, it created the
political basis for détente with China. Significantly, Gorbachev also took crucial
measures to reduce the Soviet military presence in Asia.
First, the 'Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Nuclear Forces' (the IINF Treaty) was signed by the Soviet Union and the USA on 8
December 1987. In this treaty, the Soviet Union agreed to remove intermediate-range
and shorter-range nuclear missiles which were deployed in Europe and in Asia,
including the SS-20s targeting China."6
Second, Gorbachev announced, on 8 February 1988, that the Soviet Union
would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan on 15 May 1988, and would complete
the withdrawal within a ten-month period."7
Third, in his 16 September 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech, Gorbachev made specific
proposals concerning regional security in Asia. Gorbachev pledged not to increase
Soviet nuclear weapons and naval forces in the region." 8
 In addition, he decided to
withdraw Soviet troops from their bases in Vietnam, if the USA closed its bases in
Zhongguo Yan Shi Publishing House, 1997), P.99. (author's translation)
115 The key elements of Gorbachev's new ideas can be summarised as: the primary priority on domestic
economic and social policy over foreign policy and international commitments; the maintenance of a
stable and peaceful international environment; recognition that Soviet interests could be promoted by
the forming of a multi-polar and interdependent world; and the subordination of ideological criteria
and military operation in international relations. See Allen Lynch, 'Changing Soviet Elite Views on
the International System and Soviet Foreign Policy', in Frederic J Fleron, Jr. Erik P. l-loffmann and
Robbin F. Laird (eds), Soviet Foreign Policy: from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (New York: Walter de
Gruyter Inc., 1991), p.388 and pp.394-400.
116 
'Treaty between United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missile', SIPRI Yearbook 1988
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.395-406.
" Brain Urquhart, 'Conflict Resolution in 1988: The Role of the United Nations', SIPRI Yearbook
1989 (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.450-452.




Gorbachev's policy reduced the Soviet military threat against China. Thus,
despite the fact that the 'three obstacles' had not been resolved completely, Beijing
agreed to hold a Sino-Soviet summit. The summit in May 1989 symbolised the
normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations. On 18 May 1989, both countries agreed to
resolve all the disputes between them through peaceful negotiation. The Soviet
Union announced that Vietnam would withdraw its troops from Kampuchea by the
end of September 1989 under effective international supervision. The Soviet Union
also decided to withdraw 75 per cent of its troops from Mongolia. Both sides agreed
to take steps to reduce their military forces in the areas along the Sino-Soviet
boundary. Finally, the Soviet side expressed support for the Chinese government's
'one China' position.'20
After the Tiananmen Square crackdown of June 1989, China's relations with
Western countries became significantly strained. To protest against Beijing's brutal
massacre of students, Western countries, led by the USA, suspended military sales
and announced economic sanctions on China. Washington even suspended all high-
level diplomatic contacts - at the level of assistant secretary and above - with China,
and used its influence to delay the consideration of loans to China by international
agencies.' 2 ' This policy resulted in China facing a new international isolation, and
added to Beijing's sense of urgency to improve relations with Moscow, including
119 ibid.
120 
'Sino-Soviet Joint Communique', Beying Review, 29 May - 4 June 1989, p.11.
121 Robert Delfs, 'Doddering Helmsman', Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter called as FEER), 29
June 1989, pp.10-1 1. After the Tiananmen Square event of 1989, China suffered Western economic
sanctions. For example, the World Bank postponed discussion on U.S.$ 290 million worth of loans,
including a U.S.$ 60 million agriculture loan and two loans totalling U.S.$ 230 million for a power
project and training programme.
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stable economic, political and security relations.'22
The Resumption of Military Cooperation
The improvement of Sino-Soviet political relations in 1989 created a positive
atmosphere for exchanges and cooperation in the military-security field. In May
1991, General Secretary of the CCP Jiang Zemin visited Moscow. The two parties
announced strengthened cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, cultural,
and military spheres.'23
Two important documents were approved that were to reduce tensions between
them. First, the 'Guiding Principles of Reducing Border Forces and Enhancing
Mutual Trust in the Military Field' was signed by the Chinese and Soviet
governments in April 1990. In this agreement, both sides reaffirmed their pledge in
the Joint Statement of 1989 that they would adopt measures to reduce military forces
along their border to the level commensurate to their normal relations.' 24
 To increase
mutual trust, in December 1991, Chinese and Soviet military delegations started to
visit each other's military regions.' 25
 Second, during Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow in
May 1991, the USSR and China signed an agreement to end their dispute over the
122 Roger E. Kanet, The Soviet Union and China: The Complexities of the Relations, p.15. Paper
presented at the Conference on Asian International Relations, 11-14 November 1990, Taipei.
l2 
'Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqué', Beijing Review, 27 May - 2 June 1991, p.12. In the late 1980s,
Chinese and Soviet trade drastically increased. In 1989, the volume of Sino-Soviet trade totalled U.S.$
3.8 billion, a 20 per cent increase over 1988. Meanwhile, China sent 15,000 workers to the Soviet
Union to work on various construction projects. Culturally, when Beijing and Moscow resumed
student exchanges in 1983, the number exchanged was only 10, but it increased to 450 by 1988. See
Yi Chu, 'An Auspicious Year of Sino-Soviet Relations', Beying Review, 30 January - 5 February 1989,
p. 4; Gu Guanfu and Chun-tu Hsueh, 'Sino-Soviet Ties Grow Steadily', Beijing Review, 3-9 September,
1990, p.8; Wan Chengcai, 'Another Milestone in Sino-Soviet Relations', Beijing Review, 23-29 ApriL
1990, p.4.
24 Shik Chun-yu, 'China and the Soviet Union Jointly Pledge Maintenance of Peace in the Border
Areas', Ta Kung Pao (1-long Kong), 26 April 1990, p.3, in FBIS-CHI-90-08 1, 26 April 1990, p.2 1.
125 
'Report on Completion of Soviet-Chinese Border Talks', Radio Moscow, 11 December 1991, in
SWB, SU 1260, 20 December 1991, p.A3 1-2.
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eastern section of the border. They agreed that the navigation channel of a river
would be the dividing line of their common border.'26
Coupled with this improved political atmosphere, China started to seek to
purchase arms from the Soviet Union. After the Tiananmen Square crackdown of
1989, a significant military contract, the Sino-U.S. 'Peace Pearl programme', was
cancelled. The programme would have updated Chinese Shenyang J-8 II interceptors
with U.S. avionics such as fire-control, environmental control, and electrical-powers
systems. The cancellation of this contract had a negative impact on Chinese plans to
modernise its aviation industry with Western advanced technology.'27
Given that Moscow had adopted a 'neutral position' during the Tiananmen events,
Beijing turned to import arms from the Soviet Union.' 28
 Soviet domestic hardship
opened it also to the possibility of arms sales to China.' 29
 In June 1990, China sent a
high-level military delegation to Moscow, headed by Liu Huaqing, Vice-Chairman of
the CMC, to discuss the possibility of purchasing weapons.' 3° In October 1990,
China announced an agreement to buy 24 Mi-I 7 HIP-H transport helicopters from the
Soviet Union.' 3 ' In May 1991, when Soviet Defence Minister Dimitry Yazov visited
Beijing, China expressed an interest in purchasing advanced Su-27 aircraft fighters.'32
The improvement of political relations not only alleviated military tensions between
126 
'Border Agreement Signed', Xinhua news agency (Beijing), 16 May 1991, in FB1S-CHI-91-096, 17
May 1991, p.'2.
127 
'USA Cancels Defunct Chinese Contracts', Flight International, 6-12 January 1993, p.10.
I 8 For a discussion of the Soviet reaction to the 1989 Tiananmen events, see Alexander Lukin, 'The
Initial Soviet Reaction to the Events in China in 1989 and the Prospects for S,no-Soviet Relations', The
China Quarterly, no. 125 (March 1991), pp.1 19-136.
29 Tai-ming Cheung, 'Ties of Convenience: Sino-Russian Military Relations in the I 990s', in Richard
H. Yang (ed.), China's Military: The PLA in 1992/1993 (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy
Studies, 1993), p.65.
" 'China Is Seeking Soviet Fighters', Jane's Defence Wee/dy (hereafter JDW), 21 July 1990, p.70.
H Gill and Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, p.58.
132 Cheung, 'Ties of Convenience', p.62.
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China and the Soviet Union. It also paved the way for the resumption of military
cooperation.
E) Conclusions: An Uneasy Military Relationship
This review of Sino-Soviet military relations during the Cold War raises two main
points of interest to the study of contemporary military cooperation between these
states.
First, territorial disputes and mutual threats against each other have been
important problems in these two countries' military-security relationship. Border
conflicts in the late 1 960s awakened Chinese nationalist resentment about Russian
occupation of Chinese territory from the 19th century. Also, Chinese claims
deepened Soviet worries about its geographic vulnerability in the Far East. Coupled
with their military build-up along the common border in the I 970s, the sense of
mutual threat sharpened.
In the late 1980s, new domestic and external situations moved these two
countries to normalise bilateral relations. In an improved political climate, rapid
progress was made to alleviate military tensions. However, beyond this, there still
remained significant historical legacies to overcome. Territorial disputes, such as the
further demarcation of the common border and disputes over its eastern section, were
still unresolved. Moreover, both sides continued to deploy a great number of troops
in border areas, underscoring their concerns about a potential threat from the other.
For these two states, territorial disputes and the sense of mutual threat have been
deeply embedded in a historical, geopolitical, and national security matrix. In a tense
political climate, these historical legacies may become the source of renewed military
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tensions between these two neighbours.
Second, this review has shown that these two states' military cooperation has to
be based on a stable political foundation. Throughout the Cold War period, Sino-
Soviet political relations had been unstable and were repeatedly affected by
leadership transitions, changes in their domestic situations, and their relationship with
the USA. These developments led to an uneasy military-security relationship
between China and the USSR, swinging from military alliance, armed clashes, active
confrontation, to military containment.
In a friendly political climate, the two parties undertook arms transfers and
technology cooperation to display 'fraternity' and 'good-neighbourliness'. However,
the close military ties of the I 950s did not help to consolidate their political relations.
On the contrary, coupled with the split in political relations, disputes over issues
relevant to military cooperation became a source of tension. In the conflicted
political atmosphere of the late 1950s, Soviet proposals to strengthen military
cooperation were rejected by China and were perceived as an attempt to bring China
under Soviet military control. The historical lessons of an over-reliance on the USSR
led to a recognition in China that over-dependence on a single supplier of weapons
and defence technology was a political and security danger.
This discussion has highlighted the uneasy nature of the two states' military
relationship and the importance of positive political foundations for military
cooperation between these two states. Throughout the Cold War period, the Sino-
Soviet military relationship reflected changes in their political relations and the wider
political environment. Section 2 will investigate the political framework of Sino-
Russian relations since the end of the Cold War, in an attempt to determine whether a
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stable political foundation exists for close military cooperation between China and the
Russian Federation.
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The second proposition behind this study is that a stable political foundation would be
important for China and Russia to develop close military cooperation. As shown by
history, Sino-Soviet military relations reflected wider political relations. Without a
stable political foundation, military cooperation between these two states may be of
short duration. Given this, a study of Sino-Russian military cooperation needs to
elucidate bilateral political relations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China
and the Russian Federation sought the establishment of a 'partnership'. Since late
1992, the two countries have boosted their ties from a 'good neighbourly relationship'
to a 'constructive partnership' to a 'strategic partnership'.' This chapter examines
shared Sino-Russian interests, the nature of their bilateral cooperation, and the limits
of this cooperation in various fields. In the realm of international diplomacy, it
explores Sino-Russian cooperation in coping with U.S. dominance in world affairs.
In the field of regional security, it addresses two issues: first, Chinese and Russian
concerns about U.S.-dominated regional security arrangements in Asia and Europe;
and second, their common concerns about stability in Central Asia. Finally, it
examines the two parties' economic cooperation. This examination of Chinese and
Russian cooperation will reveal the nature of this 'partnership'. In this way, it will be
'In their Joint Statement in December 1992, China and Russia declared that they would build a good-
neighbourly relationship. By September 1994 when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Moscow,
the two countries defined their relationship as a constructive partnership oriented toward the 21st
century. In April 1996, during Yeltsin's visit to China, both sides announced a strategic partnership
of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination toward the 21st century.
80
possible to determine whether Chinese and Russian cooperation has created solid
political foundations for military cooperation.
A) International Diplomacy
Since the end of the Cold War, both China and Russia have attempted to obtain
greater international influence. For both, however, U.S. dominance in world affairs
has been seen as a factor that could obstruct their efforts. To understand Chinese
and Russian cooperation in the field of international diplomacy, three issues will be
explored in this section. These are: first, China's concerns over U.S. hegemony;
second, Russia's desire to be a Eurasian great power; and third, the development and
limitations of Chinese and Russian attempts to counter-balance U.S. hegemony.
Chinese Concerns: US. Hegemony in World Affairs
From the Chinese point of view, 'U.S. hegemony' represents the USA's ambition to
dominate world affairs and to impose its own social system and ideology on other
states. 2 Such hegemony would damage China's interests by restraining its external
influence, and by interfering in Chinese internal affairs.
Given its growing economic strength, China has shown more confidence in
working as a major balancing factor in the APR and the rest of the world. 3 While
seeking increasing international influence, China has been worried about the sole
superpower status of the USA in the new international power structure. 4
 Many
leading Chinese scholars have pointed out that following the end of the Cold War the
2 Sa Benwang, 'The "Expansion Strategy" Practiced by the United States Is Impeded', Liawang
(Beijing), no. 26 (27 June 1994), pp.58-59, in FBIS-CHI-94-136, 15 July 1994, pp.3-S.
Xing Hua, 'China's Successful Diplomacy', Beijing Review, 11-17 May 1992, pp.8-12.
'Delegation Head Interviewed on Visit to PRC', Radio Moscow, 13 December 1991, in FBIS-SOV-
81
USA has sought to find a new enemy to justify its foreign policy and military strategy
- and that China appears to be the main target. 5
 In 1996, the USA's decision to
strengthen security cooperation with Japan and Australia was viewed by Chinese
military leaders as concrete actions seeking to contain a rising China. 6
 (also see 3 .B)
On 7 March 1997, Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian stated that China had come
to play an increasingly important role in international affairs; however, some
antagonistic powers had deliberately concocted the theory of a 'China menace' and
tried to damage China's international image. 7
 In an interview conducted by the
author on 12 January 1998, Chinese strategist Guo Zhenyuan noted:
U.S. restraint on China's rise would be detrimental to Chinese interests.
China's major security concern in the new era is not an immediate military
threat from foreign countries, but other great powers' restriction on China's
increasingly international status.8
Secondly, China has been concerned about the USA's attempt to interfere in
Chinese internal affairs, in its efforts to reinforce the 'fortress of democracy' and to
'reform' China following the U.S. model. 9 As Wang Jisi, Director of the Institute for
American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, warned in 1996:
In fact, 'engagement' does not merely mean closer high-level contacts. It is
not a friendly gesture but rather an attempt to pervade China with U.S.
economic, political, cultural and ideological influences. Eventually, the
United States hopes China will accept Western-led international norms.
91-242, 17 December 1991, p.43.
The author's interviews with Prof. Chen Qimao, President of the Shanghai Society for International
Relations, 15 January 1998, Shanghai; with Dr. Niu Jun, Director of the U.S. Diplomacy Division, the
Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 8 January 1998, Beijing.
6 
'Japan: Defense Cooperation for Far East Emergencies Studied', Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 9 April
1996, p 3, in FBIS-EAS-96-070, 10 April 1996, p.9; 'Canberra Plans to Enhance Security Ties with
U.S., Indonesia', Melboune Radio Australia, 3 July 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-132, 9 July 1996, p.'02.
'Chi Haotian's Comments on the Draft National Defense Law of the PRC', Jiefangjun Bao (Beijing),
7 March 1997, p.1, in Inside China Mainland(Taipei), vol. 19, no. 5 (May 1997), p.42.
8 The author's interview with Guo Zhenyuan, Deputy-Chief of the International Strategy and Security
Division, China's Center for International Studies, the Chinese State Council, 12 January 1998,
Beijing.
Sa, 'The "Expansion Strategy" Practiced by the United States Is Impeded', p.3.
Wang Jisi, 'US China Policy: Containment or Engagement?', Beying Review, 21-27 October 1996,
p.7.
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China has criticised the U.S. Congress linkage between offering China 'most favoured
nation' (MFN) status and satisfactory progress on issues of human rights." Any
foreign power's interference in China's domestic affairs has been viewed as a
challenge to the CCP's ruling status. In a press conference on 27 June 1995, Chinese
Prime Minister Li Peng complained that 'there are some states which teach others
how they should live and what social system they should choose'. He stressed that
'China is against intervention in other countries' internal affairs, no matter where it
comes from and what form it manifested (sic) itself in'.'2
Another Chinese complaint has been U.S. interference in the question of the
Taiwan Strait, which has been regarded by China as part of its territory. When
Washington decided to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan in September 1992,
Beijing strongly condemned U.S. 'hegemonistic' actions. In the words of China's
official Beijing Review:
This decision flagrantly violates the Sino-US joint communiqué of August
17, 1982, grossly interferes in China's internal affairs, and obstructs and
undermines the cause of China's peaceful reunification. The Chinese
people have expressed their great outrage with and strong protest against
such hegemonistic behavior.'3
In addition, Washington's decision to permit Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to pay a
'private visit' to the USA in May 1995 was regarded by Beijing as reflecting a U.S.
intention to openly support 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan'.' 4
 The peak of
military tensions between China and the USA occurred in March 1996. During the
Taiwanese Presidential elections, Washington dispatched two aircraft carrier battle
"Xiao Hong, 'US Contradicts Itself on Human Rights', Beying Review, 30 March -5 April 1992, p.13;
Liu Wenzong, 'US "Diplomacy of Human Rights", Beijing Review, 8-14 June 1992, p.7.
2 Li Peng Talks to Journals', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 27 June 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-124, 28 June
1995, p.7.
' Proposed F- 16 Sale Draws Strong Protest', Beijing Review, 14-20 September 1992, p.S.
'Lee's US Entry Visa Protested', Beijing Review, 12-18 June 1995, p.7; 'China Issues Strong Protest
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groups to the waters near the Taiwan Strait, where China was carrying out military
exercises. This was regarded by Beijing as a public military provocation. In the
aftermath of the March incident, the Chinese military has begun to assess the
possibility of an armed conflict with the USA in this region. They have 'called for
the speeding up of China's armament programme to thwart further American
intervention in the Taiwan Strait'.'5
Distinct national interests and differing political values of these two countries
might lead the USA to make use of economic pressure, military containment, or
international isolation to restrict China's rise and interfere in its internal affairs.'6
This anxiety has led China to seek further cooperation with Russia. An enhanced
Sino-Russian relationship has been sought to prevent the USA from playing the
'Russia card' to contain China. The Chinese-backed Hong Kong newspapers Wen
Wei Po commented on 24 April 1996 that a friendly relationship with Russia would
deal 'a heavy blow to the hegemonist forces which attempted to contain China'.'7
Moreover, developing cooperation with Russia, as a permanent member of UN
Security Council, on the resolution of international disputes could help China to
obtain greater international influence and increase its leverage against
'hegemonism'.'8
to US, Beijing Review, 12-18 June 1995, p.'8
' Willy Wo-Lap Lam, 'Hawkish Elements within the PLA Have Called for the Speeding up of China's
Armament Programme to Thwart "Further American Intervention" in the Taiwan Strait', South China
Morning Post (Hong Kong), 12 April 1996, p.10, in FBIS-CHI-96-073, 15 April 1996, p.42.
16 Tsung Lan-hai, 'CPC Decided on Its International Archenemy', Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), no. 195
(I January 1994), pp.16-18, in FBIS-CHI-94-016, 25 January 1994, p.5.
'President Yeltsin's Second Visit to China', Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), 24 April 1996, in SWB,
SU 2596, 26 April 1996, p.B 9.
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'Speech by President Jiang at the Russian Institute of International Relations', Beijing Review, 19-25
September 1994, pp.1 1-12.
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Russian Concerns: Eurasian Great Power Status
The Russian Federation became an independent state on 31 December 1991. From
late 1991 to mid-1992, in order to promote the democratic and market transformation
of Russia, President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev adopted a
pro-Western diplomatic line, which sought Russia's incorporation into the Western
world.' 9
 This Western-oriented policy, however, caused heated debate among
Russian political elites. In February 1992, Russian State Counselor Sergei
Stankevich criticised Kozyrev's pro-Western stand, and argued that Eurasianism was
a better alternative for Russian foreign policy. 20
 The question of whether Russia was
a European or a Eurasian power became the focus of debates on national interests and
identity.2'
Eurasianists warned that alliance with the West would force Russia into the
Western security system and alienate it from the Muslim world and China. 22
 As
Mikhail L. Titarenko, Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Russian
Academy of Sciences, wrote:
In our view, the new Eurasianism, having overcome the extremes of
Westernism and Slavophilism and having accepted the organic link of the
" Alexander Rahr, "Atlanticists" versus "Eurasians" in Russian Foreign Policy', Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Research Report, vol. 1, no. 22 (29 May 1992), pp.17-19.
Proponents of the pro-Western diplomatic line included Yeltsin's close associates in the presidential
quarters and cabinet of ministers, such as Gennady Burbulis, Yegor Gaidar, and Mikhail Poltoranin.
Within the Foreign Ministry, the ideas of this group were shared by ministerial deputies and aides, such
as Georgy Kunadze, Vitaly Churkin, and Fedor Shelov-Kovediaev. Proponents of this group were
also found in the Supreme Soviet, such as Viktor Sheinis, Sergei Yushenkov, Vladimir Kuznetsov,
Gleb Yakunin, and Galina Starovoitova; and among academic specialists, e.g., Nikolai Kosolapov,
Konstantin Sarkisov, and Andrei Kortunov See Alexei G Arbatov 'Ru sia's Foreign Policy
Alternatives', International Security, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp.9- 1 0.
2 See Stankevich's speaking at the forum 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', International
Affairs (Moscow), no. 4/5 (1992), pp.98-101.
21 According to Margot Light, in Russia, three major foreign policy views can be identified: 'liberal
westernizers', 'pragmatic nationalists', and 'fundamentaltst nationalists'. See Margot Light, 'Foreign
Policy Thinking', in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light (eds), Internal
Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.44-61. For the
foreign policy debate, also see Arbatov, 'Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives', pp.8-14.
22 Rahr, "Atlanticists" versus "Eurasians" in Russian Foreign Policy', pp.19-20.
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unique Russian civilization with the European, Ugro-Turk and Islamic
cultures, would become the paradigm for the restoration of the single
democratic state of Russia.23
This argument, that Russia should make use of its geopolitical position to
strengthen its role as a great power, was supported by many Russian leading
politicians.	 As Yevgeni Primakov, General Director of Russian Foreign
Intelligence Services (and later successor of Kozyrev), stated in February 1992:
Russia lies in both Europe and Asia, and geopolitical factors continue
playing a very big role in the framing of its foreign policy. I mean our
policy on China, India, Japan, the United States, and not only on Europe and
the Middle East but on the Third World, because Russia cannot be great, it
cannot play the positive role it is destined to in the absence of such wide
geopolitical scope. In promoting relations with all those countries, we
must remember that history never nullifies geopolitical values.24
In addition to the political elites' criticism of Kozyrev's pro-Western policy,
increased voices were heard from the Russian public calling for the restoration of
Russia's great power status. In late 1992, an opinion poll conducted in Moscow
showed that 69 per cent of respondents agreed that 'Russia must stay a great power,
even if this leads to worse relations with the outside world'. 25 After the Soviet
collapse, the USA had become the sole superpower in world politics, and many
Russians felt disenchanted with the loss of Russia's international position. 26 This
was exacerbated by a perception of humiliation among the Russians, when promised
Western aid was either not delivered or was tied to specific conditions. 27 (also see
23 Mikhail L. Titarenko, Security and international Relations in East Asia. Russia's Policy vis-.a-vzs
PR China and Taiwan, p 5. Paper presented at the seminar 'In Search of a Unified China' 28
December 1995, Moscow.
24 Primakov's speaking at the forum 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', p.96.
25 Vera ToIz, 'Russia: Westernizers Continue to Challenge National Patriots', RFE./RL Research Report,
vol. 1, no.49(11 December 1992), p.9.
2 Georgi Arbatov, 'A New Cold War', Foreign Policy, no. 95 (Summer 1994), p.97.
21 In 1993, due to its worry that Russia might become highly nationalistic in the near future, the U.S.
Congress tied some conditions on U.S. aid to Russia. These included: Russia could not take any
action to violate another states' territorial integrity and national sovereignty; U.S. assistance could not
be used to strengthen Russian military capabilities; and Russia must keep its promise to withdraw its
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3.D)
In a democratising state, the Yeltsin leadership was forced to respond to
domestic sentiment against the exclusive pro-Western diplomatic line. On 25
October 1992, Kozyrev publicly announced that 'the romantic period of the
relationship between Russia and the West is through'. 28
 On 27 October 1992, Yeltsin
himself declared that Russia was not 'a country that can be kept in the waiting room'
and that Russia was no longer 'a country that only ever says Yes'. 29
 One of the main
modifications to Yeltsin's foreign policy was to take a more assertive and independent
position on some international and regional issues which had a direct impact on
Russian interests. One example of this in early 1993 was a more active policy
towards the Balkan conflict.30
Another major modification in Russian foreign policy was that the Yeltsin
leadership started to emphasise Russian relations with countries in the APR to
assuage domestic criticism of the previous pro-Western line. In late 1992, under
strong pressure from Parliament, the Foreign Ministry was forced to revise Russia's
'foreign policy concept' from a pro-Western diplomatic line to a more 'balanced'
stand. 3 ' The modified 'foreign policy concept' stressed that Russia's relations with
troops from the former Republics of the Soviet Union. See Stuart D. Goldman, 'Russia's Emerging
Foreign and Defense Policy', CRS Report for Congress, no. 94-493 F (June 1994), p.CRS-29.
2S Andrei Kozyrev, 'Partnership with the West: A Test of Strength', Moscow News, 25 October 1992.
29 Aleksandr Golts, 'Our Foreign Policy Can Have Only One Ideology - Russia's Interests. Russian
President B. N. Yeltsin Stated at Foreign Ministry Co legium Session', Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 28
October 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-209, 28 October 1992, p.14.
In early 1993, Russia demanded an easing of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro The
Russian delegation to the UN issued a statement at the Security Council condemning Croatia.
Meanwhile, the Russian parliament demanded that the Russian government should take a more active
policy towards the Balkan conflict. On 17 December 1992, the parliament drafted the 'Resolution on
the Attitude of the Russian Federation toward the Yugoslav Crisis'. This document argued that
Russia should use its right of veto in the UN Security Council if that body intended to conduct military
intervention. This development reflected the shift in Russia's foreign policy toward a more
conservative stance. See Suzanne Crow, 'Russia Adopts a More Active Policy', RFE./RL Research
Report, vol. 2, no. 12 (19 March 1993), pp.1-6.
31 In early 1992, the Russian Foreign Ministry subni tted to the parliament a draft of 'foreign policy
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the APR countries would 'play a very important part in the realisation of our [Russia's]
Eurasian status' and 'the attainment of a balance in our relations with the West'.32
During his first visit to China in December 1992, Yeltsin explained why he sought to
deepen Russia's ties with China:
We are accused of americanization, of looking towards the West all the time,
that is why we are now making the second break-through into the Asian-
Pacific Ocean region after the visit to the Republic of Korea. This, of
course, will balance our foreign policy..
Suffering under crippling economic hardships and a continuing erosion of its
international influence, Russia faced difficulty in rebuilding an image as a great
power. 34
 Playing the 'China card' was seen as a way to increase Russia's foreign
policy flexibility as China was a permanent member of UN Security Council and had
its own tensions with the USA on issues of human rights and Taiwan. Yeltsin stated
in December 1992 that 'relations with China were among the priorities of the new
Russian foreign doctrine, not only in Asia but throughout the world'.35
Bilateral Cooperation and Limitations
In the field of international diplomacy, China and Russia have common concerns
about the dominant U.S. place in world affairs. This has led them to seek greater
cooperation in this area.
First, in their Joint Declaration on 18 December 1992, China and Russia asserted
concept', stressing that Russia should cooperate with the West on economic issues and arms control.
In J ne 1992, Russian parliamentarians critic sed this document's over-emphasis on Russian relations
with the West, and called for the document to be revised See Suzanne Crow, 'Russia Debates Its
National Interests', RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 2 (July 1992), p.44.
32 
'Russian Foreign Policy Concept', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 1(1993), p.16.
E 
'Yeltsin Arrives in China', lIAR-lASS (Moscow), 17 December 1992, in SWB, FE 1567, 18
December 1992, p.At 1.
Natalia Narochnitskaya, 'Russia's National Interest', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 4 5 (1992),
pp.105-I 13.
'Holds Talks with Li Peng', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 18 December 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-244, 18
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that the new international order should be based on 'Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence': mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-
aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual
benefit; and peaceful coexistence. 36
 This political declaration made it clear that U.S.
interference in other countries' sovereignty and internal affairs was unacceptable. In
the words of Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, 'Russia and China are two great powers,
which cannot allow anyone to teach themselves (sic) how they should live and
work.' 37 In their Joint Statement on 25 April 1996, Russia reiterated that Taiwan was
an inalienable part of the Chinese territory, and China held that the question of
Chechnya was the domestic affair of Russia.38
Second, China and Russia have argued that it is important to establish a
multipolar world system, in which no country can pursue hegemony, practice power
politics or monopolise international affairs. The Joint Statement on 3 September
1994 stressed that they would intensify their cooperation in international affairs,
including the cooperation in resolving global issues. 39 To achieve this, the two
parties asserted that it was necessary to strengthen the role of the UN Security
Council in maintaining international peace and security. 40 They stressed that
December 1992, p.7.
36 
'Russia and China Sign Joint Declaration as Basis for New Relations', Xinhua news agency (Beijing),
18 December 1992, in SWB, FE/1568, 19 December 1992, p.A1/3. The Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence were initiated jointly by China, India and Burma in the 1950s. Rhetorically, China has
claimed that the five principles are the basic norms in handling its relations with all countries. For
China's speculation on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, see Chinese Foreign Minister Wu
Xueqian's speaking at the 39th Session of UN General Assembly on 26 September 1984 'China's
Stand on World Situation Outlined', Beying Review, 8 October 1984, pp.1 6-25.
" 'Eight Accords Reached', Interfax (Moscow), 26 June 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-123, 27 June 1995,
P.S.
'Russia and China Issue Joint Statement' Xinhua news agency (Beijing), 25 April 1996, in SWB,
SU 2596, 26 April 1996, p.B 1.
'Full Text of Sino-Russian Joint Statement', Xinhau news agency (Beijing), 3 September 1994, in
FBIS-CHI-94- 172, 6 September 1994, pp.2 1-22.
° 'Russia and China Issue Joint Statement', pp.B 2-3; 'Joint Statement by the People's Republic of
China and the Russian Federation on the Multipolarization of the World and the Establishment of a
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'peacekeeping operations can be undertaken only by the decision of the UN Security
Council and the approval of the countries concerned, and in strict compliance with
the Security Council mandate and its supervision'. 4 ' This policy line has sought to
restrict U.S. dominance and to reinforce the decisive influence of their right of veto in
global affairs. In addition, from the Chinese point of view, these procedures would
help to prevent the USA from interfering in any future crisis in the Taiwan Strait.42
Despite Chinese and Russian declarations to strengthen cooperation in the realm
of international diplomacy, bilateral cooperation has been actually limited. First,
given that both China and Russia have been eager to pursue domestic economic
development, they have been in need of U.S. capital, investment, and much coveted
markets.43
 Accordingly, China and Russia have sought to prevent any breakdown in
their relationship with the USA. In the seven Joint Statements issued in the 1 990s,
Beijing and Moscow repeatedly stressed that their cooperation was not directed
against any third country.	 Clearly, the two states have faced a dilemma that
required them to walk on a tightrope between seeking increasing international
influence and accommodation with the USA.
New International Order', Beying Review, 12 -18 May 1997, p.7.
'Joint Statement by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the
Multipolarization of the World and the Establishment of a New International Order', p.8.
42 Zheng Yu, 'Zhonge guanxi' [The Sino-Russian Relationship], in Weng Jie-ming, Zhang Xi-ming,
Zhang sou, et. al. (eds), Zhongguo zuixin guoqing da toushi 1997-1998 [The Prospect of the Latest
National Situation in China, 1997-1998] (Hong Kong: Mingpao Publishing Ltd., 1997), p.479.
(author's translation)
The U.S. has become a major foreign investor in China. By 1997, the U.S. had actually invested
U S $ 17 495 billion of contracted amount of U S.$ 40 063 billion More than 100 major American
companies had invested in China. See Xhang Liping, 'Chronology in Sino-U.S. Relations', Beijing
Review, 29 June - 5 July 1998, p.17.
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lIAR-lASS (Moscow), 10 December 1999, in SWB, SU 3715, 11 December 1999, p.B 2.
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As a result, while pursuing cooperation with Russia in the realm of international
diplomacy, China has insisted on an independent foreign policy. 45
 In an interview on
7 January 1998, Shi Ze, Vice President of China Institute of International Studies at
the Chinese Foreign Ministry, pointed out:
China has to maintain an overall contact with foreign states. As a great
power, China has to evaluate its own national interests and seek the dynamic
balance among the other vital powers. As such, China can preserve
foreign policy manoeuvre.46
After creation of Sino-Russian strategic partnership in April 1996, China still built up
a 'constructive strategic partnership' with the USA to boost bilateral cooperation in
November 1997.	 In December 1998, then Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni
Primakov visited India and called for the establishment of a Moscow-Beijing-New
Delhi strategic triangle. Such a proposal did not interest China, and China declined
to assume any commitment that might restrict its freedom of manoeuvre. 48
 In 1999,
Russian analyst Georgy Bovt concluded:
Now China is fully prepared to play the 'Russian card', among others, in the
interests of building its own relations with the West on the most
advantageous terms possible for itself (and at present relations with the West
are, in fact, one of the PRC's top economic priorities). Today a military
alliance between Russia and the PRC, especially an anti-Western alliance, is
impossible.49
Moreover, cooperation in the resolution of international disputes has been
limited due to different Chinese and Russian assessment of their state interests. One
example of this was the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Both China and Russia watched the
Since the early 1980s, China has adopted an independent foreign policy. Guided by this, China
claimed that it would never attach itself to any big power or group of powers. See Wu, 'China's Stand
on World Situation Outlined', p.23. Also see 2.D.
46 The author's interview with Shi Ze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS),
the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1998, Beijing.
Xhang, 'Chronology in Sino-U.S. Relations', p.16.
48 Sergei Guly, 'Triangle Embarrassment', Noviye !zvesiiya (Moscow), 22 December 1998, in CDPSP,
vol. 50, no. 51(20 January 1999), pp.25-26.
Georgy Bovt, 'Greetings to Clinton from the Middle Kingdom', Izvestiya (Moscow), 10 December
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U.S.-led NATO bombing against Yugoslavia with great concerns. They feared that
American military involvement in Yugoslavia would create a precedent for
Washington to interfere in Chinese and Russian internal affairs, if and when Russia
attacked separatist forces in Chechnya, and China cracked down dissension in the
restive ethnic regions of Xinjiang and Tibet or assaulted Taiwan. 5° China and Russia
stressed that they rejected the concept that 'human rights are superior to sovereignty'
and accused the U.S.-led NATO of flaunting the banner of humanitarianism to launch
a barbaric war against the Yugoslav people. 5 ' They called for an immediate
cessation of air strike and the return of the Kosovo crisis to political negotiations.52
Despite Sino-Russian commonalities in reaction to the U.S.-led NATO bombing
of Yugoslavia, there remained different assessments of their state interests. For
Russia, a breakdown in relations with the United States would be too costly. While
continuing to condemn the NATO bombings, Moscow decided to work together with
the West rather than engage in conflict with it. 53 After the U.S. bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1999, Beijing took a hard line and proposed
to resolve the Kosovo problem in the UN Security Council. Yet, Russia preferred a
discussion of the Kosovo issue within the context of the Group of Eight (G8) states,
of which China was not a member. In this way, the West might have listened more
to Russia's views. 54 A draft resolution proposed by G8 states was submitted to the
1999, p.!, in CDPSP, vol 51, no. 50(12 January 2000), p.3.
Bates Gill, 'Limited Engagement', Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 4 (July August 1999), p.70.
Luo Tongsong, 'Who Whips up Anti-American Feeling?', Beijing Review, 7 June 1999, p.12; 'Main
Points of the Sino-Russian Summit Statement', Inside China Today, Website http: www.insidechina.
corn features.php3?id-1 17592
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12 May 1999, pp.1,3, in CDPSP, vol. 51, no. 19(9 June 1999), pp.13-14.
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UN Security Council. It was approved on 10 June 1999, with China abstaining.55
Given that China was not fully consulted in the process of drafting a resolution on
ending the Kosovo crisis, Beijing accused G8 states of treating the Security Council
as a 'mere rubber stamp'.56
In sum, interactions among China, Russia, and the USA differ in nature from the
Cold-War triangular relationship. During the Cold War period, each player's
strategic concerns were to dominate over all others, and mutual adversity had made
each cooperative move an adjunct to the larger competitive or conflicting
relationship. 57 In contrast, the end of the Cold War coincided with the dawning of a
new era, characterised by growing economic cooperation and interdependence, even
among traditional rivals. 58 As such, both China and Russia have embraced a policy
of 'equal proximity' to other major powers. 59 The need for a stable relationship with
the USA and different assessments of their state interests have led to circumstances
where actual Chinese and Russian cooperation in international diplomacy has been
limited to diplomatic rhetoric.60
Ren Yan, 'Kosovo Issue Returns to the United Nations', Beijing Review, 28 June 1999, pp.9-10.
According to the draft resolution, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would withdraw all its military
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B) Regional Security (I): The U.S.-Dominated Regional Security Arrangements
This section will examine specific Chinese and Russian concerns about U.S.-
dominated regional security arrangements. Three issues will be addressed. First, it
will analyse Chinese anxiety about the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and a Japanese
potential threat. Second, it will address Russian fear of NATO enlargement.
Finally, it will examine the development and limits of Sino-Russian cooperation in
dealing with the U.S.-centered regional security arrangements.
Chinese Concerns about the US.-Japanese Security Alliance and a Japanese
Potential Threat
After the collapse of the Soviet military threat, the driving factor that had led to
strategic cooperation between China, the USA and Japan during the Cold War period
disappeared. (see 2.C) On the contrary, China started to view U.S.-Japanese security
cooperation and Japan itself as a potential threat.
China has increasingly seen the U.S.-Japanese military alliance as targeted
against China. In the analysis of Chinese strategist Guo Zhenyuan:
It should be particularly noted that Japanese new security strategy is based
on U.S.-Japanese security alliance. Both the USA and Japan believe that
after the Cold War, there remain very important common security interests
between them. Coping with the so-called 'China threat' jointly is the most
important aspect.6'
61 Guo Zhenyuan, 'Riben xinanquan zhanlue yu jinhou di zhongmeiri anquan guanx: 1 [Japan's New
Security Strategy and Future China-U.S.-Japan Relationshipj, Hepzngyufazhan (Beijing), no. 4 (1997),
p 10. For China's worries about the U S -Japane e security cooperation, also see Zang Shijun
'Guanyu zhongri guanshi di jige went? [Issues on Sino-Japanese Relations], Guojiwenti luntan
(Shanghai), no. 4 (1997), pp.27-29; Sun Cheng (ed.), Riben yu yatai shiji zhijiao difenxiyu zhanwang
[Japan and the Asia-Pacific: Analysis and Prospect at the Turn of the Century] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi
Publishing House, 1997), p.90 (author's translation); Shi Yongming, 'Yatai anquan zhong di maodunyu
hezuo' [Asia-Pacific Security: Contradictions and Cooperation], Guojiwuti yanjiu (Beijing), no. 3
(1997), p.17; Chen Yali, 'US-Japan Alliance Not Conducive to Peace', China Daily (Beijing), 26 May
1997; He Fang, 'US Threatens Asia's Security', China Daily (Beijing), 2 April 1997; Ni Feng,
'Enhanced US-Japanese Security Alliance: Cause for Concern', Beijing Review, 16-22 June 1997, pp.7-
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During the Cold War, China thought that U.S.-Japanese security cooperation could
help to restrain a resurgence of Japanese militarism and to cope with the Soviet
military threat. 62
 However, after the Cold War, China has become worried that the
U.S.-Japanese security alliance might encourage Japan to play a more positive role in
the military-security field in the APR. 63
 In April 1996, the USA and Japan decided
to extend the application area of the 'Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation'.
'The Far East', an expression used in the past, was replaced by the 'Asian and Pacific
region' to cover the area of the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea regarded by
China as its territory. TM
 On 15 April 1996, the 'Agreement between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Reciprocal
Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Armed Forces of
the United States of America and the Self-Defence Forces of Japan' was signed.
This agreement promoted military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in a future
international crisis.6
In order to cope with strengthening U.S.-Japanese security cooperation, Chinese
analysts have suggested that China should strengthen ties with Russia. As Li Jingjie,
Deputy Director of the Institute of East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies
at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argued in 1997:
After the Cold War ended, the West led by the United States has viewed
Russia as a potential threat to Europe and is now trying to contain that
country by expanding NATO eastwards. Whereas in Asia, China has been
the bogey, and to counteract this potential threat attempts are being made to
strengthen the U.S.-Japanese alliance and so contain the People's Republic
of China. This Western policy, in effect, places China and Russia in
62 Zang, 'Issues on Sino-Japanese Relations', p.27.
63 Guo, 'Japan's New Security Strategy and Future China-U.S.-Japan Relationship', plO.
Tadashi Nishihara, 'Japan and the United States Now Look More Like Allies', Asahi Shimbun
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similar strategic circumstances.
Moreover, viewed from the perspective of geopolitics, Japan, in its own right,
could be a major rival to China for political and economic influence in the APR.
According to Bonnie S. Glaser, China has worried that, by the beginning of the 21st
century, Japan will emerge as a political or military power posing a direct threat to
China. If it becomes even stronger economically, Japan may terminate its security
reliance on the USA and seek to become a dominating regional power. On the other
hand, if Japan suffers an economic downturn, this may also create greater pressure for
the country to pursue a militaristic path to restore its status and pride.67
The historical experience of the Japanese invasion of the 1930s has created
lingering Chinese distrust of Japan. 68 To date, China and Japan have not resolved
the territorial dispute of the Diaoyu Islands (called the Senkaku Islands by the
Japanese). In China's view, the resurrection of Japanese militarism is likely. The
establishment of Japanese Defence Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) in January 1997
has been seen to support this view. 69 In 1997, Liu Jiangyong, Director of the
Department of Northeast Asian Studies at the Institute of Contemporary International
Relations, commented:
Li Jingjie, 'The Progress of Chinese-Russian Relations: From Friendship to Strategic Partnership',
Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 3(1997), pp.44-45.
67 Bonnie S. Glaser, 'China's Security Perceptions: Interests and Ambitions', Asian Survey, vol. 33, no.
3 (March 1993), p.258. This article is based on Glaser's interviews with Chinese officials and
analysts in October 1991 and November 1992. For a discussion of China's worry about a Japanese
potential threat, also see Thomas J. Chnstensen, 'China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security
Dilemma in East Asia', International Security, vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), pp.52-57.
68 According to a poll of Chinese youth on issues related to 5mb-Japanese relations, over 40 per cent
held a 'negative' view of Japan. Meanwhile, 96.6 per cent of those surveyed said that they were
reminded of Japanese imperial atrocities in the Second World War when they saw a Japanese 'Sun
Flag'. See Jiang Yuechun, 'Sino-Japanese Relations in the New Era', International Studies (Beijing),
no.12 14 (1997), p.19.
69 On 7 January 1997, DIH was established to improve Japan's intelligence capabilities. Its head, Lt.
Gen. Masahmro Kunimi, had an intelligence background with an emphasis on China. See 'Intelligence
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After the creation of Japanese Intelligence Headquarters in this year, the
military's influence on Japanese foreign strategy decision-making will be
augmented. In the case that Japan is dominated by the military and utilises
the 'China threat' as the basis of its strategy of China, the result will lead to a
recurrence of Chinese and Japanese strategic confrontation.7°
On the Japanese side, China has also been regarded as a potential threat to its
security. China's war games off the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 deepened Japanese
worries that China might menace its neighbours with a diplomacy of intimidation as it
gains more economic confidence and military power. According to an opinion poll
conducted in Japan in May 1997, 54 per cent of Japanese respondents believed that
'Chinese military modernization would pose a threat to Asian security and stability'.7'
In reaction, Japan announced the 'Mid-Term Defense Program (FYi 996-FY2000)' to
modernise the Self-Defence Force (SDF). 72
 The SDF also planned to equip the
Southwestern Composite Air Division in Naha, Okinawa (which is adjacent to China),
with F-i 5s. Meanwhile, whilst the number of P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft
was being reduced nationwide, the number of P-3Cs deployed at the 5th Fleet Air
Wing on Okinawa has been kept at high levels.73
Due to such mistrust, China and Japan have interpreted the defence
modernisation of the other as a potential offensive threat. In order to cope with the
HQ Builds Bilateral Exchange', JDW, 9 July 1997, p.25.
70 Liu Jiangyong, 'Zhongri Iiaguo mianxiang eshiyi shiji di zhanlue xuanze' [Strategic Choice for China
and Japan to Keep Abreast of2I' t Century], Hepingyufazhan (Beijing), no. 3 (1997), p.31.
l 'Meirijianghuajungshi uanxii zhenzheng mubiao shi zhonggong' [The Strengthened U.S.-Japanese
Military Tie is Targeted at Communist China], Chungkuo shihpao (Taipei), 9 June 1997. (author's
translation) For a discussion of Japanese worry about China's defence modemisation, see Valery
Kistanov 'Japan's Attitudes to Russian-Chinese Strategic Partnership', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow)
no. 2 (1997), p.55; tkuo Kayahara, 'China as a Military Power in the Twenty-first Century', Japan
Review of International Affairs (Tokyo), vol. 12, no. I (Spring 1998), pp.49-68.
These projects included the upgrade of the F-15IDJ interceptor and P-3C patrol aircraft, the
improvement of Patriot and HAWK surface-to-air missile systems, the production of the new-
generation F-2 fighters, and the continuing acquisition of All-i S anti-tank helicopters. See 'On the
Mid-Term Defense Program (FY-1996-FY2000)', Defense of Japan 1997 (Tokyo: The Japanese
Defense Agency, 1997), pp.301-306.
'DA to Reinforce Air Rapid Alert System', Nihon Keizai Shibun (Tokyo), 20 September 1995, p.2, in
FBIS-EAS-95-183, 21 September 1995, p.6.
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possible resurrection of Japanese militarism, China has sought to develop cooperation
with Russia. During his visit to Moscow on 8 May 1995, Chinese President Jiang
Zemin noted the tremendous Chinese national sacrifices incurred in fighting against
the Japanese during the Second World War. The Chinese leader asserted that, in
order to prevent such terrible tragedies from happening again, China and Russia had
to continue to cooperate in fighting against 'fascism and militarism'. 74 This
argument implied that China saw the strengthening of Sino-Russian relations as a
means to prevent a resurgent Japanese military role in Northeast Asia.
Russian Concerns about NATO Enlargement
In January 1994, NATO formally launched the 'Partnership for Peace' (NP)
programme as the first step to implement the enlargement of NATO eastward to
shelter the Central and Eastern European countries. 75 This programme has led many
Russian politicians to believe that the West still regarded Russia as a 'real enemy'.76
From Russia's point of view, NATO enlargement would radically worsen
Russia's geo-strategic situation, and could lead to its international isolation. In 1995,
Sergei Rogov, Director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies at Russian
Academy of Sciences, commented:
Washington seems to be conceiving a new geopolitical strategy whose top
priority is preservation of the system of military-political alliances set up by
the United States during the Cold War... These developments create the
impression that the West continues to play a zero-game with Russia and tries
to consolidate its victory in the Cold War at the expense of the loser's
'Anniversary of VE-Day Boosts Sino-Russian Ties', Beijing Review, 29 May -4 June 1995, p.5.
NATO has sought to develop military cooperation with partner states, for the purpose of joint
planning, training, and exercises, so as to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The PfP programme planned to eventually accept some
Central and Eastern European countries for NATO membership. See Manfred Wörner, 'Shaping the
Alliance for the Future', NATO Review, vol.42, no. I (February 1994), pp-5-6.
76 Andrei Kozyrev, 'Partnership or Cold Peace?, Fore gn Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995), p.1 1.
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interests.77
The Russian military has been worried that NATO enlargement would seriously
change the balance of military forces in Europe. In the analysis of Major General A.
F. Klimenko, following enlargement, NATO would extend a further 750 km towards
the east. As a result, the Russian strategic warning period would be shortened.78
According to Klimenko, those new allies would increase the combat strength of
NATO's ground forces by 20 per cent, and its air forces by 10-15 per cent. The new
network of NATO airfields would enable its tactical aviation to increase the depth of
strikes at Russia's territory up to Smolensk and Kursk.79
In December 1995, Russia stressed that the 'expansion' of NATO might put an
end to Russian cooperation with the West and force Russia to take counter-measures,
including reintroducing Russian combat forces and tactical nuclear weapons into the
western Russian and Belarusian regions. 8° In June 1996, then Russian Defence
Minister Pavel Grachev warned that if NATO deployed tactical weapons in Eastern
Europe, this would lead to a new 'Cold Peace' between Russia and NATO.8'
The credibility of these threats was diluted because of Russian political and
economic weaknesses. Playing the 'China card' was expected to offer Russia some
compensation for its loss of influence in Europe and also to make Russia more
confident to make adjustments in its relations with the USA and other NATO
Sergei Rogov, Russia and the United States: A Partnership or Another Disengagement',
International Affairs (Moscow), no. 7 (1995), p.7.
Maj. Gen. A. F. Klimenko, 'International Security and Character of Future Military Conflicts',
Military Thought (Moscow), vol. 6, no. 1(1997), p.7.
' Ibid.
s Strategic Survey 1995 96 (London: HSS, 1996), p.122.
' 'Army General Pavel Grachev: In Four Years We Have Learned not only to Discuss the Army and
Navy's Problems, but also to Solve Them Independently', Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 30 May 1996,
in SWB, SU/2617, 1 June 1996, p.S1 1.
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members. 82
 In the mid-i 990s, the Russian fear of NATO enlargement constituted an
important factor which pushed Russia to enhance its relations with China. Grachev
played the 'China card' in 1996, warning that if NATO expanded to the Russian
traditional sphere of influence, Russia would go 'east' too and 'form a rival alliance
with China'.83
Bilateral Cooperation and Limitations
As a result of their disagreement with the U.S.-centered regional security
arrangements in Asia and Europe, China and Russia have claimed that 'developing
bilateral relations is of great significance to their common security'. TM
 In their Joint
Statements during the 1990s, these two countries repeatedly condemned
expansionism, power politics and the establishment of 'antagonistic' political and
military groups in international and regional politics.85
Although China and Russia have shown their opposition to 'bloc politics'
through diplomatic rhetoric, concrete cooperation on this issue has been limited.
First, while Beijing has regarded the U.S.-Japanese military alliance as a serious
security threat, Moscow has seen the maintenance of U.S.-Japanese security
cooperation as being in Russia's security interests. This has been reflected in the
unofficial 'Russian National Security Concept for 1994' drafted by Russian political
elites and defence experts:
82 Anatoly Boliatko, 'Military and Technological Cooperation, and Prospects of Russian-Chinese
Strategic Interaction', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 3 (1997), pp 55-56.
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The maintenance of the U.S. military presence in Japan is in line with
Russia's interests in the Far East. In the event of withdrawal by the United
States and of China's headlong economic and military strengthening, Japan's
reaction could only take the form of accelerated remilitarization... Any
sharp change of the balance of forces in favor of China or Japan and the
emergence of hegemonic aspiration in one of the two powers could pose a
direct threat to Russia's Far East.86
Second, in spite of Chinese anxieties about the potential Japanese threat, Russian
interests have not resided in developing cooperation with China at the cost of
relations with Japan. While attempting to develop its Far East areas, Russia has
required Japanese participation, in particular, financial investment. 87
 In October
1997, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto revised the policy of 'non-
separation of economy and politics' towards Russia.88
 Guided by this new policy,
both sides have expressed their desire to develop economic cooperation, in particular,
in the fields of energy development and the promotion of a market economy in
Russia.89
Russian and Japanese cooperation has also extended to military and security
affairs. In November 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto and Yeltsin agreed
to conduct joint military exercises focusing on humanitarian missions and disaster-
relief operations. A regular exchange of visits between the chief of Japan's Joint
Staff Council and the Russian counterpart was also concluded. 90
 In November 1998,
Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi issued a Joint Statement,
86 
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89 Peter Landers and Sergei Blagov, 'Warmth in Siberia: Hashimoto and Yeltsin Hope to Thaw
Relations', FEER, 30 October 1997, p.30.
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declaring the emergence of 'constructive partnership' and expressing Russian-
Japanese determination to develop bilateral cooperation.9 ' Clearly, although China
has seen Japan as its major geopolitical rival in the next century, Russia has sought to
pursue economic and security cooperation with both China and Japan to ensure its
own interests.
Third, although Chinese President Jiang Zemin publicly stated in 1996 that
NATO's 'expansion' eastwards to Russia's border was impermissible, such diplomatic
rhetoric had no practical influence on the process of NATO enlargement.92
Economic and political weakness led to a recognition in Russia that despite its dislike
for NATO enlargement, Russia could not prevent it happening.93
 On 27 May 1997,
the 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO
and Russia' was signed. Both sides agreed to set up the NATO-Russia Permanent
Joint Council to enhance their consultations on security issues of common concern.94
To avoid offending the USA, both China and Russia have declared that they
would not develop an alliance relationship. 95
 This has limited actual Russian-
Chinese cooperation in countering NATO enlargement. More significantly, China
did not show strong support for Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement. Beijing
worried that strong opposition to NATO enlargement might have disrupted relations
p.3, in CDPSP, vol. 50, no.22 (1 July 1998), pp.20-21.
'Text of Russian-Japanese Moscow Declaration', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 13 November 1998, in
SWB, SU 3386, 17 November 1998, p.B 12.
'Yeltsin Upbeat Following Talks with Chinese President', 1TAR-TASS (Moscow) 25 April 1996 in
SWB, SU/2596, 26 April 1996, p.B 5.
Margot Ligit, Stephen White and John LOwenhardt, 'A Wider Europe: The View from Moscow and
Kyiv', International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 1 (January 2000), pp.77-88.
For full text of the Act, see SIPRI Yearbook 1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.168-
173.
'Denies PRC Military Allianc&, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 18 December 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-244,
18 December 1992, pp.6-l; Principles of Relations with the CIS', Beijing Review, 14-20 December
1992, p.10; 'Foreign Minister Briefs Parliament on Russian-Chinese Relations', ITAR-TASS
(Moscow), 16 September 1999, in SWB, SU 3643, 18 September 1999, p.B 15.
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between China and those Eastern European states which have joined or intended to
join NATO. Taiwan might exploit such a situation to develop its ties with those
Eastern European states.
These developments have suggested clearly that although China and Russia have
attempted to cooperate to counter U.S.-centered regional security arrangements in
Asia and Europe, a gap has existed between their political pledges and actual
cooperation. Distinct geopolitical interests and different perceptions of military
threats restricted these two parties' cooperation in resisting the U.S.-Japanese security
alliance and NATO enlargement.
C) Regional Security (II): The Central Asia Factor
Stability in Central Asia, adjacent to both Chinese and Russian territories, has been
another common security concern. An increase in ethnic extremism and Islamic
fundamentalism in this region might pose a direct threat to Chinese and Russian
territorial security. This discussion will explore China and Russia's concerns about
stability in Central Asia, and the development and limitations of their bilateral
cooperation in this area.
Chinese Concerns about Central Asia
For China, Central Asia lies in a very important geographical location. Following
the demise of the USSR, three of the five new Central Asian states, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, share borders with China's Xinjiang province. Chinese
concerns about Central Asia have resided in two major areas. First, China has
' Zheng, The Sino-Russian Relationship', p.482.
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worried that the political situation in these newly independent states could affect
separatism in Xinjiang. Second, China has been interested in the development of
natural resources in Central Asia.
Within Xinjiang province, Uighur, Kazakh, Tajik, Uzbek and Tatar nationalities
share ethnic ties with the Central Asian countries. 97 The disintegration of the USSR
deepened China's fear that the independence of these Central Asian states would
encourage separatism in Xinjiang and legitimize the separatists' struggle for
independence. Also, China worried that Iranian-backed Islamic fundamentalism and
Pan-Turkism would come to the borders of China.98
Since 1990, anti-Communist and nationalist demonstrations have occurred in
some areas of Xinjiang, such as Tacheng, Bole, Atai and Aksu. An armed rebellion,
which was launched by local Muslim leaders to pursue the establishment of a
Republic of East Turkestan, occurred in Xinjiang in April l990. 	 In March 1992,
Tomur Dawamat, Chairman of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region People's
Government, warned:
The changeable international situation has affected and is still affecting
Xinjiang's social stability. Hostile forces, both at home and abroad, have
stepped up their infiltration, subversion and sabotage.'°°
There were reports that Muslims in Xinjiang were arming themselves with weapons
smuggled from abroad. Supply routes for arms started from Afghanistan, passing
The minority nationalities in Xinjiang speak the Turkish language and believe in Islam. They see
Turkey and the Middle East rather than China as their spiritual and cultural home. For further
d scussion, see Lillian Craig Harris, 'Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Pol cy in
the Islamic World', The China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993), p.114; Diii C. Gladney, 'The Muslim
Face of China', Current History, vol. 92, no. 575 (September 1993), pp.275-280.
Harris, 'Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in the Islamic World', pp 120-
121.
Chu Chien-ling, 'Fuping xinjiang duli qingxu, zhonggong dakaoyan', [Easing Xinjiang's
Independence Emotion: A Big Challenge to Communist China], Chungkuo shihpao (Taipei), II
February 1997. (author's translation)
'Tomur Dawamat Urges Crackdown on Separatism', Zhong Tongxun She (Hong Kong), 17 March
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over the Afghan-Tajik frontier to enter Xinjiang.'°'
In addition to concerns about the political situation in Central Asia, China has
expressed a strong interest in the development of natural resources in this region.
China has argued that the most important unexploited petroleum reserves in the world
lie in Central Asia.'° 2 Given this, China has sought to enhance economic
cooperation with the Central Asian countries. In 1997, China and Kazakhstan
signed an agreement on petroleum production, calling on China to invest U.S.$ 9-10
billion in the latter.'° 3 Also, China planned to build a new railroad that would start
from China's eastern coast passing through Central Asia and linking eventually with
Amsterdam.'°4 Closer economic ties with Central Asian states have been seen as a
means to extend the Chinese presence in this region and increase China's leverage in
preventing the Central Asian countries from supporting separatism in Xinjiang.
While developing economic cooperation with Central Asian states, Beijing has
demanded that these states pay respect to the principle of non-interference in each
other's internal affairs.'°5
In order to promote its interests, China has been concerned about the
development of the policies of the USA, Russia, Iran, and Turkey toward Central
Asia.'°6 In particular, while strengthening its cooperation with Central Asia, China
1992, in FBIS-CHI-92-053, 18 March 1992, p.59.
'°' 'Sino-Russian Accord May Curtail Rebel Arms Traffic', Jane's International Defence Review, no.
29 (August 1996), p.13.
2 Feng Yujun, 'Daguoji diqu shill dui zhongya guojiasuo di zhengduo jiqi yinxiang' [The Contention
of Big Powers and Regional Forces for Central Asia and Caucasia and Its Effects], Dongou 7hnngya
yanjiu (Beijing), no. 6 (1997), p.79.
'3 Dai Xiaohua, 'China-Kazakhstan Trade and Economic Cooperation Promising', Being Review, 18-
24 May 1998.
04 Gulya Chernogayeva, 'Bypassing Russia: Railroad from China Will Deprive Trans-Siberian of All
International Freight', Kommersant-Daily (Moscow), 29 April 1997, p.6, in CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 19 (11
June 1997), pp.19-20.
'5 Chinese Premier Li Peng, 'China's Basic Policy towards Central Asia', Beijing Review, 2-8 May
1994, p.19.
06 Ou Zhongyan, 'Dui dangqian zhongya diqu xingshi di jidian sikao' [Reflections on the Current
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has recognised the need to take into account the Russian political, military, and
economic presence in this region.'°7
Russian Concerns about Central Asia
Russia's relations with Central Asian countries are important politically and in terms
of security. In 1993, Russia developed a 'Monroe Doctrine' for the former Soviet
periphery, which allocated to Russia the role of sole guarantor of security in the 'near
abroad'.'°8
 Guided by this doctrine, Russia has built close security relations with the
Central Asian states.
Historical and geopolitical factors have led Russia to regard Central Asia as part
of its sphere of influence. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia has sought to
strengthen its role as a security guarantor in the region by means of bilateral treaties
with these former Soviet republics, and through the establishment of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) collective security system.'°9
In order to ensure stability in Central Asia, Russia has also played an important
role in defending the external borders of these CIS members. Russian border troops
remain in Tajikistan. In this way, Russia has sought to prevent ethnic extremism,
arms smuggling, and terrorism from spreading into this region, and to strengthen its
role as regional security guarantor.°
Situation in Central Asia], Guoji wutiyanj:u (Beijing), no. 3 (1997), pp.39-43; Feng, 'The Contention
of Big Powers and Regional Forces', pp 78-84.
107 Ou, 'Reflections on the Current Situation in Central Asia', p.43; Feng, 'The Contention of Big
Powers and Regional Forces', pp.81-82.
'o Mohiaddin Mesbahi, 'Russia and Its Central Asian "Near-Abroad": Towards a Doctrine for the
Periphery', in Haffeez Malik (ed.), The Role of the United States, Russia and China in the New World
Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1997), pp.162-163.
Ibid., p.163; Sergei Gretzky, Russia's Policy toward Central Asia (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow
Center, 1997,), pp.9-18.
110 Vladimir Klimov, 'l'hrough Transparent Borders', Ross iyskaya gazeta (Moscow), 26 August 1994,
p.1, in FBIS-SOV-94-169, 31 August 1994, pp.17-18.
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Moreover, many ethnic Russians still live in Central Asia. Ethnic Russians
accounted for 38 per cent of population in Kazakhstan, 22 per cent in Kyrgyzstan, and
8-10 per cent in Tajikistan." In its military doctrine, Russia stressed that the
suppression of the rights, freedom and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian
Federation residing in foreign states' was a potential source of military threat.
Russia did not discount the possibility that inter-ethnic conflict in Central Asia could
lead to Russian military intervention in these states."2
Bilateral Cooperation and Limitations
Regional security concerns in Central Asia may provide the basis for Russian and
Chinese cooperation. However, these could also create antagonism in their relations.
In the context of bilateral cooperation, shared concerns about Central Asia's stability
have given reasons for China and Russia to coordinate and consult on security issues
arising in Central Asia. The maintenance of regional stability and the prevention of
Islamic extremism have been vital issues enhancing Chinese and Russian cooperation
in Central Asia."3
At the five-nation Alma-Ata summit on 3 July 1998, the leaders of China, Russia,
and three Central Asian countries - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - declared
that 'any form of national splittism (sic), ethnic exclusion and religious extremism is
unacceptable'." 4 The parties declared that they would strengthen multilateral
cooperation in controlling international terrorism, organised crime, arms smuggling,
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), p.81.
112 
"Detailed Account of Russia's Military Doctrine", Rosszyskiye Vesti (Moscow), 18 November 1993,
pp.1-2, in SWB, SU/1858, 29 November 1993, pSI 3.
'Meeting with Kozyrev: Need to Contain Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia', ITAR-TASS
(Moscow), 24 November 1992, in SWB, SU 1549, 27 November 1992, p.A1/2.
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and the trafficking of drugs. The five leaders pledged not to allow their territories to
be used for activities which would undermine the national sovereignty, security and
social order of any of them."5
During the post-Cold War period, China and Russia sought to cooperate in this
region based on realistic assessments of political developments. In developing
relations with the Central Asian states, China has had to take account of Russia's
close ethnic, political, and security ties with the states in this region." 6
 Although
Russia has played the role of guarantor of security in this region, it has had to face the
fact that Central Asian states have been eager to develop economic cooperation with
China, a growing economic power."7
Nevertheless, there still exists potential competition between China and Russia
for political influence and economic resources in Central Asia. To retain the near
abroad countries in its sphere of influence, Russian has tried to keep these countries
dependent on arms supplies from Russja." 8
 However, China has tried to extend its
military presence in the Central Asia. In 1994, Russian military officers warned that
China had commenced arms deliveries to some Central Asian StatC5." 9
 Concerns
over increasing China's presence in Central Asia partly accounted for why Russia
sought to create the CIS Defence Council in the mid-1990s.' 2° According to the
'Joint Statement of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan on the Alma-Ata Meeting',
Beijing Review, 27 July -2 August 1998, p.9.
Ibid.
116 For official statements on Chinese re pect for Russia's links with Central Asian states, see 'Meetin"
with Kozyrev', p.A I 2; Li, 'China's Basic Policy towards Central Asia', p.1 9.
Aleksandr Bovin, 'Asian Themes', Jzvestiya (Moscow), 21 July 1998, p.3, in CDPSP, vol. 50, no. 29
(19 August 1998), p.21.
' Igor Khripunov, 'Russia's Arms Trade in the Post-Cold War Period', The Washington Quarterly, vol.
17, no.4 (Autumn 1994), p.87.
119 Sergey Mashtakov, 'MiG's in Malaysia Too. Who Else Will Buy Our Fighters'?', Rossiyskaya
gazeta (Moscow), 7 September 1994, p.3, in FBIS-SOV-94-173, 7 September 1994, pp.12-13.
120 Irma Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia (London: The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1995), pp.33-34.
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Kazakh Defence Minister Mukhtar A!tynbayev, Kazakhstan has started to receive
military aids from China. This aid included 'communication equipment and other
equipment needed for headquarters'. Both sides also planned to strengthen their
cooperation in military education and training.' 2 ' In addition, China also sought to
develop military cooperation with Tajikistan.'22
Moreover, China's objective to use its economic strength to strengthen its
involvement in this region could lead to Russian anxiety over Chinese competition
for economic assets in this region. Russia has seen the Chinese plan to build a new
railroad that would link the Chinese eastern coast passing through Central Asia as
'extremely disadvantageous to Russia'.' 23
 The new railroad could deprive the
Russian Trans-Siberian Railroad of all international transit freight. In April 1997,
Russia declined to send a delegation to the Tashkent conference, at which China,
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan signed a memorandum on the construction of this new
railroad.' 24 In 1998, in commenting on the potential competition between China and
Russia in this region, Walter Schilling concluded:
The future role of China in the Central Asia (sic) region is already becoming
clear. In deciding to build a 3,000 km pipeline from Kazakstan (sic) to
western China, Beijing has given notice of its major interest in the region
and has unambiguously signaled that it regards itself as a competitor with
Russia and America for the raw material reserves of Central Asia. The
estimated cost of this huge project, $ 10 billion, represents China's largest
foreign investment to date.'25
Given that Russia has regarded Central Asia as part of its sphere of influence,
Russia is likely to seek to prevent any third party, including China, from achieving or
121 
'Chinese Military Delegation Pledges Aid', Kazakh Khabar TV (Almaty), 23 July 1999, in SWB,
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obtaining major political-military access to the region at the expense of Russia.' 26 If
China's political influence in Central Asia grows with its military and economic
involvement, potential competition between China and Russia may arise.
0) Economic Affairs
Beijing has regarded economic reform as a priority for Chinese development.
Moscow similarly has viewed the achievement of economic recovery as a vital
national interest. To understand bilateral cooperation, this section will address
Chinese concerns to increase economic prosperity in the border areas. Also, it will
explore Russia's eagerness to enhance trade cooperation with China. Finally, it will
examine bilateral economic cooperation and the problems this has faced.
Chinese Concerns to Increase Economic Prosperity in the Border Areas
During the post-Cold War period, Chinese leaders have viewed it as an important
political task to accelerate the country's economic reform and to increase prosperity.'27
In an attempt to facilitate economic development, China has sought to create special
economic zones, open coastal areas, and increase border trade.' 28 Several factors
explain the Chinese interest in developing trade cooperation with Russia.
First, the Russian level of development and types of economic structures have
been close to those of China's northern provinces - Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and
- Walter Schilling, 'The Return of Geopolitics in the Caucasus and Central Asia', Aussenpolilik, vol.
49, no. 2 (1998), p.54.
126 Mesbahi, 'Russia and Its Central Asian "Near-Abroad", pp.162-163.
127 Geng Yuxin, 'China Turns to Market Economy', Beijing Review, 9-15 November 1992, p.4; Chinese
President Jiang Zemin, Gaoju Deng Xiao-ping lilun weida qizhi. ba
 jianshe you zhongguo tese
.chehui zhuyi shiye quanmian tuixiang 2Ish:ji [Lift the Great Flag of Deng Xiaoping's Theory to Push
the Construction of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21st Century (Beijing: The
People's Publishing House, 1997).
128 
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Heilongjiang. Developing border trade with Russia might help to increase economic
prosperity in these areas.' 29
 The concentration of economic growth on the Chinese
coastal areas has left the three northern provinces with a growing recognition of the
need for trade with Russia. Economic development along the Chinese-Russian
border areas has been seen as a means to assist China in balancing the current
concentration of economic growth on the country's coastal provinces and decreasing
differences in economic development between these areas.'3°
Moreover, it was argued that trading complementary commodities could meet
the objective requirements of both countries' economjes.' 3 ' China could export
consumer goods, foods, daily necessities, and light industrial and textile products for
which Russia has a need and which it could not buy from the West because of a lack
of hard currency. On the other hand, Russia could export power equipment, raw
materials, transport machinery, and chemical products which were in short supply in
China due to its rapid economic development.'32
China also has been interested in the development of natural resources in
Russian Siberia and the Russian Far East, as the region accounts for around half of
the world coal deposits, over one-third of natural gas, and around one-fifth of oil.'11
An ambitious project called the 'Tumen River Economic Zone' (TREZ) project has
sought to create a large free trade belt along the Tumen River Delta. It has planned
to develop the rich natural resources of this region through labour from China, Russia
1993, p.11!.
12 Hou Baoquan, Prospects for Sino-Russian Trade', Beijing Review, 5-11 September 1994, pp.1 9-21.
130 Long Xuanxi, 'Brief Discussion on the Features of China's Strategy to Open Border Areas to the
Outside World', Renmin Ribao (Beijing), 4 December 1992, p.5, in FBIS-CHI-92-246, 22 December
1992, pp.19-21.
The author's interview with Prof. Xia Yishan, Head of the East European, Russian and Central
Asian Studies, CIIS, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1998, Beijing.
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and North Korea, as well as with the participation of capital and technologies from
Japan and South Korea.' 34 As growing economic and industrial development has
highlighted the need for natural resources, Beijing has shown a stronger interest in the
development of TREZ than other countries.' 35 In September 1994, Chinese
President Jiang Zemin claimed that geographical advantages and complementary
economic structures had made economic cooperation with Russia possible and
desirable.'36
Russian Concerns to Seek Economic Recovery
Economic recovery has been a vital component of Russian national interests.'37
While pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy in early 1992, the Yeltsin leadership
expected that Western economic assistance would help Russia to overcome economic
hardship. However, the greatest portion of the U.S.$ 24 billion Western aid package
focused only on trade credits, and less than U.S.$ 2 billion of the aid was paid out in
1993. The only exception in Western assistance was the defence-related programme,
which helped Russia to eliminate nuclear warheads.' 38 By 1994, due to opposition
North Korea was the first country to venture a proposal to explore the delta with international
assistance. In July 1991, the UN Development Programme convened the first international
conference on the TREZ project, in which China, North Korea, Mongolia, and South Korea
participated. See 'lumen River Delta: Far East's Future Rotterdam', Beijing Review, 20-26 April
1992, pp.5-6. For further details on this project, see Andrew Marton, Terry McGee and Donald 0.
Paterson, 'Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation and the Tumen River Area Development Project',
The PacfIc Affairs, vol. 68, no. I (Spring 1995), pp.8-33.
' 'lumen River Delta: Far East's Future Rotterdam', p.6.
36 
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and reliable transportation, storage, and destruction of weapons and on prevention of nuclear weapons
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112
from the U.S. Congress, U.S. aid for Russian economic reforms decreased by 94 per
cent.'39
Given its disappointment with economic aid and the shift away from a pro-
Western diplomatic line, the Yeltsin government started to focus on developing
economic cooperation with the APR states. This was reflected by a document
entitled 'A New Approach to National Security Issues', which was drafted by the
Russian Security Council in 1996. This document asserted that strengthening
economic cooperation with countries in the APR could reduce Russia's diplomatic
and economic dependence on the West.' 4° However, Russia has never been an active
actor in the economic development of the APR. With obstacles in Russian-Japanese
relations in the early 1990s, Russia had expected to build closer economic ties with
China in an attempt to develop its Far East and enter into joint economic activities in
the APR.'4'
In addition, the successful experience of China in building private businesses,
joint ventures, and special economic zones, as well as in converting military
industries to civilian purposes, was expected to provide Russia with useful ways of
seeking economic recovery.' 42
 During a visit to China in May 1994, then Russian
Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin had stated: 'The economic zone in Shanghai is a
fissile materials storage for U.S.$ 15 million in October 1992; construction of a fissile materials
storage for U.S.$ 75 million in September 1993; and accounting, control, and physical protection of
nuclear materials for U.S.$ 30 million in September 1993. See 'Russian-American Cooperation on
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Their Proliferation', International Affairs
(Moscow) vol 42, no. 3 (1996), pp.36-37.
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May 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94- 104, 31 May 1994, p.1 0. For the obstacles in Russian-Japanese relations
in the early 1990s, see 3.B.
42 Alexander Lukin, 'Russia's Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations', East Asia, vol. 17, no. I
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real miracle, and the Chinese experiment should be put to use in Russia as quickly as
possible'.'43
The rapid growth of border trade in the early 1 990s has led many areas of the
Russian Far Eastern regions to depend economically on the neighbouring provinces in
China. In 1993, China's share in the foreign trade of the Jewish Autonomous
Region and the Amur Region in Russia amounted to 94.6 and 92 per cent.' 44
 In this
year, in the east of Primorskiy and Khabarovsk Krays, China's share in the total trade
was nearly 48 per cent.' 45
 With growing border trade between Russia's Far East and
China, local authorities of the Amur and Chita regions have been interested in trade
cooperation with China.'46
Bilateral Cooperation and Limitations
Chinese and Russian expectations for closer trade cooperation have been reflected in
their Joint Statements, which have expressed a determination to strengthen their
economic cooperation and bilateral trade.' Although China and Russia have shown
strong interests in developing trade ties, bilateral cooperation has failed to reach the
level expected. In 1992 and 1993, about 80 - 90 per cent of Sino-Russian bilateral
trade was conducted at the cross-border and local level, while the major trade partners
were mainly small companies and shuttle merchants.' 48
 Even though Chinese-
'" Praises Shanghai as Economic Model', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 28 May 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-
104,31 May 1994, pp.10-lI
' Victor Larin, 'Russia and China on the Threshold of the Third Millennium: So Who Is Going to
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Russian trade reached U.S.$ 6 - 7 billion annually in the mid-1990s, this trade volume
accounted for a mere 5 per cent of Russia's total foreign trade, and 2.5 per cent of
China's.49
Viewed from the perspective of 'strategic cooperation', the U.S.$ 6 billion in
Russian-S mo annual trade may be considered insignificant when compared to Sino-
American annual trade totaling U.S.$ 50 billion. (see Table 2) Chinese and Russian
leaders have worried that the failure to boost the scale of economic cooperation may
create problems for the development of their 'partnership'.' 5° The factors which
obstructed bilateral trade cooperation have included the poor quality of Chinese
products, confusion in the Russian system of taxation, a lack of effective
administrative management in Russia, and the low consumption capabilities of the
Russian population.'5'
















Source: State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China, China Statistical
Yearbooks (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, years 1993-99)
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Chinese and Russian cooperation in multilateral economic activities in the APR
has been limited, even though China has supported Russia's admission to the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).' 52
 Chinese and Russian joint ventures in the
Far East region have remained small scale projects, such as hotels, canteens and
restaurants, cloth-making, and medical centres.' 53	Moreover, although local
governments of the Amur and Chita Regions have supported economic cooperation
with China, local authorities of Primorskiy Kray have voiced concerns about China's
expansion into the Russian Far East. Local authorities have expressed opposition to
the TREZ project, in which China was interested. In their opinion, China may build
a sea port in this region, and this project would decrease the importance of the
Russian ports of Vladivostok and Nakhodka. Local opposition led China to modify
the TREZ project in l995.'
In order to achieve economic recovery, the Yeltsin government expressed strong
interests in developing long-term and large-scale cooperation projects with China.
At their fifth summit in December 1997, Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin announced the
strategic objective of achieving a bilateral trade volume of U.S.$ 20 billion by the
year 2000. These two sides declared that they would develop large-scale joint
projects in such fields as petroleum, natural gas, electricity, aerospace and nuclear
power.'55
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It is doubtful that these states can increase trade cooperation through political
measures. The question here is that while Russia has been eager to develop large-
scale joint projects with China, China has seen Western high technology as a better
option for its industrial modemisation. In August 1997, the failure to win the U.S.$
750 million contract to participate in the world's largest 'Three Gorges' hydroelectric
power station in China frustrated Russian attempts to take part in large-scale and
long-term development projects in China.' 56
 Moreover, when Russia stood on the
verge of economic bankruptcy in autunm 1998, Jiang Zemin postponed a scheduled
visit to Moscow so as to prevent Russia from expecting too much from economic
cooperation with China.' 57 The ambitious projects to supply China with surplus
electricity from nuclear power plants in the Russian Far East and to deliver 1 million
tons of Russian oil to China remained in doubt.'58
These developments suggest clearly that there remain divergent economic
interests between these two parties. In the short term, Russia's unstable and
worsening economic situation has raised deep uncertainties for the development of
Sino-Russian economic cooperation, beyond limited cross-border trade. In the long
term, enhanced Russian economic capacity may not be in China's interests. After
resolving its domestic problems, Russia may strengthen its penetration into the APR
'The Fifth Russian-Chinese Summit: High Degree of Confidence Achieved, Emphasis Shifted to
Economics', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 6 (1997), p.6.
156 Since the early 1990s, the Russian leadership and consortium had been interested in this project.
But French, Swiss, Canadians and Germans won the tender in 1997. See Moiseev, 'The Kremlim's
Eastern Policy', p.35
157 Aleksandr Platkovsky, 'Beijing Decided To Take a Pause', Izvestzya (Moscow), 26 August 1998, p.1,
in CDPSP, vol. 50, no. 34(23 September 1998), p.23.
Yekaterina Kats, 'Simulation of Cooperation', Segodnya (Moscow), 10 December 1999, p.5, in
CDPSP, vol. 51, no. 50 (12 January 2000), pp.4-5. In his visit to Russia in September 2000, Li Peng,
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress, stated that 'China's
northern regions do not currently need Russian electricity'. Three years of negotiations on supplying
Russian electricity to northern China have basically collapsed. See Konstantin Levin and Andrei
lvanov, 'China Rejected Russian Electric Power', Kommersant (Moscow), 15 September 2000, p.2, in
CDPSP, vol. 52, no.37(11 October2000), p.18.
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and become a competitor of China in the region.' 59
 These problems have made the
pledge to develop strategic cooperation in economic affairs unrealistic.
E) Conclusions: An Unstable Political Foundation for Military Cooperation
China and Russia have aimed with their 'partnership' to have a 'long-term', 'equal', and
'stable' relationship. However, this objective has not meant that a stable political
environment has been created. Both sides have different perceptions and
expectations of the 'partnership'. The future development of the relationship remains
uncertain.
From the Chinese point of view, building 'strategic partnership' with other great
powers will demonstrate that China is on the course to becoming a world power. As
one Chinese analyst explained in a 1998 group discussion:
Today, for China, strategic partnership does not mean security or military
connections with foreign states, but a long-term, equal, and stable
relationship with world superpowers or vital great powers. China has been
very careful to use this term - 'strategic partnership' to define its relations
with other powers. To date the USA and Russia are the only two great
powers with which China agreed to set up a 'strategic partnership'.'6°
The creation of a 'strategic partnership' with both Russia and the USA was seen as a
means to show China's status of a quasi superpower in the new era. Moreover, since
the 19th century, China has complained of an 'unequal position' in its relationship
with Russia. The establishment of a 'strategic partnership' with Russia has
symbolised the advent of a new era in the Sino-Russian relationship, in which China
59 Eugene Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanov, 'Russia and Asia in 1992', Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. I
(January 1993), pp.95-96.
60 Dr. Yang Jiemian, Director of the Department of American Studies, Shanghai Institute for
International Studies (SItS), group discussion, 15 January 1998, Shanghai. The Chinese deliberate
terminology was illuminated in that China used the term - 'comprehensive partnership' to define its
relations with France and the U.K., and the term - 'a friendly and cooperative partnership' for Japan.
See 'China, France Sign Joint Declaration', Beying Review, 2-8 June 1997, p.7-9; 'China-UK Joint
Statement', Beijing Review, 26 October-I November 1998, pp.6-7; 'Partnership Needed for China,
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has started to enjoy an 'equal position' in its relations with Russia.' 6 ' Given its
increasing economic strength, China has shown greater confidence in dealing with
Russia. In interviews in China in 1998, the author found that many Chinese analysts
believed that China would even get the upper hand in the future development of the
Sino-Russian relationship.'62
Russia has also seen Russian-Chinese 'strategic partnership' in terms of 'stable',
'long-term', and 'equal' relations.' 63
 Russia's expectation for such a relationship
highlights the decline of its political and economic influence. In terms of Sino-
Russian cooperation, the Yeltsin leadership played a more active role than its Chinese
counterpart, particularly, after its shift away from a pro-Western diplomatic line in
late 1992. In early 1994, Yeltsin proposed setting up a 'constructive partnership'
between the two countries.' 64
 During his second visit to Beijing in April 1996,
Yeltsin insisted on using the term 'strategic' regarding the Russian-Chinese
partnership.' 65
 This emphasis on 'strategic partnership' underscored the Yeltsin
leadership's attempt to play the 'China card' to compensate for the continuing erosion
of Russia's international and regional influence and to participate in regional
Japan', Beying Review, 14-20 December 1998, p.4.
161 The author's interview with Shi Ze, Vice President of the CLIS, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 7
January 1998, Beijing.
162 The author's interviews with Guo Zhenyuan, Deputy-Chief of the International Strategy and
Security Division, China's Center for International Studies, the Chinese State Council, 12 January 1998,
Beijing; with Xin Qi, Research Fellow, Center for Peace and Development Studies, General Political
Department of the PLA, 4 January 1998; and with Xia Liping, Deputy Director of the Department of
American Studies, SIIS, 15 January 1998, Shanghai.
I Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin, 'Long-Term Strategy for Russian-Chinese
Partnership', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 2 (1997), pp.26-Z1; Vladimir Rakhman,n, Deputy
Director of the First Asian Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, 'Russia and China: Strategic
Cooperation', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 1 (1997), p 11.
In early 1994, it was proposed in a private letter from Yeltsin addressed to Chinese President Jiang
Zemin that 'a constructive partnership looking beyond this century be established between the two
countries'. See 'Speech by President Jiang at the Russian Institute of International Relations', p.13.
165 The author's interview with Prof. Chen Qimao, President of the Shanghai Society for International
Relations, 15 January 1998, Shanghai. For full text of the Chinese and Russian Joint Statement in
April 1996, see 'Russia and China Issue Joint Statement', pp.B 1-3.
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economic activities. However, given the shift in power relations between these two
countries, playing the 'China card' was increasingly viewed as a risk by Russian
political elites.'	 As Vassily Likhachev, Vice-Chairman of the Federation Council
of Russian Federal Assembly, questioned in 1997:
'Strategic partnership' in a situation, when one partner is reeling in a deep
economic and military decline and the other is on the upswing, will make
the weaker partner the underdog of such relations... It is just impossible to
speak of strategic partnership in conditions when China's real strategic
interests, indeterminate as they are, will largely depend on the strength of
the Russian positions in the Far East, inherited from the Russian Empire and
the Soviet Union, and viewed by the Chinese as historical injustice.'67
During the Cold War period, these two countries' military relations were
repeatedly affected by changes in their domestic situations and in their relationship
with the USA. After the Cold War, some of the literature has argued that Chinese
and Russian bilateral relations have been consolidated by their common interests in a
broad range of fields.' 68 In contrast, this examination suggests that the development
of the Sino-Russian 'partnership' has remained strained. Bilateral cooperation has
been developed to meet their own concerns formed by domestic and external
environments. The unsound nature of this relationship has been reflected in that
bilateral cooperation has been limited to 'contradictory commitments' and 'hyperbolic
' The author's interviews with Dr. Vasiliy I. Krivokhizha, First Deputy Director, Russia's Institute for
Strategic Studies (RISS), 6 July 1998, Moscow; with Dr. Dmitri G. Evstafiev, Leading Research
Fellow, RISS, 6 July 1998, Moscow; with Dr. Dmitri V. Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie
Moscow Center, 7 July 1998, Moscow; with Prof. loceri Fedorov, Moscow State Institute of
International Relations, the Russian Foreign Ministry, 8 July 1998, Moscow; and with Peter V. Vlassov,
correspondent of ITAR-TASS news agency and Expert magazine, 10 July 1998, Moscow.
167 Vassily Likhachev, 'Russia-China Strategic Partnership', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 2
(1997), p.40.
Li, 'The Progress of Chinese-Russian Relations', pp.33-SI; Rajan Menon, 'The Strategic
Convergence between Russia and China', Survival, vol. 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997), p-I01; Yevgeny
Afanasiev and Grigory Logvinov, 'Russia and China: Girding for the Third Millennium', International
Affairs (Moscow), no. 1112 (1995), pp.45-53; Igor Rogachev, 'Russia-China: Cooperation Projected
into the 21 Century, Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 3 (1996), pp3-l2, Leonid Moiseev, 'Russian-
Chinese Partnership: New Horizons', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 3 (1997), pp3-8; Vladimir
Lukin, 'Russia-China Strategic Partnership: A Predictable Reality', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no.
3 (1997), ppS8-65; Grigorii Karasin, 'Russia and China: A New Partnership', International Affairs
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rhetoric'.' 69 Curbed cooperation in the counter-balancing of U.S. hegemony,
different perceptions of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and NATO enlargement,
potential competition in Central Asia, and limited economic cooperation have
underlined geopolitical and economic contradictions between China and Russia.
The future of the relationship remains uncertain. The establishment of a
'partnership' has not created a favourable strategic circumstance or a stable political
foundation for close military cooperation.
Given the standstill in bilateral cooperation, the Yeltsin government expected
that military cooperation could help to consolidate the relationship.' 7° This thesis
seeks to broaden understanding on the nature of Chinese and Russian military
cooperation. The third proposition underlying this study is that an enduring sense of
distrust and conflicts of interest have continued to obstruct Chinese and Russian
military cooperation. Section 3 will examine the development and limits of the
major components of Sino-Russian military cooperation.
(Moscow), vol. 43, no. 3 (1997), pp.23-29.
Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, Adeiphi Paper no. 315
(London: IISS, 1997), p.79.
" 'Russian Foreign Official Says Relations with China Are "Dynamic", Interfax (Moscow), 5 January
1997, in SWB, SU/D2809, 6 January 1997, p.B 28.
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SECTION 3 COMPONENTS OF MILITARY COOPERATION:
Chapter 4
Confidence-building Measures (CBMs)
After the end of the Cold War, CBMs have constituted an important component of
Chinese and Russian military cooperation.' In the context of Sino-Russian military
cooperation, CBMs have sought to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and to resolve
lingering problems in the military-security field. 2 This chapter examines the nature of
Sino-Russian CBMs, and reveals their limitations. It opens by reviewing the evolution
and major types of CBMs which were developed by the participating states of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) since the 1970s. 3 Also, it
addresses the rationale for Sino-Russian CBMs .  Following this, this chapter examines
the key provisions of Sino-Russian CBMs from a comparative perspective in an attempt
to reveal similarities and differences between European and Sino-Russian CBMs.
Finally, it explores Chinese and Russian cooperation in resolving issues of territorial
security, which were not covered by the European model and have shown significant
According to James Macintosh, Director of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, although there
is some sense in the distinction between CBMs and their second-generation variation, confidence- and
security-building measures (CSBMs), it hardly seems necessary to engage in this sort of terminological
inflation. In this thesis, the term CBMs is used to encompass all varieties of confidence-building measures.
See James Macintosh, 'Confidence- and Security-building Measures: A Sceptical Look', in UN Department
for Disarmament Affairs (ed.), Confidence and Security-building Measures in Asia (New York: The United
Nations, 1990), p.93.
2 Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov, 'Russo-Chinese Partnership Is a Major Security and Stability
Factor in the Asia-Pacific Region', Military News Bulletin (Moscow), vol. 6, no. 5 (May 1997), p.1 1;
Yevgeny Afanasiev and Grigory Logvinov, 'Russia and China: Girding for the Third Millennium',
International Affairs (Moscow), no. 11/12 (1995), p.48.
In 1995, in order to make the CSCE a permanent organisation, the participating states started to
strengthen the structures of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and to
increase its potential for political consultation and conflict management.
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effort to increase confidence and security building. This chapter closes by arguing that
Sino-Russian cooperation on CBMs has helped to lessen military tensions in the border
areas and to avoid a surprise attack from the other. However, it has not meant that these
states have trusted each other in the wider military and security field, or that the level of
trust between them has become solid.
A) The Evolution and Basic Types of CBMs
Before Sino-Russian CBMs may be examined, certain vital concepts and issues related to
CBMs require exploration. This section consists of two parts. The first part reviews the
evolution and major types of European CBMs. The second part addresses the dynamics
and content of Sino-Russian CBMs.
The European Experience of CBMs
CBMs are a concept whose primary policy application was rooted in the political and
military context of Europe during the Cold War. This concept originated, when NATO
and WTO member states signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 in an attempt to promote
peaceful coexistence and cooperation under the political atmosphere of détente. In the
Helsinki Final Act of 1975, a set of principles on CBMs, including prior notification of
military manoeuvres involving at least 25,000 troops, was agreed by the participating
states of the CSCE.4
Following that, the participating states convened a series of conferences to discuss
Disarmament Negotiation in 1975', SIPRI Yearbook 1976 (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1976),
pp.323-327.
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further confidence-building. The Stockholm Conference, which was held between
January 1984 and September 1986, agreed to constraints on military activities and
deployments, as well as verification measures, which were together viewed as significant
military steps toward security-building. 5 In the late 1980s, Gorbachev's 'new thinking'
led to the improvement of political and military relations between NATO and WTO. (see
2.D) On 17 November 1990, the CSCE states signed the 'Vienna Confidence- and
Security- building Measures Document'. According to this document, the CSCE
participating states would conduct an annual exchange of information on their military
organisations, manpower, weapon systems, plans for the development of new weapon
systems, and defence budgets. 6 On 19 November 1990, the 'Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe' (the CFE Treaty) was signed. It set common ceilings for
NATO and WTO with regard to five major categories of offensive conventional
armaments and equipment - battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat
aircraft, and combat helicopters.7
The collapse of the USSR put an end to the East-West military confrontation. The
'Treaty on Open Skies' was signed on 24 March 1992. In this, the parties agreed to
establish a multilateral regime for the conduct of observation flights by unarmed
reconnaissance aircraft over the territories of the parties in the area from Vancouver to
Severre Lodgaard, 'The Building of Confidence and Security at the Negotiations in Stockholm and
Vienna, SIPRI Yearbook 1986 (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1986), pp.423-446.
6 For full text of this document, see 'Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on CSBMs Convened in
According with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the CSCE',
SIPRI Yearbook 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.475-488.
'Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe', SIPRI Yearbook 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991), pp.461-488. For a detailed study on the CFE Treaty, see Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping
Europe's Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty (Cambridge, Massachusettes:
The MIT Press, 1995).
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Vladivostok. 8
 On 28 November 1994, the CSCE states signed 'The Vienna Document
1994', in which the parties concluded more elaborate procedures for the disclosure of
defence budgets, allowing for visits to air bases, observation of military activities, joint
military exercises, and verification.9
Five basic types of CBMs can be identified from this experience. These are: first,
communication measures; second, transparency measures; third, constraint measures;
fourth, verification measures; and finally, declaratory measures.'° (see Table 3)
Communication measures seek to keep channels of communication open between states
that have tense relations so as to help defuse tensions during moments of crisis."
Transparency measures attempt to share information on the postures, capabilities, and
policies of states in the military-security field so that the parties can reduce suspicions
and misunderstanding.' 2
 Constraint measures seek to impose reciprocal limits on the
activities of the parties which have military significance, so as to reduce the likelihood of
armed conflict.' 3
 Verification measures are designed to collect data or provide first hand
access in an attempt to confirm or verify a state's compliance with a particular treaty or
agreement.' 4
 As for declaratory measures, they are defined as generalised statements of
interests, norms, and beliefs espoused by the parties as a guide to the conduct of relations
S Zdzislaw Lachowski, 'The Treaty on Open Skies', SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995), p.601.
'The Vienna Document 1994', SIPRI Yearbook 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.799-
820
Macintosh, 'Confidence- and Security-building Measures', p.85; The Henry L. Stimson Center,
Confidence-Building Measures Project, Website http: /www.stimson.org/cbm
 cbmef.htm
"The Henry L. Stimson Center, Confidence-Building Measures Project.
2 Amitav Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building (Ottawa: Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, 1997), p.2.
13 Ibid
The Henry L. Stimson Center, Confidence-Building Measures Project.
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among them.'5
Table 3 Basic Types of CBMs
Communication Measures
• Hot lines
• Joint crisis control centres
• Regularly scheduled consultations (annual meetings between the armed forces, direct
military-to-military contact)
Transparency Measures
• Data exchanges (publication of defence information, information exchange, consultative
commissions, publication of defence budget figures)
Constraint Measures
• Limited force deployment zones (no threatening manoeuvres or equipment tests, no
threatening deployments near sensitive areas such as tanks on a border, manpower limits,
nuclear-free zones)
• Pre-notification requirements (advance notification of exercises, force movements,
mobilisations - including information, mandatory invitations with information about the
activity)





• Any variety of undertaking to act in a way that will increase confidence, understanding, etc.
(non-first use of nuclear weapons and non-first use of force)
Source: Macintosh, 'Confidence- and Security-Building Measures', p.85; The Henry L.
Stim son Center, Confidence-Building Measures Project
The major goal of these measures is to exchange information and knowledge about
military activities so as to clarify their true nature. Also, they aim to inhibit the use of
' Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p.2.
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force and to prevent the display of large military forces.' 6
 As such, the parties may
increase predictability in their security relations, enhance stability and security, and
improve the political climate.'7
The Dynamics and Content of Sino-Russian CBMs
While developing CBMs with a potential adversary, a country may face a security
dilen-una between the elements of cost and benefit. One of the major costs of CBMs is
that military secrecy will be open to scrutiny by a potential military adversary. This will
reduce a country's capacity to create surprise in a situation of war.' 8 On the other hand,
CBMs can bring benefits, particularly, stability, predictability and security in a country's
relationship with a military adversary.' 9 To evaluate the costs and benefits of CBMs, a
country has to consider the wider political landscape as well as its grand strategy.2°
It has been argued that the pursuit of CBMs depends on pre-existing political
détente between two states. 2 ' As was stated in Chapter 2, in the late 1 980s, new domestic
and external environments had pushed China and the USSR to normalise bilateral
relations. In April 1990, the two parties signed the 'Guiding Principles of Reducing
Border Forces and Enhancing Mutual Trust in the Military Field'. In December 1991,
Marie-France Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures, Adeiphi Paper no. 307 (London:
[ISS, 1996), pp.8-9.
Ibid., p.5; Johan Jørgen Hoist, 'Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework', Survival, vol.
35, no. 1 (January February 1983), p3.
Roif Ekeus, 'Multilateral Measures to Increase Military Transparency and Their Alternatives' in UN
Department for Disarmament Affairs (ed.), Confidence- and Security-budding Measures: From Europe to
Other Regions (New York: The United Nations, 1991), p.58.
19Ibid.
20lbid.
21 Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures, p.5. Also see Jing-dong Yuan, Sino-Russian
Confidence Building Measures: A Preliminary Analysis, Working Paper no.20 (Vancouver: Institute of
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Chinese and Soviet military delegations had started to visit military regions of the other.
After the collapse of the USSR, China and Russia stressed the importance of having
stable bilateral relations. This policy paved the way for their cooperation on CBMs. 22 At
the 1992 summit, Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin agreed that the 1990 agreement would serve
as the basis for negotiations on CBMs and arms reduction.23
In addition to changes in the political climate, other factors accounted for Chinese
and Russian interests in pursuing confidence-building in the military-security field. For
China, the military build-up along the border was a heavy burden in its defence spending.
In the early 1990s, ground forces constituted 2.3 million out of 3 million in total PLA
manpower, and three-quarters of the PLA's ground troops were deployed in the north.24
Due to financial considerations, between 1990 and 1993, China had withdrawn about 25
divisions from its border with Russia, leaving another 25 there. According to the PLA's
General Staff Department, the reduction of troop strength along the border with Russia
annually saved nearly 7 billion renminbi in Chinese military expenditure. 25
 Also,
alleviating tensions along the common border with Russia could help to end the necessity
for a large standing ground force along China's northern border. In this way, China has
sought to concentrate resources to modernise the air and naval forces and to deter against
international Relations, University of British Columbia, 1998), p.12 and p.25.
22 The author's interviews with Shi Ze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry, 7 January 1998, Beijing; and with Prof. Evgeny P. Bazhanov, Director of the Institute of
Contemporary International Studies, the Russian Foreign Ministry, 6 July 1998, Moscow.
23 
'Russia and China Sign Joint Declaration as Basis for New Relations' Xinhua news aoency (Beijing) 18
December 1992, in SWB, FE/1568, 19 December 1992, p.A1 4.
24 The Military Balance 1991/92 (London: HSS, 1992), pp.150-152; Vladimir Skosyrev, 'Chinese Say Kind
Words to Grachev in Preparation for Meeting with Clinton', Izvestiya (Moscow), 11 November 1993, p.1,
in FBIS-SOV-93-217, 12 November 1993, p.16.
25 Chuan Hsun-che, 'High-Level Think Tank Suggests "China Allying Itself with Russia against the United
States", Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), no. 193 (1 November 1993), pp.20-21, in FBIS-CHI-93-213, 5
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Taiwan's attempts to attain independence.26
After the USSR signed the CFE Treaty with NATO in 1990, China had worried
that Moscow would move military hardware from the European theatre to east of the
Ural Mountains. According to a report of Far Eastern Economic Review in November
1992, following the signature of the CFE treaty in 1990, Moscow transferred more than
16,000 tanks, 16,000 armoured fighting vehicles and 25,000 artillery pieces to east of the
Urals. 50 per cent of the armour, in particular, modern T72 and T80 tanks, was
transferred to re-equip Russian military units in Central Asia and the Far East. 27 Moscow
explained that the re-deployment of military hardware was a normal result of the
country's military modernisation. Yet, in China's view, the dramatic growth in the
number of modern weapons systems located in the Russian Far Eastern regions
represented a threat to its security, since the quality of Chinese military equipment was
inferior. 28 Pursuing cooperation with Russia on CBMs could ease Chinese anxiety over
this issue.
On the Russian side, the maintenance of massive military forces was also a heavy
budgetary burden, as the country continued to suffer economic hardship and its defence
spending was drastically reduced. Maintaining a smaller force was seen as an
advantageous option for Russian defence policy. In 1996, the Yeltsin government
November 1993, p2.
26 Zhang Feng-shan, 'Haixia liangan guanxi' [Relations across the Strait], in Weng Jie-ming, Zhang Xi-
ming, Zhang sou, et. al. (eds), Zhongguo zuixin guoqing da toushi 199 7-1998 [The Prospect of the Latest
National Situation in China, 1997-19981 (Hong Kong: Mingpao Publishing Ltd., 1997), p.395. (author's
translation)




planned to reduce its armed forces by more than one million servicemen. 29
 The Russian
and Chinese negotiations on reductions coincided with Russian intentions to conduct an
overall reduction of its armed forces.
In addition, due to draft evasion and budget cuts, Russian forces have stood at a low
level of readiness. In 1995, it was estimated that only one-fifth of the Russian tank fleet
was usable. 3° According to James Clay Moltz, in 1995, Russian forces facing China
consisted of less than 40 divisions, with many of them reported to be at less than 40 per
cent strength. This led to the situation where the actual troop levels deployed along the
border with China were only 200,000 strong. 3 ' In an interview conducted by the author
on 10 July 1998, Peter V. Vlassov, correspondent of ITAR-TASS and Expert magazine,
pointed out that Russian conventional armed forces would no longer be able to cope with
a large-scale ground attack launched by China. As such, China would be able to occupy
many of Russian territories in the Far East within 12 hours.32 The talks with China over
CBMs were designed to ease such worries.
Based on these assessments of their interests, between 1992 to 1999, several
political declarations and documents concerning confidence-building were agreed to by
China and Russia. In their Joint Statements on 18 December 1992 and 3 September 1994,
Chinese and Russian leaders issued declaratory measures on the non-use of force and on
non-aggression. In the 'Agreement on Military Cooperation for the Next Five Years'
29 
'Address of President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin to the Leaders of the Russian Anned
Forces on May 29, 1996', Military News Bulletin (Moscow), vol. 5, no. 6 (June 1996), pp.3-6.
30 Strategic Survey 1994/95 (London: IISS, 1995), pp.81-83.
31 James Clay Moltz, 'Regional Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement', Asian Survey, vol. 35, no.
6 (June 1995), p.5 I9.
32 The author's interview with Peter V. Vlassov, correspondent of ITAR-TASS and Expert magazine, 10
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signed in November 1993, some information and communication measures were agreed
to by the two Defence Ministers. In the 'Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous
Military Activities' on 13 July 1994, 'tension-reduction' measures were issued by the
Defence Ministers, On 3 September 1994, Chinese and Russian leaders signed an
agreement of declaratory measures on non-first use and non-targeting of nuclear weapons.
In August 1995, in the 'Agreement on Cooperation in Border Defence', the two sides
agreed to strengthen information and communication measures between neighbouring
military districts. In the 'Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in
Border Areas between China and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan' on 26
April 1996 (called the Shanghai Agreement thereafter), the parties agreed on notification
measures, observer measures, and constraint measures. In the 'Agreement on Mutual
Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas' on 24 April 1997, China, Russia, and
three Central Asian states went beyond the Shanghai Agreement to conduct force
limitations in the border areas.
A major limit to an examination of Sino-Russian CBMs is that relevant information
has been inaccessible. Except for the Sino-Russian Joint Statements, these documents
have remained secret (Unofficial translations and partial texts of these documents have
been available). European CBMs have been well examined as information about initial
proposals, negotiations, disputes, final agreements, and implementation has been
available. In contrast, little information is available on the negotiating history and the
implementation of Sino-Russian CBMs. In 1997, Amitav Acharya, a CBMs expert,
July 1998, Moscow.
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called upon the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) members to urge China and Russia to
provide more details on their CBMs so that others could learn from them.33
Given this limitation, this discussion of Sino-Russian CBMs will analyse key
provisions of these agreements from a comparative perspective. Concluding documents
on CBMs has meant that the parties have agreed to accept specific demands for
transparency in their military affairs. An examination of their key provisions can help to
understand the security concerns of China and Russia while they sought to develop
CBMs. Sino-Russian CBMs have paralleled the five major European types -
communication measures, transparency measures, constraint measures, verification
measures, and declaratory measures. This chapter below will explore similarities and
differences between European and Sino-Russian CBMs in order to reveal the nature of
these measures.
B) Similarities of Sino-Russian CBMs to the European Model
Some similarities can be found between European and Sino-Russian CBMs. These have
resided in four areas: first, declaratory measures; second, transparency measures; third,
communication measures; and finally, constraint measures. These will be explored in
this section.
Declaratory Measures
Declaratory measures seek to increase mutual confidence and understanding in different
B Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p.1 6.
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fields and on different issues by clarifying security policy. (see 4.A) For this, the CSCE
states declared that they would refrain from the threat and use of force in the 1975 Final
Act and the 1990 Vienna Document. 34 During the Cold War, the USSR had emphasised
the need for building mutual trust through declarations on the non-use of force, in the
belief that such declarations could help to strengthen confidence among states. 35 On 19
May 1991, in their Joint Statement, China and the USSR declared that they would
resolve disputes through peaceful measures and would not use force or threaten to use
force.36
In December 1992, Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin reaffirmed that both countries would
resolve all controversial issues by peaceful means. The two parties also announced that
they would not resort to military force or threat in whatever form against each other,
including threats that were created from the use of the territory, territorial waters and air
space of a third country. 37 In addition, they agreed that neither should take part in
military and political alliances directed against the other party. Neither side would sign
treaties or agreements with any third country that were detrimental to the state
sovereignty and security interests of the other state. 38 Moreover, no party would allow its
territory to be used by a third country to the detriment of the state sovereignty and
interests of the other. 39 These joint statements are related to issues of general principles
and govern bilateral politico-military relations. They can help to increase stability in the
'Vienna Document 1990', p.475.
0. N. Bykov, 'Mery doveria' [Measures of Confidence] (Moscow: lzd. Nauka Publishing House, 1983),
p.57, cited in Bruce Allyn, 'Soviet Views of CBMs', in John Borawski (ed.), Avoiding War in the Nuclear
Age Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), p.1 17.
36 
'Sino-Soviet Joint Communiqué, Moscow, May 19, 1991', Beijing Review, 27 May -2 June 1991, p.15.
'Russia and China Sign Joint Declaration as Basis for New Relations', pp.A 1 3-4.
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Sino-Russian relationship.40
Since the Cold War, reciprocal nuclear threat has been a main security concern of
Beijing and Moscow. (see 2.C) To reduce the perception of mutual nuclear threat, in
September 1994, China and Russia announced the non-first use of nuclear weapons
against each other and the de-targeting of strategic missiles away from each other. 4 ' This
agreement echoed similar documents that Russia had signed with the USA and the U.K..
Although the number of strategic missiles between Russia and China is asymmetrical,
'China's nuclear weapons have become more survivable through cave-basing, road
mobility, and strategic submarine deployment'. 42 In the unofficial 'National Security
Concept for 1994', Russian political elites and defence experts had warned that the
growing nuclear-missile potential of China could pose a military threat to Russia.
Reducing the nuclear threat from China was seen as one of the vital tasks for Russia to
parry potential external threats in the 1 990s.43
In an interview on 6 July 1998, Vasiliy I. Krivokhizha, First Deputy Director of
Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, noted that Russia had the capability to re-target its
strategic missiles in twenty minutes. 44 Therefore, the meaning of the pledge on non-first
use and de-targeting has been largely symbolic. The aim of such a declaration was to
38 Ibid.
39Ibid.
4° Yuan, Sino-Russian Confidence Building Measures, p.27.
' 
"Text" of Sino-Russian Nuclear Policy Declaration', Xinhau news agency (Beijing), 3 September 1994,
in FBIS-CHI-94-172, 6 September 1994, p.19.
42 Chong-pin Lin, 'Red First: China's Army in Transition', International Defence Review, no. 28 (February
1995), p.32.
" 'Russian National Security Concept for 1994', Obozrevatel Observer (Moscow), Special Supplement, 14
December 1993, pp.3-173, in FBIS-SOV-038-S, 25 February 1994, p.6.
The author's interview with Dr. Vasiliy 1. Krivokhizha, First Deputy Director, Russia's Institute for
Strategic Studies, 6 July 1998, Moscow.
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show a psychological breakthrough in both sides' security relationship. Nevertheless, it
was alleged in July 1997 that strategic missiles deployed on the territory of China were
still targeted at Russia.45 Naturally, this report drew Russian concerns. This led China to
reaffirm that it would abide by the joint statement on non-targeting of strategic missiles
and non-first use of nuclear weapons. 46 This event implied that the level of trust between
the two parties still remained weak and that reciprocal nuclear threat was an enduring
major security concern of China and Russia.
Transparency Measures
Lack of information on military matters can lead to mistrust and tension between states.
According to one analyst of CBMs, when 'there is a lack of information about other
states' military capabilities or activities, officials tend to make worst case analyses'. 47 To
prevent this from happening, the CSCE states cooperated to achieve military
transparency by means of providing each other with hard data and facts with regard to
significant military activities, force structure, and force planning. 4 In addition, regular
and joint discussion of military doctrines and security concepts was conducted. This
enabled these states to 'share information on the mind-set, the philosophy and the ideas
guiding the activities and structure of each other's armed forces'.49
Similarly, China and Russia have exchanged information on armed forces deployed
'China Denied Reports That Its Missiles Are Targeted at Russia', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 15 July 1997,
in SWB, SU 2972, 16 July 1997, p.B 13.
Ibid.
Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures, pp.21-22.
'Vienna Document 1990', pp.475-476; 'The Vienna Document 1994 "p.803.
Ekeus, 'Multilateral Measures to Increase Military Transparency and Their Alternatives', pp.56-57.
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in border areas. In the 1996 Shanghai Agreement, China, Russia and three Central Asian
states agreed to exchange information on the personnel strength and the quantities of
major military equipment of all their forces (ground, air, air defence aviation, and border
guard troops) deployed in the 100-km geographical area on each side of the border line.50
For the first time, China and Russia agreed to exchange information annually on military
deployment in the border areas.
Additionally, China and Russia have also developed information exchanges of
military doctrines and security concepts. In the 'Agreement on Military Cooperation for
the Next Five Years' in November 1993, they agreed to improve the transparency of their
military affairs by informing the other about their military doctrines, their experience in
armed forces construction, and other matters which concerned both sides.5'
Data exchanges relevant to armed forces deployment in the border areas and
military and security concepts have been seen as important steps in the confidence-
building process. (see 4.A) Chinese and Russian agreements on these measures have
demonstrated their desire to ease tensions and establish an atmosphere of trust in their
relationship.
Communication Measures
Communication between military representatives can help to promote mutual
° 'Unofficial Translation: Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People's Republic of China on Confidence Building in
the Military Field in the Border Area' (hereafter called as 'Unofficial Translation: the Shanghai
Agreement'), in Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Appendix 3, p.58.
51 
'Russian and Chinese Defence Agreement Signed - (A)', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), II November 1993, in
SWB, SU 1845, 13 November 1993, p.S 1/2.
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understanding of the intentions of potential adversaries. The exchange of views among
personnel directly involved in military planning, decision-making and training may
overcome misperceptions and prejudices.52 According to Martine Vukovich, of the
Austrian Foreign Ministry, 'the development of human relations through these means is
of no less importance than the exchange of professional views'. 53 For these reasons, the
CSCE states agreed in the 1990 and 1994 Vienna documents to exchange visits between
senior military representatives, increase contacts between military institutions, and
exchange visits by naval vessels and air force units.54
In April 1996, China and Russia announced the establishment of a telephone hotline
between the leaderships. 55 In addition, both sides have sought to increase contacts
between their armed forces in an attempt to reduce the scope for misunderstanding.
Guided by the 1993 'Agreement on Military Cooperation for the Next Five Years', the
two sides enlarged the staff of the military attaches in their embassies in Beijing and
Moscow by three persons, in order to focus on increasing exchanges and contacts
between both defence ministries. 56 In 1993, a direct communication channel was set up
between the commanders of the Russian Far Eastern Military District and the Chinese
Shenyang Military Region, which are the main military regions along the common
Martin Vukovich, 'Contacts, Consultations and Communication as Set out in the Vienna Document of
1990', in UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (ed.), Confidence and Security-building Measures:
From Europe to Other Regions, pp.43-44.
Ibid., p.44.
'Vienna Document 1990', pp 478 479 'The Vienna Document 1994 "pp 805-806
" 'Russo-Chinese Agreements Signed', lIAR-lASS (Moscow), 25 April 1996, in SWB, SU 2596, 26 April
1996, p.B 6. Although it is not known what information can be passed on the hotline, its establishment
offers a channel to exchange time-urgent information, clarify intentions, and take preparatory measures to
control crisis escalation in periods of tension.
Patrick E. Tyler, 'China and Russia Act to Avoid Conflicts', International Herald Tribune, 4 December
1993; 'On Grachev's Signing of Accord', AFP (Hong Kong), 11 November 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-217, 12
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border. Commanders from both headquarters have conducted exchanges with each
other's forces. 57 In August 1995, the two countries signed the 'Agreement on
Cooperation in Border Defence'. As a result, exchanges and visits have developed
between the Chinese Jilin and Heilongjiang provincial Military Districts and Inner
Mongolia Military District and the Russian Pacific, Far East, and the Rear Baykal Border
Guard Districts.58
Furthermore, Chinese and Russian naval forces resumed reciprocal port calls, which
had been terminated in the late 1950s. In August 1993, three ships of the Russian Pacific
Fleet, under Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Khmelenov, visited the Chinese naval
base of Qingdao. In return, in December 1993 a Chinese fleet visited Vladimir, and also
sent a ground force delegation to Russia's Far Eastern training facilities and military
academies. 59 On 28 July 1996, a PLA Navy destroyer participated in a naval review
commemorating the 300th anniversary of the Russian Navy at Vladivostok.60
Exchange visits to military bases and units have also been conducted on a voluntary
basis. In November 1993, the Chinese military arranged for then Russian Defence
Minister Grachev to visit the Chinese Lushun naval base in Liaoning Province, an
important site never previously seen by either Soviet or Russian military servicemen. On
this visit, Grachev stated that 'the fact of visiting Lushun (Port Arthur) is evidence of the
November 1993, p.2.
Tyler, 'China and Russia Act to Avoid Conflicts'; 'Terms Trip "Very Successful", lIAR-lASS
(Moscow), 11 November 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-217, 12 November 1993, p.17.
'PRC: Sino-Russian Border Reflects Friendly Relations', Xinhua news agency (Beijing), 21 April 1996,
in FBIS-CHI-96-078, 22 April 1996, pp.21-22.
James Clay Moltz, 'From Military Adversaries to Economic Partners: Russia and China in the New Asia',
Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol.9, no.3 (Winter 1995), p.171.
60 The National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 1997-1998 (Tokyo: The
National Institute for Defense Studies, 1998), p.256.
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Chinese side's respect for our state and its striving for strong ties with Russia'. 6 ' In return,
the Russian military allowed the Chinese to make their first visits to regional
detachments of Russian armed forces. In September 1994, a military delegation was sent
by China to visit the Russian Transbaikal Military District. 62
 In June 1999, a Chinese
military delegation, led by the Vice-Chairman of China's Central Military Committee
Zhang Wannian, was allowed to visit a unit of Russia's Strategic Missile Troops.63
Such communication measures have no implications for military secrecy. However,
these personnel contacts may reduce the scope for misperception between the two sides.
For this reason, both China and Russia have been enthusiastic about communication
measures, particularly in contacts between high-level military officials. These various
forms represented important 'confidence-building exchanges' and have contributed
positively to Sino-Russian relations.TM
Constraint Measures
As was stated, constraint measures seek to impose reciprocal limits on the activities
which have military significance, so as to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. An
important constraint measure consists in limiting threatening manoeuvres near sensitive
areas. In the 1990 Vienna Document, the CSCE participating states agreed not to carry
61 
'Russian and Chinese Defence Agreement Signed - (A)', p.S1 2.
62 Moltz, 'Regional Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement', p.5 19.
63 
'Russian, Chinese Military Heads Tour Nuclear Facility, Call for Joint Research', ITAR-TASS (Moscow),
12 June 1999, in SWB, SU/3560, 14 June 1999, p.S 1/3.
Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measues, p.56; Yuan, Sino-Russian Confidence Building
Measures, pp.18-22.
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out military activities, subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops.65
Similarly, in the 1996 Shanghai Agreement, China and Russia agreed to limit the scale of
military exercises within the 100-km border zone. (see Table 4)
Table 4 Scale Limits of Military Exercises in Sino-Russian Border Areas
Geographic Area
In the 100-kilometre geographical
area on both sides of the border line
Within the 15-kilometre area
Scale Limits of Military Exercises
1. The parties shall not conduct troop exercises
with the number of participants exceeding 40,000
people in the Eastern part of the Chinese-Russian
border; and 4,000 or 50 battle tanks in the
Western part of the Chinese-Russian border and
on the border of the three Central Asian states
separately or jointly.
2. The sides shall conduct troop exercises with
the number of participants exceeding 25,000
people no more than once a year.
The sides can conduct troop exercises with no
more than one regiment participating in live
firing exercises.
Within the 10-kilometre area 	 The sides shall not deploy new combat units
other than border troops.
Source: 'Unofficial Translation: the Shanghai Agreement', p.59.
Another important constraint measure consists in pre-notification requirements.
Within the context of CBMs, provisions on advance notification of military exercises
seek to reduce the scope for biased perception and the likelihood of inadvertent
65 
'Vienna Document 1990', p.483.
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escalation. 66
 The sole binding provision of the Helsinki CBMs was the notification
provision for exercises involving more than 25,000 troops. (see 4.A) In the 1990 Vienna
Document, the CSCE states agreed that exercises above 13,000 men or 300 battle tanks
had to be notified.	 Additionally, annual calendars of military activities were
introduced.67
Achieving a clearer understanding of the nature and intentions of exercises in the
border areas was an important element of the Shanghai Agreement of 1996. In this
Agreement, these sides agreed to notify each other of military activities within the 100-
km geographical area on both sides of the border line, when: (1) there was a troop
exercise with the number of participants exceeding 25,000 people, and (2) troops and
equipment deployed beyond the 100-kilometre geographical area on both sides of the
border line were temporarily brought into this area, in numbers of nine thousand and
more, or 250 battle tanks and more. 68 Notifications of these military activities had to be
presented no later than 10 days before their commencement. The notification had to
contain information on the total number of military personnel involved; the number of
military formations at the level of regiment and above; and the numbers of battle tanks,
battle armoured vehicles, artillery systems of 122 mm caliber and above, battle aircraft,
battle helicopters, and tactical missile launchers. Information on the tasks, duration, zone
Jonathan Alford, 'Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects', in Jonathan Alford
(ed.), The Future of Arms Control: Part III. Confidence-Building Measures, Adeiphi Paper no. 149
(London: IISS, 1979), p.8; Serre Lodgaard, 'A Critical Appraisal of CSBMs by Category', in UN
Department for Disarmament Affairs (ed.), Confidence and Security- building Measures: From Europe to
other Regions, p.22.
67 
'Vienna Document 1990', p.479 and p.482.
'Unofficial Translation: the Shanghai Agreement', p 59.
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of military activities and levels of command would also be provided.69
Together with advance notification of military exercises, the CSCE participating
states had agreed that military activities would be subject to observation whenever the
number of troops exceeded 17,000 troops. 7° Like the European states, China and Russia
also agreed to invite each other to observe military exercises when the number of
participating troops equaled or exceeded 25,000 people or 13,000 people and 300 battle
tanks. The invitation would be sent to the other not later than 30 days before the
commencement of such exercises. The invited party could send no more than 6
observers to the military exercises.7 ' In July 1996, the 'Amur-96' command and control
exercises of the Border Troops of the Russian Far Eastern Military District were attended
by military observers from the Chinese Defence Ministry and Public Security Ministry.
For the first time, Chinese military officers were invited to observe Russian Far Eastern
Military District exercises.72
Such observer measures are to ensure that military activities would be conducted in
a non-threatening manner and in accordance with information previously released. As
such, the parties can reassure each other of the non-aggressive nature of their behaviour.73
For China and Russia, with nearly 4,300 km of common border and with a difficult past
during the Cold War, observer measures, coupled with prior notification of military
exercises, can provide early warning of attack, and help to ease mutual concerns about
Ibid., pp.59-60.
'Vienna Document 1990', p.480.
'Unofficial Translation: the Shanghai Agreement', pp.60-61.
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surprise attacks.74
C) Differences between Sino-Russian CBMs and the European Model
In addition to the similarities, some differences between the European model and Sino-
Russian CBMs can be identified. These differences consist in the different extent and
scope of application of these measures. They may provide insight into the difference in
Chinese and Russian security concerns from those of the CSCE states. These have
included four major issues: first, the absence of disclosure on defence spending; second,
the emphasis on 'tension reduction' measures; third, the lack of inspections and
verification; and finally, the failure to conduct overall force limitations in the border
areas.
Absence of Disclosure on Defence Budgets
Although China and Russia have exchanged information about armed forces deployed in
the border areas and on military doctrines, the information has not included defence
spending, an important element in the context of transparency measures. The disclosure
of defence spending can help to enhance predictability because it offers the full picture of
the other state's military systems and future development and procurement. 75
 Guided by
the 1990 and 1994 Vienna documents, the CSCE participating states have exchanged
information on their military budgets on an annual basis. More importantly, each
1996, p.S1 5-6.
Lodgaard, 'The Building of Confidence and Security', p.436.
74Ibzd
Hoist, 'Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework', p.! 1.
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participating state has had the right to ask for clarification of the budgetary information
provided by any other participating state.76
As a CSCE member, Russia has provided the CSCE with information on its defence
budget. This information is itemised on the basis of the categories set out in the UN
'Instrument for Standarised International Reporting on Military Expenditures' adopted on
12 December 1980. Data on the status of budget figures, clarifications of inflation,
operating costs, procurement and construction, and R&D are to be provided. 77
 As a
result, the evolution of Russian military development has lost some of its secrecy.
In contrast, any evaluation of China's defence spending remains based on guesswork.
The Chinese government published Defence White Papers in 1995, 1998, and 20O0. In
these Papers, a description has been offered of China's military doctrine, organisation,
education, training, and defence industry structure. However, the Papers still lack
transparency in such key areas as the military's weapons list, force deployments and
defence purchases. In addition, China offered information on defence budgets in its
Defence White Papers. According to the Papers, China spent only U.S.$ 6.39 billion on
defence in 1994, U.S.$ 9.8 billion in 1997, and U.S.$ 14.6 billion in 20OO. It is widely
believed that actual Chinese defence spending is between two to five times higher than
the official budget. 8° Such areas as R&D, military pensions, and earnings from overseas
76 
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arms sales and civilian production have been excluded from official budget figures.81
According to Chinese military tradition, 'there is no such thing as tota' transparency
for the military - there is only proper transparency'. 82
 Conservative Chinese thinking
about secrecy has resulted in an absence of provisions on defence budget disclosure in
Sino-Russian transparency measures. Although it is unclear whether Russia has
complained about this, the lack of a provision on defence spending disclosure has meant
that the application scope of Sino-Russian transparency measures has not reached that
achieved among the CSCE states.
Emphasis on 'Tension-Reduction' Measures
So-called 'dangerous military activities' include actions taken by armed forces, their
subdivisions or individual servicemen in peace time which can be detrimental to military
personnel, civilians, military hardware, and installations, the environment, and therefore
the strategic stability of another state.83 Such activities can create tensions between
armed forces deployed by opponent states in sensitive neighbouring areas. To avoid this,
in the 1990 Vienna Document, the CSCE participating states set up a mechanism for
consultation and cooperation on 'unusual military activities' and 'hazardous incidents of a
military nature'. It was agreed that matters relating to information about hazardous
Lucian W. Pye, 'China: Not Your Typical Superpower', Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 43, no. 4
(July August 1996), pp.7-8.
' Ibid.
82 Banning Garnett and Bonnie Glaser, 'Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and Its Impact on
Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing', Contemporaiy Southeast Asia, vol. 6, no. 1 (June 1994), pp 28-29.
Major General A. V. Bolyatko, 'Prevention of Dangerous Activity at the Operational-Tactical Level',
Military Thought (Moscow), no. 5 (September/October 1995), p.1 7.
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incidents would be discussed by participating states at the Conflict Prevention Centre.
As a result of their historical experience, China and Russia have placed more
emphasis on the prevention of dangerous military activities than the CSCE states. This
emphasis on the prevention of dangerous military activities has highlighted their
common concern to avoid incidents that could damage their wider political relations, as
had occurred during the Cold War. China and Russia have clearly defined relevant
measures to prevent 'dangerous military activities' in the 'Agreement on the Prevention of
Dangerous Military Activities' of 23 July 1994.
Partial texts of this Agreement have been revealed by China's official news agency
Xinhua and other sources. 85 This Agreement provided for several measures to prevent
dangerous military activities. These included: safeguards against accidental missile
launches; bans on the use of eye-damaging lasers, which can damage the personnel or
material of the other state; a prohibition of the electronic jamming of communications;
and an early-warning system to prevent each other's aircraft, helicopters, and ships from
straying too close to the other's territories. Additionally, these two sides agreed on an
annual meeting to review the implementation of the 'Agreement' 87
84 
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Moreover, a provision on the compensation of damages resulting from dangerous
activities was included in the 1996 Shanghai Agreement. The parties agreed that the
damage resulting from dangerous military activities of one state would be compensated
by that state in accordance with generally recognised principles and rules of international
law. 88
 Such a provision was not covered in the European 1990 Vienna Document. The
historical experience of the 1 960s when armed incidents leading to military tensions in
the border areas has led China and Russia to develop stricter tension-reduction measures.
In order to lessen military tensions in the border areas, the prevention of dangerous
military activities and incidents has been an important element in the Sino-Russian
CBMs.
Lack of inspections and Ver jfI cation
In the context of CBMs, the provisions for inspections and verification are in themselves
deterrents to non-compliance with the agreement. 89 For this, aerial inspections and on-
site inspections have been developed. Aerial inspections enable the parties to monitor
compliance with force deployment limitations in restricted areas, to confirm information
exchanges on the disposition of military forces, and to provide early warning of
potentially destabilising activities.90 On-site inspections, 'challenge' and routine, are
designed to help to verify that the parties are complying with agreements.9'
See 'Russia, China Take Specific Measures to Prevent Dangerous Military activities', RIA news agency
(Moscow), 29 July 1997, in SWB, SU 2984, 30 July 1997, p.B 10
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In Europe, the CSCE participating states developed elaborate provisions for
inspections and verification. These included the right to conduct on-site challenge
inspections with no right of denial, and aerial inspections. In the 1990 Vienna Document,
up to 35 articles agreed to by the participating states were linked to the implementation
of verification. 92
 On 24 May 1992, the 'Treaty on Open Skies' was signed to conduct
observation flights by unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over the territories of the parties.°3
In the 1994 Vienna Document, up to 32 articles were concluded to standardise the
procedure for aerial and ground inspections.94
The absence of a mechanism for inspections and verification is an important
weakness of Sino-Russian CBMs. In the Sino-Russian Shanghai Agreement, only 4
articles touched upon inspections and verification. This agreement stipulated that
inspections could be carried out only if there were clear signs of irregular and threatening
activity. More importantly, the Shanghai Agreement did not specify the details of
inspections, that is, the inspection equipment, transportation tools, or the procedure for
inspections.95
The major purposes of inspections and verification are to ascertain compliance with
an agreement. It is an important step in the process of trying to achieve confidence. As
Marie-France Desjardins concluded in 1996:
In the absence of verification it is difficult to create confidence. As was so
often noted in the context of arms-control negotiations, verification is the most
important means of gaining assurance and confidence... the absence of
vertfiation removes an important procedure which could greatly and probably
'Vienna Document 1990', pp.483-485.
Lachowski, 'The Treaty on Open Skies', p.60 I.
'The Vienna Document 1994', pp.813-815.
'Unofficial Translation: the Shanghai Agreement', p.64.
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much more rapidly enhance confidence building - which for most advocates is
the 'ultimate' purpose of CBMs.96
The lack of elaborate procedures for inspections and verification underlines these two
states' reluctance to develop total transparency in their military affairs. This suggests
clearly that confidence between China and Russia has remained weak and has not
reached the same level of trust achieved among the CSCE members.
Failure to Conduct Overall Force Limitations in the Border Areas
Another constraint measure resides in manpower and equipment limits - an important
step towards reducing the possibility of war. 97
 The restrictions on the deployment of
forces have a central role to play in the imposition of constraints and the reduction of the
dangers of escalation. 98 For this, the 1990 CFE Treaty had set common ceilings for
NATO and WTO with regard to five major offensive categories of conventional
armaments and equipment - 20,000 battle tanks, 30,000 armoured combat vehicles,
20,000 artillery, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 combat helicopters. The area of
application covers the entire land territory in Europe.
In April 1990, China and the USSR had signed the 'Guiding Principles of Reducing
Border Forces and Enhancing Mutual Trust in the Military Field'. Following that, it took
' Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures, pp.40-41.
' In the late 1970s and early 1980s, arms reduction was a difficult task to achieve in Europe. Thus, at that
time many analysts and policy-makers tended to separate CBMs from politically unpopular arms reduction
so a to accomplish s mething constructive By the mid-1980 given the shift of the political environment
in Europe, CBMs started to be viewed as an important step in curbing the dynamics of the arms buildup
and in undertaking arms restraint and disarmament. See Macintosh, 'Confidence- and Security-building
Measures', pp.93-94; Lodgaard, 'The Building of Confidence and Security at the Negotiations in
Stockholm and Vienna', p.437.
Yair Evron, 'Arms Control in the Middle East: Some Proposals and Their Confidence-Building Roles', in
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seven years for China and Russia to complete talks on this agreement. The definition of
the zones of force limitations was the major dispute during Chinese and Russian talks.
The zones for force limitations or disarmament usually cover geographical points of
strategic or tactical importance, and cover an area extensive enough to make surprise
attack more difficult.'°° Although China and Russia agreed on the 100-km 'geographical
zones' for force limitations on the eve of Yeltsin's first visit to China in December 1992,
talks on force limitations were deadlocked.' 0 ' The major reason for this was that both
sides had completely different military deployments in the border areas.
The Chinese armed forces along the border were deployed deep inside its territory.
This position resulted from two factors. First, China enjoys impregnable natural barriers
such as the Great Khingan mountains and the Lesser Khingan mountains which provide
geographical shields against northern invaders. Wide and unoccupied spaces in
Manchuria and Xinjiang offer China operational space for military use.'° 2
 Second, Mao
Zedong's concept of the 'people's war' was based on a trade-off between space and time
with the aim of luring the enemy deep into Chinese territory, before drowning him in a
'Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe', pp.461-488.
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armaments in the border areas. See 'Four CIS States and China Field Talks on Armed Forces in Border
Regions', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 28 November 1992, in SWB, FE/1556, 5 December 1992, p.A2 2.
02 Gerald Segal, Defending China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.13; Georges Tan Eng Bok,
'Strategic Doctrine', in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow (eds), Chinese Defence Policy (London: The
Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1984), p.11.
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'sea of people'.'°3
 This strategy led China to adopt a defensive position of mass
mobilisation against the threat from the north throughout the 1 970s and the 1 980s.
In contrast, in Russia, the unpopulated and flat Far Eastern sector is a vulnerable
area in terms of geographical and military security. (see 2.C) Major industrial centres
and transportation lines in the Far East are close to the border with China. The Trans-
Siberian Railway line, which is of strategic importance to Russia, runs in some places
merely 5 km from the border. The distance between the vital industrial centre,
Khabarovsk, and the border is only 7 km, and Vladivostok, a major base for the Russian
Pacific Fleet, is only 70 km away from the border.'° 4 To defend its Far Eastern section,
Moscow had concentrated its armed forces within 100 km of the border since the 1 960s.
As a result, 90 per cent of the forces of the Far Eastern and Baikal Military Districts were
concentrated along the frontier.'°5
The Russian military have been concerned about a security threat from China.
Accordingly, they argued that the process of force limitations should be based on the
principle of equal, proportional downsizing of Russian and Chinese troops and weapons
to the entire depth of the sides' border troop contingents.'°' As Colonel N. M. Maslyayev
suggested in 1994:
The most acceptable downsizing option for Russia is in zones to a depth of 800
km and more from the state border because the main grouping of the People's
Liberation Army of China is stationed precisely at this depth while 80 percent
1 Bok, 'Strategic Doctrine, p.6.
'° Dmitry Balburov, 'Maritime Population Wants No "Fair Frontier" with China', Moscow News, 18-24
April 1996, p.4.
105 
'PRC Said Ready to Stop Nuclear Test', lnterfax (Moscow), 16 May 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-094, 16
May 1995, pp.8-9.
Colonel N. M. Maslyayev, 'On the Question of Russia's Military Security in the Asian Pacific Region',
Military Thought (Moscow), no. 7 (July August 1994), pp.3-4.
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of Russian troops in the Maritime and Amur Region are positioned near the
border in a zone of up to 100 kr and Russia has no possibility to redeploy
them into the country's inner parts owing to climatic, geo-physical, and
economic conditions. Therefore it is our view that the agreement reached in
December 1992 on troop downsizing within a 1 00-km border zone by each side
effectively means a unilateral downsizing of Russian troops.'°7
Even though 15 rounds of the talks had already been held, in a meeting between the
Defence Ministers in May 1995, Russian Defence Minister Grachev still refused to
conclude a final decision on force limitations in the border zones. In the words of
Grachev:
The figures suggested by China are unacceptable to Russia. They are
unacceptable only for the reason that Russia's geographic position and climate
conditions differ from those of China.., all Russian equipment and armaments
are situated in that zone, while the 100-kilometre zone of China is virtually
clear of arms.'°8
In 1997, Yeltsin started to play a central role in pushing for an agreement with
China on force limitations. At the ceremonial signing of a joint declaration with China
on 23 April 1997, Yeltsin revealed that the consultations on force limitations had been
completed by the state leaders and not the Defence Ministers. He stated:
(During the talks of border disarmament) The two defence ministers had dug
their heels in. We pushed them aside and resolved the controversial issues
ourselves. So the two heads of state cleared the matter up... We discussed
more than 20 issues with our Chinese partners. They included issues on the
borders, the level of armaments along the borders...'09
On 24 April 1997, China, Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan formally signed
the 'Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas'. In this, the
71b:d.,p.3.
'° 'Defense Ministers Discuss Border Issues', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 16 May 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-094,
16 May 1995, pp.9-10.
'° 'Yeltsin: "Controversial" Issues Resolved on Military Cooperation with China', Interfax (Moscow), 23
April 1997, in SWB, SU 2901, 24 April 1997, p.B 9.
152
five countries set ceilings on the number of troops and the amount of military equipment
each country could have within 100 km on each side of the border. This Agreement
covers personnel, battle tanks, armoured vehicles, tactical missile launchers, artillery
systems upwards of 122mm caliber, combat aircraft and combat helicopters. Russia and
the three Central Asian countries may maintain a total of 3,900 tanks, 4,500 armoured
vehicles and 290 aircraft within the zone, while China may have the same number on its
side. In addition, the military manpower of China and the four CIS states would be
limited to 130,400 troops on each side.°
Two major differences between the CFE Treaty and the 1997 five-state agreement
can be identified. First, the latter included specific restrictions on military manpower,
which the former did not. Guided by the 1997 five-state agreement, Russia will have to
reduce the actual number of its troops in the border areas by 15 per cent before the year
2000.111 As stated earlier, the great number of troops deployed in the border areas was a
serious financial burden for both China and the USSR / Russia. Since the détente of the
late 1980s, these two parties had started to reduce troops in the border areas. This was
undertaken unilaterally in the pursuit of each state's interests. On 25 April 1997, Russian
analyst Ilya Bulavinov derided the restrictions on military manpower by stating: 'these
reductions would have been made anyway, even without the five-state agreement - they
were planned by the General Staff in the context of overall reductions in the Army'.TMz
Sergei Shargorodsky, 'Russia, Asian Nations Sign Accord', The Washington Post, 24 April 1997; Chen
Yanni, 'Five Nations to Cut Border Forces', China Daily (Beijing), 25 April 1997.
David Hoffman, 'China's Jiang, in Moscow, Seek to Strengthen Ties', The Washington Post, 23 April
1997, p.A24.
2 llya Bulavinov, 'Russia's Boundless Friendship with China', Kommersant-Daily (Moscow), 25 April
1997, p.2, in CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 17 (28 May 1997), p.5.
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Another major difference is that the area of application of the CFE Treaty covers the
entire land territory in Europe. The 1997 five-state agreement merely focuses on force
limitations in border areas within 100 km on each side of the border. Most importantly,
two vital Russian cities in border areas, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, are excluded from
the reductions." 3 The arrangement highlights the Russian military's worries about the
country's geopolitical vulnerability in the Far Eastern regions and their concerns about a
potential security threat from China. On 25 April 1997, commenting on the 1997
disarmament agreement, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta concluded that this
document did not completely eliminate the real problems that existed between these
parties. TM4 This suggests clearly that although Yeltsin regarded it as an important task to
develop a more stable relationship with China through force limitations in the border
areas, Russia did not discount the possibility of China representing a security threat.
D) Chinese and Russian Cooperation in Resolving Issues of Territorial Security
In the guiding principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Stockholm Document, the
participating states of the CSCE declared that they would respect 'the inviolability of
frontiers' and 'the territorial integrity of States'." 5 In contrast to Cold War Europe,
territorial disputes have been the main source of tension in Chinese and Russian relations.
(see 2.B) Since the end of the Cold War, China and Russia have sought to resolve
Leonid Moiseev, Deputy Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry,
'Russian-Chinese Partnership: New Horizons', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 3 (1997), pp.7-8.
114 Natalia Pulina and Aleksandr Reutov, 'An Agreement Whose Preparation Began Back in the Time of the
USSR Was Concluded with the PRC Yesterday', Nezavisimaya gazeta (Moscow), 25 April 1997, p-I, in
CDPSP, vol. 49, no. 17 (28 May 1997), p.5.
" Lodgaard, 'A Critical Appraisal of CSBMs by Category', p.19.
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existing and emerging disputes relevant to territorial security. To understand this, two
issues will be examined: first, the Chinese and Russian border demarcation process; and
second, the problem of illegal Chinese immigrants in the Russian Siberian and Far
Eastern regions.
Border Demarcation
The Yeltsin government saw border demarcation as an important step in achieving a
stable relationship with China. Russia feared that the Chinese might raise territorial
disputes against Russia, as Mao Zedong has done in the 1960s and 1970s. Should this
happen, it would represent a nightmare scenario while Russia suffered from serious
internal problems and China was becoming a world power. The comments of Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov on 31 August 1994 reflected Russian worries
about this issue clearly:
In 1970s, the then Soviet Union spent over 200 billion rubles equipping our
borders. There was no other solution but the demarcation of the border. There
could not be combat actions over every single island. If we do not carry out the
demarcation of the border now, the situation could become more complex in the
future. In China there are certain circles which could make major territorial
claims on us. The completion of the demarcation process will remove the
problem of possible claims.'16
On 16 May 1991, China and the USSR had signed an agreement on resolving
disputes over the eastern section of shared borders. They agreed following the
international law based on the Thaiweg Principle that the navigation channel of a river
should be the dividing line for their common border. (see 2.D) After the Soviet collapse,
" Anna Kozyreva, 'A Partnership Oriented Toward the 21st Century', Ross:yskiye Vest, (Moscow), II















talks between China and Russia on the resolution of border disputes had begun in
Moscow in July 1992.117 The talks concentrated on two major areas: first, defining the
55-km western sector, and second, demarcating the 4,300-km eastern border. (see Map 2)
Map 2 Sino-Russian Border Demarcation
o disputed island omitted from 1991	 4300km shared	 AMUR KHABDemarcation Agreement
	 border still under
- International boundaries
FED E RATIO N
















Source: Strategic Survey 1996/97 (London: IISS, 1997), p.25 1.
When Jiang Zemin visited Moscow in September 1994, the leaders signed a
protocol on the western section of the common border, defining the 55-km section in
Altay Kray. (see Map 2) They also agreed to continue demarcating the eastern section of
the conunon border." 8 By November 1997, at their fifth summit, Jiang Zemin and
'Russo-Chinese Border Demarcation Talks Begin', Russia's Radio (Moscow), 2 July 1992, in SWB,
SU/1424, 4 July 1992, p.A1/1.
' 'Border Accord Signed with PRC', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 3 September 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-172, 6
September 1994, p.20; 'Qian Qichen Says Border Issue 95 Percent Resolved', Radio Rossi Network
(Moscow), 4 September 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-172, 6 September 1994, p 20; 'Sino-Russian Ties Set Eye
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Yeltsin announced officially that all points of contention regarding surveying and
demarcating the eastern section of the Sino-Russian border were resolved according to
the agreement signed on 16 May 1991U9
Although China and Russia called this a historical achievement, potential problems
have remained. First, the 1991 agreement omitted contentious territories claimed by both
parties in the eastern section of the common border. These include the islands of
Tarabarov and Bolshoy Ussuriyskiy near Khabarovsk (30 km in length and 350 square
km in area) and Boishoy Island on the river Argun (28 km in length and 5 square km in
area).' 2° (see Map 3) To maintain a friendly political atmosphere with China, Russia
announced that the resolution of these disputed islands might be passed onto the next
generation.' 2 ' Shelving disputes does not signal the final resolution of sensitive territorial
issues. On 22 July 1997, after conducting in-depth interviews with local authorities,
residents, and border guards in Khabarovsk Kray on the issue of territorial disputes with
China, a Russian television channel warned: 'We are bequeathing a time bomb to our
future generations'.'22
on New Century', Beying Review, 12-18 September 1994, p.4; Yelena Matveyeva, 'Demarcation of the
Russian-Chinese Border', Moscow News, 16 July 1993. Also see Chairman of the Russian delegation in
the Joint Russian-Chinese Demarcation Commission Genrikh Kireyev, 'Demarcation of the Border with
China', international Affairs (Moscow), vol. 45, no. 2 (1999), pp.1 04-105.
"° 'Sino-Russian Joint Statement on Relations', p.9.
120 
'Official Explains Border Agreement', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 3 September 1994 in FBIS-SOV-94- 172,
6 September 1994, pp.20-21; Kireyev, 'Demarcation of the Border with China', ppio5-1O6. In the
Chinese-Russian border agreement, both sides did not mention how to resolve these disputed islands. They
stated it this way: 'Because there are considerable differences of opinion over these islands, the talks will
continue'. See Kozyreva, 'A Partnership Oriented toward the 21St Century', p.1 6.
121 Yuriy Savenkov, "Before You Paint a Tree, See How It Grows". Moscow and Beijing Strive To Abide
by This Chinese Proverb', Izvestiya (Moscow), 2 September 1994, pL3, in FBIS-SOV-94-171, 2 September
1994, p.6.
22 
'Far East Region Worried over Future of Islands on Chinese Border', NTV (Moscow), 22 July 1997, in
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Map 3 Islands under Contention in the Eastern Section of the Sino-Russian Border
Source: Strategic Survey /996/97 (London: LISS, 1997), p.25 1.
Local Russian authorities and the people of Primorskiy and Khabarovsk Krays have
accused the Yeltsin government of territorial concessions to China that damage Russia's
interests and security.' 23
 In 1994, Viktor Ysayev, chief executive of Khabarovsk Kray,
openly criticised the Sino-Russian border eastern frontier accord as an 'unjust accord',
and called for its revocation.' 24
 In 1996, Yevgeny Nazdratenko, Governor of Primorskiy
Kray, threatened to disobey the Russian government if the Russian-Chinese border was
revised.' 25
 In March 1996, the local Duma of Primorskiy Kray even requested that the
SWB, SU 2980, 25 July 1997, p.B 19.
123 
'Russian Minister Pours Scorn on Fears over Russo-Chinese Border', Ostankino Radio Mayak (Moscow),
24 April 1996, in SWB, SU 2596, 26 April 1996, p.B 8; Alexander Lukin, 'The Image of China in Russian
Border Regions', Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 9 (September 1998), p.827.
124 Ho Tan-chi, 'Inside Story on Yeltsin's Letter to Jiang Zemin, Russian Leaders' Recent Visits to Beijing',
Kuang Cluao Ching (Hong Kong), no. 261 (16 June 1994), pp.6-8, in FBIS-CHI-94-130, 7 July 1994,
pp.7-8.
Balburov, 'Maritime Population Wants No "Fair Frontier" with China', p.4.
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Russian Constitutional Court examine the constitutionality of the border agreement with
China.'26
Among the internal actors influencing Russia's policy-making, military leaders have
been particularly resistant to making any territorial concessions to foreign states.' 27 They
have expressed their disagreement with the Yeltsin leadership's border demarcation with
China. On 4 April 1996, Major General Valery Rozov, Chairman of the Border
Demarcation Commission for Primorskiy Kray, resigned, claiming that he could not
supervise the transfer of'strategically important Russian lands' to China.' 28 Also in 1996,
Vitaly Poluyanov, leader of the Ussuriisk Cossack Force, declared that the Russian-
Chinese border should remain unchanged, otherwise he would enlist the support of local
authorities to take extreme actions.' 2° On 18 April 1997, Feliks Gromov, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, openly warned that the demarcation of the
eastern section of the border would change the strategic balance in the APR, particularly
if China were to build naval base in the region.'3°
Disputes over territory have gone to the heart of each state's strategic interests. This
is particularly important for Russia, a state which has suffered a marked loss of power
and international status.' 31 Although regional and military resistance failed to force
126 
'Far East Worried over Future of Islands on Chinese Border', pp.B 18-19.
127 Alex Pravda and Neil Malcolm, 'Conclusion', in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot
Light (eds), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford Univers,ty Press, 1996), p299.
s Felix Corley, 'Russia Hands over Land to the Chinese, Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 3, no. 6 (June
1996), p.3.
129 Balburov, 'Maritime Population Wants No "Fair Frontier" with China', p.4.
130 
'Navy Chief Says China Border Agreement May Lead to Change in Strategic Balance', lnterfax
(Moscow), 18 April 1997, in SWB, SU 2899,22 April 1997, p.S1 1.
'' Vladimir S. Miasnikov, 'Russia and China', in Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov (eds),
Damage Limitation or Crisis?: Russia and the Outside World (Washington and London: Brassey's, Inc.,
1994), p.230.
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Yeltsin to halt border demarcation with China, this domestic opposition has represented
an enduring source of uncertainty for a final resolution of border disputes between these
two neighbours.
Illegal Chinese Immigrants in Russia's Far East
From late 1992 to 1993, Chinese and Russian central and local authorities concluded
agreements on visa-free visits between civilians in an attempt to encourage cross border
contacts. The Chinese local authorities in the Heilongjiang province particularly
encouraged the export of Chinese labour to take part in the development of Russian Far
East areas.' 32 However, given the increasing number of illegal Chinese immigrants,
Russian central and local authorities have expressed concerns about a Chinese 'economic
offensive' and 'ethnic expansion' into Siberia and the Far Eastern regions, where Russia
faces problems of strategic vulnerability, remote location from the country's centre, and
low population levels.' 33 This has created tensions between Russia and China. In the
words of then Russian State Duma Chairman Gerrnadiy Seleznev, 'this phenomenon (the
illegal settlement of Chinese immigrants in Russian Far East areas) is fraught with
creeping territorial
In these areas, such problems as severe climatic conditions, a sharp deterioration of
the economic situations, food crisis, unemployment, and growing crime, have led ethnic
2 Long Xuanxi, 'Brief Discussion on the Features ofChinas Strategy to Open Border Areas to the Outside
World', Renmin Ribao (Beijing), 4 December 1992, p.5, in FBIS-CHI-92-246, 22 December 1992, p.'9.
133 Lukin, 'The Image of China in Russian Border Region', pp. 821-828; Vladimir S Miasnikov, Russia and
China: Constructive Partnership towards the 2/st Century in the Context of the Russia's New Asian -
Pacific Policy, p.20. Paper presented at the seminar - 'In Search of Unified China', 28 December 1995,
Moscow.
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Russians to emigrate to west of the Ural mountains.' 35 The total Russian population of
eastern Siberia and the Far East is only about 8 million, and the population of China's
northeastern provinces is more than 110 million. According to some unofficial estimates,
the number of the Chinese flowing into Russia has reached 2 million and Chinese
immigrants have outnumbered the local Russian population in some settlement points in
Russian Far Eastern areas.'36
In order to prevent the illegal Chinese immigrants from flowing into the Russian Far
East, two agreements on visa travel, which tightened control of border crossing, were
signed by the Chinese and Russian governments on 29 January 1994.' On 5 May 1995,
an agreement on cooperation between Chinese-Russian border regimes also entered into
effect.' 38 Although the Chinese and Russian governments have tried to reduce the impact
of this issue on their political relationship, alarming complaints from the local Russian
population against the Chinese have occurred. According to Yevgeny Afanasiev and
Grigory Logvinov, high ranking diplomats of the Russian Foreign Ministry, in a 1995
opinion survey in Russia's Far East, almost 70 per cent of the population expressed a
negative attitude towards the Chinese.'39
134 'Seleznev Compares Illegal Influx of Chinese with "Territorial Expansion", ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 26
June 1998, in SWB, SU/3265, 29 June 1998, p.B 11.
Vladimir Yakovievich, 'Are the Chinese Coming? Migration Processes in Russia's Far East',
International Affairs (Moscow), vol.42, no. 1 (January February 1996), pp.133-134.
The number of Chinese immigrants living in Russia may be exaggerated. But it has been widely cited
in Russian papers. Ibid., p.136; Lukin, The Image of China in Russian Border Regions', p.825; Ho, 'Inside
Story on Yeltsin's Letter to Jiang Zemin', p.8.
Yevgeny V. Afanasev, 'Concerning the China Card. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arranges the
Accents', Lileratuma:a gazela (Moscow), no. 7 (16 February 1994), p.9 and p.14, in J. L. Black, Russia
and Eurasia Documents Annual 1994, vol. 1 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1994),
pp.233-236.
Afanasiev and Logvinov, 'Russia and China Girding for the Third Millennium', p.49.
Ibid., p.51.
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The issue of increasing Chinese immigrants in Russia's Far Eastern regions can be a
source of potential conflict in the Sino-Russian relationship. The Constitution of the
PRC stipulates that 'all persons holding the nationality of the People's Republic of China
are citizens of the People's Republic of China'. It also argues that 'the People's Republic
of China protects the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals residing
abroad'.' 4° As early as 1958, the issue of 'overseas Chinese' led to serious frictions
between China and Indonesia.' 4 ' The 'management' of Chinese immigrants could
become a disputed issue between China and Russia as well. In 1995, Russian border
troops, the Interior Ministry, and the Federal Counterintelligence Services carried out an
operation code-named 'Foreigner' to catch Chinese people with overdue visas or forged
passports. The Chinese government criticised this policy and called upon the Russian
government to avoid human rights violations in this operation.' 42 It is possible that
increasing Chinese immigrants in Russia's Far East may provide China with an excuse to
criticise or interfere in Russia's internal affairs. In 1998, Russian military expert Dmitri
Trenin warned of such a scenario:
There is a forecast that by mid-2lst century there will be 7 - 10 million Chinese
living in Russia who will thus become the second largest ethnic group in Russia
after Russians themselves. This possibility alone should revolutionize Russian
mentality and mobilize the will of the authorities. In these conditions the lack
of a clear and consistently implemented immigration policies virtually
guarantees frictions on the inter-ethnic basis that may lead to an inter-state
conflict between Russia and China.'41
'° The PRC's Constitution Chapter Two: Article 33 and Article 34, Website http: www.qis.net/  chinalaw
lawtran I .htm
'' In 1958, the Indonesian government forbade Chinese merchants from trading in the villages and sent
them to the cities. This policy provoked angry protests from the Chinese government. See Jusuf Wanandi,
'ASEAN's China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement', Survival, vol. 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), p.118.
4° 
'PRC Foreign Ministry Criticized Ouster of Illegal Aliens', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 26 January 1995, in
FBIS-SOV-95-018, 27 January 1995, p.10.
'4° Dmitri Trenin, Russia's Chinese Problem, unpublished paper (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center,
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Clearly, with a shift in their power relations, demographic tensions between China and
Russia have deepened. Increasing Chinese immigrants in Russia's territories, and
Russian fears of Chinese 'expansion', have created uncertainties for the future of the two
parties' security relationship.
E) Conclusions: The Search for Trust between China and Russia
Confidence-building should be seen as a 'process' as well as a 'procedure'. This dual
characteristic leads to two separate dimensions of confidence-building. The 'process'
dimension of a definition of confidence-building stresses that CBMs themselves consist
of a process of psychological transformation. The 'procedure' dimension focuses on the
content and objective of CBMs. This conceptual duality has led to debates over the
practical scope of confidence-building.' 44 After addressing the key provisions of Sino-
Russian CBMs from a comparative perspective, it is worth applying these two
dimensions of confidence-building to outline the nature of Sino-Russian CBMs.
The 'process' dimension emphasises that debating, developing and negotiating
CBMs are all integral parts of the confidence-building phenomenon. Bilateral
consultations and dialogue may allow the parties to explain their views, discuss their
positions, and uncover each other's perceptions. Even though there remain different
perceptions and debates, this process of dialogue is considered to contribute to the
development of confidence-building.' 45 Viewed from this point of view, Chinese and
Russian negotiations and cooperation on CBMs have shown their attempt to have a more
1998), p.16.
' Macintosh, 'Confidence- and Security-building Measures', p.77 and pp.83-84.
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stable relationship, as their CBMs have included some of the major types of European
CBMs. In particular, communication measures, transparency measures, and tension-
reduction measures concluded by the two parties have helped to lessen military tensions
in the border areas. Also, constraint measures, such as constraints on the scale of
military exercises within the 100-km border zone and pre-notification requirements, can
help to reduce the possibility of a surprise attack from the other. These have contributed
to the improvement of bilateral military-security relations.
However, viewed from the 'procedur& dimension, which focuses on the content and
objective of CBMs, there remain many problems in Chinese and Russian CBMs.
Compared to the European model, many insufficiencies have remained in Sino-Russian
CBMs. Unlike the European model which developed a comprehensive instrument
applying to military developments anywhere in the territories of the parties, the focus of
Sino-Russian CBMs has been only to reduce military tensions in the border regions.'46
China has been reluctant to allow more elaborate and constraining CBMs. Following a
holistic approach to arms control and CBMs in general, China was only interested in the
limited applicability of CBMs within the 100-km border areas.' 47 This has led to the
situation where beyond the lessening of military tensions in these areas, Sino-Russian
CBMs have failed to create an outcome in which both sides rule out the possibility of a
potential security threat from the other.
This was reflected in that Sino-Russian information exchanges did not include
disclosures on defence spending, thus preventing both sides from tracing the full picture
"i Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures, p.1 8.
Acharya, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p.1 8.
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of the other's military system and future military development and modernisation. In
addition, the lack of elaborate procedures for inspections and verification is a serious
weakness in their CBMs, highlighting that the level of trust between China and Russia
has remained weak. Moreover, it is significant that given its geographic vulnerability in
the Far East, Russian concerns about a potential security threat from China have
remained salient. Due to geo-strategic and security considerations, these parties have not
fulfilled overall force limitations within the 100-km border zone.
More importantly, bilateral cooperation has not gone so far as to eliminate historical
problems such as territorial disputes and enduring perceptions of mutual territorial threat.
Russian regional and the military resistance to the results of Yeltsin's border demarcation
with China may become a problem for a final resolution of the two countries' territorial
disputes. Also, given the increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants in the Russian Far
Eastern areas, Russia's anxiety about Chinese 'expansion' and ambitions towards Russian
territory has risen. Potential inter-ethnic friction between Chinese and Russian peoples
in Russia's Far East cannot be ruled out.
Within the context of Sino-Russian military cooperation, CBMs have sought to
create an atmosphere of mutual trust to enable the two sides to tackle the problems that
have been irritants in their relations. This process was initiated by Gorbachev, and was
continued under Yeltsin, particularly, after his shift away from a Western-centric foreign
policy in late 1992. Bilateral cooperation 'is sustained not by trust and goodwill but by
calculated self-interest'.' 48 Compared to the past, significant progress has been made to
147 Yuan, Sino-Russian Confidence Building Measures, p.30.
48 Rajan Menon, 'The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China', Survival, vol. 39, no. 2 (Summer
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reduce military tensions in the border areas and to avoid a surprise attack from the other.
Beyond this, however, the sense of mutual threat has remained, preventing both sides
from trusting each other in the wider military and security field. Although cooperation
on CBMs has contributed to the normalisation of bilateral relations, the level of trust




Russian Arms Transfers to China
Another important component of Sino-Russian military cooperation has been arms
transfers. This chapter examines bilateral cooperation and reveals the limits of it. It
opens with the examination of demand-side and supply-side factors that led to the
possibility of Russian and Chinese arms transfers. It proceeds to elucidate the basic
principle of Russian arms transfers to China, that is to ensure that Russian security
interests are not undermined. This basic principle is illustrated in two facts. First,
Russia has maintained tight controls over the types of weapons supplied to China.
Second, Russia has sought to maintain the PLA's power projection vector to focus
towards the south through these transfers. Following this, it addresses existing
problems in these two states' arms transfer relationship. These have included three
major issues. First, China has suffered problems with absorbing Russian weapons.
Second, arms exports to China have not been profitable to Russia. Third, disputes
over weaponry pricing have delayed arms deals. Also, this chapter explores potential
uncertainties for this relationship: first, the alternatives available to China; second,
probable armed clashes between China and other Russian arms customers; and finally,
U.S. diplomatic pressure. This chapter closes by arguing that the Russian-Chinese
arms transfer relationship has remained fragile as it has failed to fully meet both sides'
objectives.
A) Demand-side Factors
This examination of Russian-Chinese arms transfer relationship starts by
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investigating the rationales behind China's purchases of Russian weaponry. Two
major issues will be addressed. They include the new Chinese military strategy in the
post-Cold War period and the reasons why China has required Russian weapons for
its defence modernisation.
New Military Strategy and Defence Modernisation
With the improvement of relations with the USSR in the late 1 980s, China's
sovereignty claims over Taiwan and the Spratlys highlighted that China's potential
conflict areas were increasingly concentrated on the country's coastal islands. To
cope with this new security environment, China has shifted from a strategy of
preparing the armed forces for an early, large-scale, nuclear war to one of preparing
the army for local and limited conflicts.'
Since the early 1990s, resolving territorial disputes over coastal islands had been
viewed as a vital task of China's defence policy. In February 1992, the PRC's
National People's Congress passed the 'Law on the Territorial Waters and Their
Contiguous Areas', asserting China's ownership over Taiwan and the Spratlys. This
law claimed the Chinese right to adopt all necessary measures to prevent and stop the
harmful passage of vessels through its territorial waters, including the right of the
PRC's warships and military aircraft to expel the intruders. 2 In 1998, Chinese
Defence Minister Chi Haotian made it clear that the basic goal of China's defence
policy was to consolidate national defence, resist foreign aggression, defend the
Nan Li, 'The PLA's Evolving Warfigluing Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985-1995: A Chinese
Perspective', in David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang (eds), China's Military in Transition (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997), pp.179-199; Paul H. B. Godwin, 'From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine,
Strategy and Capabilities towards 2000', The China Quarterly, no. 146 (June 1996), pp.464-487.
2 
'The Law of the People's Republic of China on Its Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas',
Xrnhua news agency (Beijing), 25 February 1992, in FBIS-CHI-92-040, 28 February 1992, pp.2-3.
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nation's territory, territorial air and waters and maritime rights and maintain national
integrity and security.3
However, due to its limited air and naval projection capability, China has
suffered serious problems in preparing for possible conflicts over Taiwan and the
Spratlys.4 The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) possessed 3,000 J-6s
(copies of MiG-19), 500 fighters of Chengdu J-7s (copies of the early MiG-21), 100
Shenyang J-8s (revisions of MiG-21), and 120 Xian H-6 bombers (copies of Tupolev
Tu-16 Badger). 5 Most of the aircraft date back to Soviet designs of the 1950s. Since
the late I 970s, China's development efforts have failed to provide the PLAAF with a
modern fleet. Given this, China has been eager to obtain new fighters that possess
superior capabilities to combat in the air and attack targets on land and water.6
In the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), major surface combatants and
submarines were also obsolete. The equipment of major surface combatant, such as
electronics, radar, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, naval artillery, and anti-
submarine accouterment, were almost exclusively derived from old Soviet models
and design.7 The new classes of Chinese-developed major surface combatants, the
Jiangwei frigate and the Luhu destroyer, still lacked modernised communications,
'China's Defense Policy Expounded', Beijing Review, 2-8 March 1998, p.1 1.
The author's interview with Dr. Chi Su, Deputy Secretary-General, Office of the President, Republic
of China, 22 December 1997, Taipei. See also Larry M. Wortzel, 'China Pursues Traditional Great-
Power Status', Orbis, vol. 38, no. 2 (Spring 1994), p.lT2; Felix K. Chang, 'Beijing's Reach in the South
China Sea', Orbis, vol. 40, no. 3 (Summer 1996), pp.353-374; John J. Schulz, 'China as a Strategic
Threat: Myths and Verities', Strategic Review, vol. 26, no. I (Winter 1998), p.1 1; Ross H. Munro,
'Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects War, Where It Doesn't', Orbis, vol. 38, no. 3
(Summer 1994), pp.371-72.
The Military Balance 1992/93 (London: IISS, 1992), p.147.
6 The PLAAF Headquarters Education and Research Office, Kong/un Shi [History of Air Force]
(Beijing: The PLA Press, 1989), p.243 (author's translation). Also see Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn
Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, C.A.:
RAND, 1995), pp.147-155.
John Jordan, 'The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 6, no. 6
(June 1994), pp.276-277.
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electronics, and defence systems. Air surveillance radar and fire control radar were
based mainly on old Soviet designs or relatively simple systems of Chinese origin.8
Additionally, an outdated submarine fleet has been an important weakness of the
PLAN. The PLAN submarine fleet has consisted of obsolete Whiskey and Romeo-
class traditional submarines built with Soviet blue-prints of the late 1950s. A 1994
report of the U.S. Congressional Research Service concluded:
A large (100) submarine force with very dated boats (as many as one half
may no longer be operational); difficulty in communications adds to reasons
for keeping boats close to shore. China's record of fatal sub accidents is
among the worst in the world, especially given the limited amount of time
such boats actually spend at sea.9
In the 1 990s, improving the weaknesses of the country's military forces was
viewed as an important task by the Chinese leadership. In his report to the Eighth
National People's Congress on 15 March 1993, then Chinese Premier Li Peng stressed
that defence modemisation must 'adhere to the strategic principle of active defence
and constantly increase its combat effectiveness and defence capabilities under
conditions of modern warfare'.'° In order to deal with probable conflicts over coastal
islands, upgrading the projection capability of air and naval forces has been seen as a
priority in China's defence modernisation. In an article published in Jiangfanjun Bao
on 6 August 1993, General Liu Huaqing, Vice Chairman of the CMC, made this point
clear by stating:
Priority must be given to the development of the Navy and Air Force and to
strengthen the building of technical arms... In order to protect our country's
oceanic interests, we should build a strong navy. Under modern conditions,
be it a war on land or at sea, we cannot part with the support of air force.
S Bates Gill, 'Determinants and Directions for Chinese Weapons Imports', The Pac/Ic Review, vol. 8,
no. 2 (1995), p.377.
Robert G. Sutter and Shirley Kan, China as a Security Concern in Asia: Perceptions, Assessment and
U.S. Options, CRS Report for Congress 94-32s (5 January 1994), p.CRS-17.
'° 'Document: Premier Li Peng's Report on the Work of the Government', Bejj:ng Review, 12-18 April
1993, p.XIV.
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Therefore, we must put modernisation of the Navy and Air Force in the
priority position."
In addition to the aim of modemising its air and naval military hardware, commercial
and political-military factors have encouraged China to purchase arms from Russia.
Why Russian Weapons?
After the end of the Cold War, many traditional arms export states began to reduce
their investment in defence production and to encourage their defence firms to seek
foreign markets, so as to maintain a profitable scale of production. Increasing
competition in international arms market led to the emergence of a buyer's market, in
which the buyer could drive harder bargains in arms agreements.' 2
 However, this
trend did not bring obvious profits for China. Since the Tiananmen events of 1989,
China has been placed under a Western arms embargo, and has veiy limited sources
for 'lethal military equipment'. (see 2.D) In 1998, one report of the U.S. General
Accounting Office concluded that 'we found no cases of EU members entering into
new agreements to sell China lethal military items after 1989'.' Since 1989, Russia
and the Middle East have accounted for almost 90 per cent of China's imported
military items.'4
In addition to limited alternative sources of arms supplies, several commercial
" Liu Huaqing, 'Unswervingly Advance along the Road of Building a Modern Army with Chinese
Characteristics', J:angfanjun Bao (Beijing), 6 August 1993, pp.1-2, in FBIS-CH!-93-l58, 18 August
1993, p.21.
12 David Mussington, Understanding Contemporary International Arms Tran.sfers, Adeiphi Paper no.
291 (London: HSS, 1994), p.4.
' The EU arms embargo against China is based on a 1989 political declaration that EU members will
embargo the 'trade in arms' with China. Each EU member may interpret and implement the embargo's
scope for itself. The U.S. arms embargo against China is enacted in laws and bars the sale to China of
all military - lethal and non-lethal - on the U.S. Munitions List. See United States General Accounting
Office, China: Military imports from the United States and the European Union since the 1989
Embargoes (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 1998), p.2. For the non-
lethal military items EU members sold to China, see 5.E.
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and political-military benefits explain the Chinese interest in Russian weaponry. First,
viewed from the perspective of commercial interests, the price of Russian weapons
has been lower than other alternative sources.' 5 As early as May 1991, the CMC
drafted a report, emphasising that the cost of modemising Chinese military forces
with Russian weapons was comparatively cheaper than with other sources. It
concluded that modemising the PLA's military hardware through imports from Russia
could save Chinese spending on purchases of foreign arms.'6
Another commercial enticement was that in the early 1990s Russia accepted a
very flexible arrangement for payments. Before the mid-1990s, to strengthen its
competitive profile in the world arms market, Russia allowed arms payments to be
paid by clients through flexible forms of settlement, such as counter-trade.' 7 For
China, such flexible settlement structures were seen to reduce the drain on Chinese
financial resources, helping to lessen the negative economic impact of Chinese arms
purchases from abroad. Moreover, such a structure could also expand the export of
Chinese goods and commodities. A 1993 research report, drafted by the CMC Policy
Research Office, suggested that China should make use of Russia's economic
weakness to offer it light industry goods, foods, and meat in exchange for purchases
' Ibid.
' Distortions in the factors of production (labour materials) allowed Russia to reduce the price of
weapons for exports. For example, Russian defence industries paid 2 cents a kilowatt hour for
electricity and U.S.$ 700 a scientist and engineer a year. See David Markov, 'Advanced Conventional
Weapons Sales Offerings', in Sverre Ledgaard and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (eds), Arms and
Technology Transfers: Security and Economic Considerations Among Importing and Exporting States
(New York and Geneva: United Nations Publication, 1995), p.66.
16 
'Chinese "Secret" Report Urges Stronger Military Ties with Russia', Kyodo news service (Tokyo), 16
December 1992, in SWB, FE 1568, 19 December 1992, pAl 6.
" According to Aleksandr Kotelkin, General Director of Rosvooruzheniye, 'tactical flexibility' in
payment forms, including partial payment in barter, could help Russia to achieve the 'strategic'
objective of increasing arms exports. See Aleksandr Kotelkin, 'Russian Aviation Export: A
Breakthrough into the 21st Century', Military Technology, Special Supplement, 1995, p.15. By the
mid-1990s, due to increasing financial pressure, Russia adjusted such a policy and demanded arms
clients to pay more hard cash for Russian arms. See S.D.
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of modem weaponry)8
China's purchases of Russian weapons have also been related to assessments of
political and military utility. The Yeltsin leadership was eager to build a friendly
relationship with China, and agreed on the principle of non-interference in Chinese
internal affairs. (see 3 .A) Russia therefore was seen as a source for the supply of
modem weapons and technologies without the threat of sanctions over Chinese
human right violations. In addition, while purchasing arms from abroad, a country
has to consider whether it has the capability to absorb imported weapon systems)9
Given that most of Chinese military hardware was dominated by Soviet manufacture
and design, Russian weapons and technology were seen to be an efficient way to
achieve the modemisation of the PLA's military forces.2°
B) Supply-side Factors
After exploring the rationales behind China's purchases of Russian weaponry, this
discussion examines the factors that affected the Yeltsin government's decision to
supply arms to China. This section will address Russian interests in arms transfers to
China, ranging from commercial profits to strategic considerations.
Arms Transfers as an Economic Tool
After the Soviet collapse, a deep economic crisis, profound reductions in military
Chuan Hsun-che, 'Higli-Level Think Tank Suggests "China Allying Itself with Russia Against the
United States", Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), no. 193 (1 November 1993), pp.20-2!, in FBIS-CHI-93-
213, 5 November 1993, p.1.
19 Christian Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1988) p.74.
20 Gerald Sega!, 'Russia and the Chinas - New Risks', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 4, no. 9
(September 1992), p.416; Pi Ying-hsien, 'The Dynamics of Sino-Russian Relations', Issues and Studies,
vol. 32, no. 1 (January 1996), p.24; Ian Anthony, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siman T. Wezeman, 'The
Trade in Major Conventional Weapons', SIPRI Yearbook 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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expenditures, and drastic defence conversion resulted in Russian defence industries
suffering serious challenges to their survival. 2 ' On 26 March 1992, S. Shuklin,
Chairman of the All-Russia Trade Union of Defence Industry Workers, pointed out
that Russian arms exports in 1992 were 3.8 times less than in 1989, while the USA
had increased arms exports by about 2.2 times in the same period. 22 Meanwhile,
nearly 21 per cent of Russian defence enterprises stood on the verge of bankruptcy,
while 43 per cent would soon be classified as barely viable. 23 By 1993, the financing
of arms production had been reduced by nine times, and Russian military orders were
fulfilled by no more than 10-15 per cent of the defence industry's production
capacities.24
Faced with the drastic reduction of domestic orders, in 1992 Russian defence
enterprises expressed a desire to increase arms exports by up to 40-50 per cent.25
After the end of the Cold War, the Russian defence industry viewed China as a vital
market for arms exports. UN-sanctioned embargoes against Iraq, Libya, and
Yugoslavia, as well as various arms transfer restrictions on Iran, India, Cuba, and
North Korea led to the loss of traditional Russian customers. On 18 May 1993,
Sergei Glazyev, then Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, declared that Russia's
support to UN sanctions banning weapons deliveries to some countries had led to the
1995), p.506.
21 Michael J. Barry, 'Privatization, Conversion, and Restructuring in Russia's Military-Industrial
Complex: Macroeconomic Implications of a Sector Set Apart', Comparative Strategy, vol. 13, no. 4
(November/December 1994), p.420.
22 




'Glukhikh Reports on Defence Industry's Conversion', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 7 December 1993, in
SWB, SU 1871, 14 December 1993, p.Sl/2.
25 
'Russia Seeking New Market for its Arms', Interfax (Moscow), 30 November 1992, in SWB,
SU/1555, 4 December 1992, p.C4 1.
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loss of U.S.$ 16 billion in revenues.26
 Moreover, with the disintegration of the WTO,
the former customers of Russian defence indusiries in Eastern Europe turned to seek
political and military cooperation with NATO, including arms purchases. 27
 These
developments pushed Russian defence industries to struggle to find new arms buyers.
As one Russian analyst pointed out, 'Russia's increased exports of combat aviation
equipment to China are partially a response to the West thwarting its efforts to retain
a monopoly over Eastern Europe's aviation market'.28
In 1994, it was estimated that Russian defence industries consisted of 2,000
production facilities and 660 research centers, which accounted for nearly 60 per cent
of Russia's industrial production value. In addition, they employed 4 million people,
of whom 800,000 are scientific personnel. 29
 There were about 80 defence industry
towns where defence production accounted for more than 80 per cent of local
economic activity. 30
 To prevent unemployed defence workers from forming a source
of social and political instability, many local governments supported the military-
industrial lobbies in promoting arms sales abroad.3 ' The regional governments of
Yekaterinburg, Irkutsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, St Petersburg and Tula, where defence
industries were concentrated, supported arms exports in an attempt to lighten
economic hardship and support employment in the defence industry. This was
illustrated in that many regional governments received Chinese military delegations
26 Yuri Laskin and Alla Glebova, 'Russian Defence Sales The Insiders' View', Military Technology,
vol 17, issue 2 (1993), p48
27 Joanna Spear, 'Bigger NATO, Bigger Sales', The World Today, vol. 53, no. 11 (November 1997),
pp.272-274.
28 Nickolay Novichkov, 'Russian Arms Technology Pouring Into China', Aviation Week & Space
Technology (hereafter A WST), 12 May 1997, p.73.
29 Barry, 'Privatization, Conversion, and Restructuring in Russia's Military-Industrial Complex', p.420;
Igor Khripunov, 'Russia's Arms Trade in the Post-Cold War Period', The Washington Quarterly, vol.
17, no. 4 (Autumn 1994), p.80.
30 Barry, 'Privatization, Conversion, and Restructuring in Russia's Military-Industrial Complex', p.420.
' Ibid
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and warmly welcomed Chinese purchases of Russia's arms.32
Deteriorating economic conditions at home and the growing need to earn hard
currency abroad led the Yeltsin leadership to seek an increase in arms exports. In
early 1993, Yeltsin put strong pressure on the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations (MFER) to restore Russian positions in the world arms market. 33 The
Yeltsin government stressed that profits earned from arms exports would be used for
the conversion of defence industries. 34 In November 1993, the state Rosvooruzheniye
company was established to coordinate Russian arms exports and technical
cooperation with foreign countries. 35 At the end of 1995, eight arms producers were
permitted to negotiate on arms deals with potential foreign customers.36
In order to increase its competitiveness in the world arms market, Russia set out
to make modem military hardware available for export. Major weapon systems on
the list for export have included: MiG-29 and Su-27 jet fighters, and their modified
32 Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, 'Sino-Russian Military-Technical Cooperation: A
Russian View', in Ian Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998), p.201.
In February 1993, Petr Aven, then Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, was removed by Yeltsin.
He was accused of failing to make effective policy for arms exports. Aven's successor Sergei Glazyev
was also threatened with the same fate by Yeltsin if he could not push Russia's arms exports. See
Stephen Foye, 'Russian Arms Exports after the Cold War', RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 13 (26
March 1993), p.60.
Edwin Bacon, 'Russian Arms Exports - A Triumph for Marketing?', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol.
6, no. 6 (June 1994), p.268.
For functions of the state Rosvooruzheniye company, see Director General of Rosvooruzheniye
Alexandre Kotelkin, 'Russia and the World Arms Market', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no.
4 (1996), pp.3 1-38. Also see Chairman of Rosvooruzheniye V. I. Samoylov's speaking in a TV
interview, "Aty-Baty" Views Arms Sales Abroad', Russian Television and DubI Networks (Moscow),
20 August 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-183, 21 September 1994, p.17.
36 These firms included: fighter jet manufacturer M1G-MAPO, helicopter maker Rosvertol, light arms
manufacturer Luzhmash, maker of air defence systems Antei, a hydraulic equ pment maker
Gydromash, utility vehicle manufacturer Metrovagonmash, component manufacturer Ufa Production
Association, and scientific instrument maker Byuro Priborostroyeniya. Although these arms producers
were permitted to negotiate with foreign customers on arms deals, all exports were still required to
follow the licencing process. These arms producers' success in selling weapons to foreign states was
limited by their lack of expertise in the international arms market. See Peter Litavrin, 'The Process of
Policy Making and Licensing for Conventional Arms Transfers', in Anthony (ed.), Russia and the
Arms Trade, p.1 10; Andrew J. Pierre, 'Toward An International Regime for Conventional Arms Sales',
in Andrew J. Pierre (ed.), Cascade of Arms: Managing Conventional Weapons Prolferation
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versions; T-72S and T-80U main battle tanks; BMP-3 mechanised infantry combat
vehicles; MI-8 and KA-25 helicopters; Smerch multiple Launch Rocket systems;
Thor-MI and S-300 air-defence systems; and Kilo- and Amur-class diesel-powered
submarines.37
Arms sales to China were seen as a means to lighten the financial crisis in the
Russian defence industry. In September 1992, after meeting with then Chinese
Defence Minister Qin Jiwei, then acting Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar called
Russian arms exports to China as an opportunity to employ the capacity of Russian
defence industries in connection with the sharp reduction of military expenditure.38
Arms Transfers as a Strategic Issue
Arms transfers were viewed by the Yeltsin leadership as one of vital elements for
developing the strategic goal of a 'friendly' relationship with China. (see 3.E) To
achieve this, meetings between both state leaders were scheduled to deal with anns
sales.39 The 'Memorandum on the Principles of Military and Technical Cooperation'
between China and Russia was signed by Yeltsin and Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng
in December l992.° Praising this memorandum, Yeltsin said that 'in this way, the
friendly character of our relations has been strengthened'.4'
(Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 1997), pp.392-393.
Pyotr Litavrin, 'Russian Arms Exports: New Aspects of An Old Business', International Affairs
(Moscow), no. 7(1994), p.33; 'Rosvooruzhenie State Company for Exports/Imports of Armaments and
Military Equipment', Foreign Trade (Moscow), no 4 6 (1997), pp 34.37 • Major-General Alexander
Kotelkin, 'Rosvooruzheniye - A Reliable Exporter of the World's Best Weapons Systems', Military
News Bulletin (Moscow), no. 4 (April 1997), p.10.
Jeff Lilley, 'Russian Handicap: Moscow Looks East but the Picture Is Bleak', FEER, 26 November
1992, p.24.
'Accords on Troop Cuts, Arms Sales', Moscow Radio Rossii Network, 17 December 1992, in FBIS-
SOV-92-243, p.18.
° 'Full Text of Yeltsin's Address, and Answers to Questions, at Press Conference', ITAR-TASS
(Moscow), 19 December 1992, in SWB, FE 1569,21 December 1992, p.A1 4.
Ibid., p.A1 2.
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Under normal circumstance, a country only exports arms to friendly or neutral
governments. Arms transfers therefore can serve as 'gestures of political support'.42
In November 1993, Russian Defence Minister Grachev claimed that military
cooperation with China would 'contribute to the consolidation of good-neighbourly
relations'.43 While pursuing a stable relationship with China, the Yeltsin leadership
supported the supply of weaponry to China, stressing that military and technical
cooperation with China was 'a key sphere of bilateral relations'. Such diplomatic
rhetoric showed Russia's intention of using its arms transfers to China as a symbol of
their friendly relations.
It has been argued that the growing economic and military power of China, the
world most populous country, could destablise regional security and challenge U.S.
political and military predominance in the world.45 Arms transfers involve a series of
bilateral consultations, training support, and maintenance assistance. This process
was seen as a means to boost Russian ties with the Chinese army and to increase
Russian influence over Chinese defence modernisation. In an interview in July 1998,
while commenting on Russian arms transfers to China, General Anatoly Bolyatko
stressed that apart from the purely economic advantages, supplying weapons to China
could provide a chance of influencing China's military and political strategy and
maintaining ally-like relations with that country. 46 As such, Russia might increase its
42 Caina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, p.12.
'Russian Defence Minister Arrives in China', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 9 November 1993, in SWB
SU/1845, 13 November 1993, pp.S1/1-2.
'Sino-Russian Joint Statement on Relations', Beijing Review, 22-28 December 1997, p.1 0.
See, for example, Nicholas D. Kristof, 'The Rise of China', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5
(November/December 1993), pp.59-74; Joseph S. Nyc, 'China's Re-emergence and the Future of the
Asia-Pacific', Survival, vol. 39, no. 4 (Winter 1997 1998), pp.65-79.
The author's interview with Major General Anatoly Bolyatko (also Boliatko), the Institute of Far
Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), 1 July 1998, Moscow. Also see Anatoly
Boliatko, 'Military and Technological Cooperat on, and Prospects of Russian-Chinese Strategic
Interaction', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 3 (1997), p.56.
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political leverage in the region and in relation to the U.S..41
Many factors have motivated Russia and China to undertake arms transfers.
However, important problems have arisen. Mutual distrust and conflicts of interest
have still obstructed bilateral cooperation. In particular, Russia has tried to safeguard
its own security interests when supplying weapons to China. This development has
given rise to uncertainties in their arms transfer relationship.
C) The Principle Guiding Russian Arms Transfers to China: Safeguarding
Russian Security Interests
This discussion so far reveals relevant patterns in Russian arms transfers to China.
Russian arms transfers to China have been based on the basic principle, that is to
ensure that Russian security interests are not undermined. This is supported by two
facts. First, Russia has maintained tight controls over the types of weaponry supplied
to China. As such, Russia can prevent these deals from damaging its own security.
Second, through its arms transfers to China, Russia has sought to maintain the PLA's
power projection vector to focus on the south so as to prevent any threat to Russian
security. These two issues will be addressed below.
Tight Russian Controls over the Types of Weapons Supplied to China
The Yeltsin leadership's desire to have a friendly relationship with China, and the
defence industry's enthusiasm for commercial benefits, accounted for supply-side
factors behind Russian arms transfers to China. However, these have not meant that
Russia has ruled out the possibility that China could present a direct military threat to
Russian desires to influence Chinese military defence could bring increasing diplomatic pressure
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its security in the future. In particular, territorial disputes and demographic tensions
remain potential uncertainties in these two neighbours' security relationship. Many
Russian political elites have warned that, while supplying arms to China, Russia has
to take account of the fact that China could become a potential enemy and pose a
threat to Russian security.48
Although Russian defence enterprises have been eager for profits from arms
exports, the military has expressed its worries about the potential risks of enhanced
Chinese military capacities. In 1993, General Mahmut Gareyev, an officer lionized
by the General Staff, had warned:
Currently China is pursuing - to the satisfaction of all - what may be
described as a generally positive policy by promoting all-round cooperation
with Russia. But we should remember that regardless of the attitude of this
or that politician, the demographic factor may have a decisive impact on the
conduct of that country. China's foreign policy and military doctrine uphold
the thesis that the country will implement the concept of 'strategic frontiers
and space required for life' as the complex (economic, scientific,
technological and military) power grows. These boundaries would be
expected to shift in step with the growth of the 'complex power of the state'
far enough for the country to be able to pursue its real interests by using
armed forces. This amounts to an attempt to justify territorial claims
primarily on Southeast Asian countries that may, however, extend to CIS
countries.49
After the creation of a 'strategic partnership' between Russia and China, in December
1996, then Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov voiced concerns about attempts
of certain Asian countries, including China, to 'sharply increase the armed forces'
from the USA against its anns transfers to China. See 5.E.
See, for example, Sergei Rogov, 'Military Interests and the Interests of the Military', in Stephen
Sestanonvich (ed.), Rethinking Russia's National Interests (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1994), p.73; Alexei G. Arbatov, 'Russian National Interests', in Robert D.
Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov (eds), Damage Limitation or Crisis?: Russia and the Outside
World (Washington and London: Brassey's, Inc., 1994), p.72; Sergei Repko, 'To the People's Republic
of China, Russia Is an "Unquestionable Enemy" or "Belligerent Force", Nezavisimoye voyennoe
obozreniye (Moscow), 25 July, pp.1-2, in CDPSP, vol. 48, no. 30 (21 August 1996), p.22; Victor Larin,
'Russia and China on the Threshold of the Third Millennium: So Who Is Going to Defend Our
National Interests?', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 1 (1997), p.24; Iurii Fedorov, 'Interest Group
and Russia's Foreign Policy', international Affairs (Moscow), vol. 44, no. 6 (1998), p.178.
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offensive capabilities'.50
Despite Russian economic difficulties, the military have stressed the need to
assess the strategic consequences of Russian arms exports. 5 ' In the Military Doctrine
of 1993, the military made it clear that while supplying arms to foreign countries, it
was important to ensure Russia's 'military-political and economic interests in a
balanced way'. 52 Following the establishment of Rosvooruzheniye in 1993, the
Defence Ministry sent a number of military officers to this state company in order to
provide engineering support for arms exports. 53 More importantly, the Defence
Ministry was charged with defining forms, volumes, and the range of arms for export.
It also took part in talks with foreign customers, defining the quantitative aspects of
any deal. The Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the General
Staff was also directly involved with these matters.54
Although details of policy-making procedures have been inaccessible, the results
of Russian policy have shown that safeguarding Russian present and future security
has been a vital principle when supplying armaments to China. In December 1992,
Yeltsin had made it clear that Russian policy on arms transfers to China was based on
the principle of not harming Russian security.55 Some of the general scholarly
Mahmut Gareyev, 'Russia's Priority Interests', International Affairs (Moscow), no. 6 (1993), p.8.
° Igor Korotchenko, 'Igor Rodionov Advocates Creation of Defense Alliance of CIS Countries',
Nezavisimayagazeta (Moscow), 26 December 1996, p.!, in CDPSP, vol.48, no. 52(22 January 1997),
p.16.
'Interview with Col-Gen. Viadimier Zhurbenko, First Deputy Chief of Russian Armed Forces
General Staff and Member of the Interdepartmental Commission for Russian Military-Technical
Cooperation with Foreign Countries', Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 27 August 1994, p.4, in FBIS-SOV-
94-169,31 August 1994, pp.30-32.
52 
"Detailed Account" of Russia's Military Doctrine', Rossiyskiye Vesti (Moscow), 18 November 1993,
pp.1-2, in SWB, SU/1858, 29 November 1993, p.S1 9.
Yuriy Kirshin, 'The Role of the Ministry of Defence in the Export of Conventional Weapons', in
Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, p.118.
' Ibid., p.! 19; 'Interview with Col-Gen. Vladimier Zhurbenko', p.31; Lt. Col. A. L. Rybas, 'Military-
Technical Cooperation and National Security', Military Thought (Moscow), vol. 6, no. 5 (1997), p.6.
'Yeltsin Says Russia United on Need for Cooperation with China', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 18
December 1992, in SWB, FE 1569, 21 December 1992, p.A1/7.
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literature has questioned the Russian government's capability of conducting such a
policy and ensuring this principle. 56 However, the evidence available demonstrates
that Russia has tried to prevent arms deals with China from damaging its own
security. This has been reflected in two facts: first, Russia has not sold to China its
most advanced weapon systems, and second, Russian arms transfers to China have
not reached the level of quality it has supplied to other Asian states.
First, Russia has refused to supply China with the latest weapons. This was
illustrated in that Russia turned down the Chinese proposal to purchase Tu-22M
Backfire supersonic tactical-strike bombers. 57 Tu-22M bomber's combat radius can
reach over 2,486 miles, double the distance to that of Chinese Tu-16 Badger
bombers. 58 The supply of such tactical bombers along with its associated weapons
systems to China would considerably alter the military balance in this region, giving
rise to a potential threat to Russia. 59 In contrast, Russia has planned to supply India
with Tu-22 bombers. Also, due to security considerations, in 1994, Russia rejected
the Chinese plan to purchase Russian Su-35 fighters.6'
As importantly, Russia has been cautious about which missile systems are used
56 Stephen Blank, 'Challenging the New World Order: The Arms Transfer Policies of the Russian
Republic', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (June 1993), pp.253-254; Stephen Blank,
Why Russian Policy is Failing in Asia (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997), pp.6-7;
Stephen J. Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War
College, 1997), pp.5-9; Stephen J. Blank, 'Russia-Chinese Military Relations and Asian Security',
issues and Studies, vol. 33, no. 11 (November 1997), p.60.
" 'China Looks for Backfire Deal', Flight international, 2-8 June 1993, p.14
Sophearith Moeng (ed.), The Vital Guide to Military Aircraft (London: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1994),
p 121 and p.123.
'China Looks for Backfire Deal', p.14.
60 Rahul Bedi, 'India to Lease Russian AEW&C Aircraft and Buy Tu-22 Bombers', JDW, 17 November
1999, p.S.
61 
'Moscow Not to Supply Su-35 Fighters to China, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 10 August 1994, in FBIS-
SOV-94-154, 10 August 1994, p.11. The Su-35 is equipped with the AL-35 engine, which possesses
12 per cent more trust than the Su-27's AL-31F. Additionally, the Su-35 is a multi-role fighter-bomber
with enhanced air combat capability and revised capabilities to use advanced weapons in the air-to-
ground and anti-ship roles. See Sergio Coniglio, 'The Sukhoi Su-27 Combat Aircraft Family', Military
Technology, Special Supplement 1995, p.29.
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to equip the aircraft it planned to sell to China. One factor which delayed the deal on
the Su-30 fighter / bomber was that Russia refused to supply China with advanced R-
77 (AA-1 2 'Adder') medium-range air-to-air missiles (AAM).62
 The sales of two
Sovremenny-class destroyers and SS-N-22 'Sunburn' surface-to-surface guided
missiles might help to improve the strike capability of Chinese surface combatants.
Russia only agreed to export such a missile system to China because, in May 1999,
the Russian navy deployed the latest type of anti-ship cruise missile system 3M54
Alfa whose strike range was over 300 km.63
Second, compared to its arms sales to other Asian states, Russian arms transfers
to China have been more cautious. While negotiating with Vietnam on the deal of
Su-30s, Russia agreed to supply a range of tactical weapons currently in service with
the Russian Air Force. These have included: AA-12 medium-range AAMs, Kh-29
(AS-14 'Kedge') and Kh-59 (AS-13 'Kingbolt') medium-range air-to-surface missiles
(ASM), and Kh-31 (AS-17 'Krypton') medium-range anti-ship missiles.M Russian
arms transfers to India are also illustrative. Russia has agreed to supply India with
Su-30 MKI long-range multi-role fighters, Tu-22 supersonic tactical-strike bombers,
the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, the most up-to-date T-90S main battle tank,
and the quietest running Russian nuclear submarine, the Project 971 - Bars. 65
 (see
62	 Kamovs Set to Boost Chinese ASW, JDW, 4 March 1998, p.14.
63 
'E jiang wei zhonggong shengchan xianJinfanjianfeidan' [Russia Will Produce Advanced Anti-Ship
Missiles for Communist China], Chungkuo shihpao (Taipei), 16 April 1998, p.9. (author's translation).
For the development of Russian anti-ship missiles, see Cameron Butterworth, 'Assessing Russia's Anti-
Ship Arsenal', Asia-Pac/Ic Defence Reporter (December 1997/January 1998), pp.17-19; 'Russian Anti-
Ship Missile Targets Multi-$b Market', JDW, 9 June 1999, p.13.
Nikolai Novichkov, 'Hanoi Close to Russian Fighter Deal', JDW, 1 December 1999, p.4.
65 A corresponding memorandum on Russian sale of 4,000-ton aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov to
India was signed in December 1998. The Tu-90 tank is the latest main battle tank made by Russia.
Russia has supplied India with T-90 tanks to replace its T-55 and Vijayanta tanks. In July 1999, Indian
army completed tests of the 1-90, and planned to use these new tanks to arm five regiments so as to
spearhead the army corps deployed near the border with Pakistan. As for the Project 971 multi-role










































MKK's detection range is given as oniy 100 km and can track only two targets.69
Moreover, the Indian Su-30 MM has been equipped with advanced AA-12 Adder
medium-range air-to-air missiles which Russia has resisted transferring to China.70






IL-76 Candid Transport Aircraft
Kamov Ka-27 Multi-Purpose Helicopters
SA-lO (S-300) SAM Launchers
SA-lO (S-300) SAM
Su-27SK Fighters
Licenced Production of Su-27SK
Kilo I type 877E Submarines
Kilo I type 636 Submarines
T-80U Main Battle Tanks
A-50 AEW&C Aircraft (under negotiation)
Tor-Mi Air Defence Missile System
Su-30 MKK Fighters (under negotiation)
India	 Su-30 MM Fighters
MiG-29SE Fulcrum C Fighters
Kilo I type 877E Submarines
SA-19 Grisom SAM




KA-3 I Helix AEW Helicopters
T-90S Main Battle Tanks
Licenced Production of Su-30 MK Fighters
Kilo /type 636 Submarine (under negotiation)
Admiral Gor hkov Aircraft Carrier
The Project 971 multirole nuclear submarines
Tu-22M Backfire Bombers (under negotiation)
'S/iou zhonggong sukai sans/i Eguo liuyzshou' [Selling Su-30s to China. Russia Retains Advanced




















Malaysia	 MiG-29C Fulcrum Fighters
Vietnam	 Su-27SK Fighters




Su-30 Fighters (under negotiation)
Indonesia	 Su-30 Fighters (suspended)
Mu Mi-l7 Helicopters (suspended)
South Korea	 BMP-3 Combat Vehicles
T-80U Main Battle Tanks
AT-I 1 Sniper/9M1 19 Anti-tank Missiles
SA- 18 Portable SAM
* -- = unavailable
Source: SIPRI Yearbooks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, years 1992-98); 'China Buys
Seven Heavy Transport Planes', Interfax news agency (Moscow), 14 December 1992,
in FBIS-SOV-92-241-154, 10 August 1994, p.1 1; Rahul Bedi,
'India Targets $1b Russian Air Defence Capacity', JDW, 2 April 1997, p.4;
'Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap', JDW, 10 December 1997,
pp.27-28; 'Ninth "Kilo" Class vessel I-Leads for India', JDW, 28 January 1998;
'Russian Kamovs Set to Boost Chinese ASW', JDW, 4 March 1998, p.14;
Nikolai Novichkov, 'Russia and China Tighten Links on Military Projects',
JDW, 19 August 1998, p.3; 'Russia to Supply nuclear Submarines to India, but
without Cruise Missiles', p.S 1/1; Bedi, llndia to Lease Russian AEW&C Aircraft
and Buy Tu-22 Bombers', p.5; Rahul Bedi, 'India to Sign New 10-Year Defence
Deal with Russia', JDW, 1 July 1998, p 16; 'Aircraft Carrier to Be Modernized',
p.S 1/2.
For Russia, the major difference between China and India - the two largest
customers for Russian arms and technology - consists in that China is a potential
security threat to Russia, while India is not. Russian policy on arms transfers has
provoked Chinese complaints. In the author's interviews in China in 1998, many
Chinese experts complained that Russia had not sold to China its best weapons. 7 ' In
' The author's interviews with Prof. Zheng Yu, Head of the Section for Russian Studies, the Institute
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the analysis of Chinese analyst Zheng Yu, the Russian military's opposition to the
sales of sophisticated weapons to China has become a major source of uncertainty for
the development of the arms transfer relationship. 72
 In these circumstances, China
has continued to develop next-generation weapons indigenously. In explaining why
China sought to develop the B-7 (FBC-1) strike bomber, Chen Yi-jian, General
Designer of the aircraft, stressed: 'It is unlikely to buy the latest weapons from abroad.
Foreign states usually retain important technologies while exporting arms'.
This refusal to supply China with offensive and the latest weapons systems
suggests clearly that Russia has remained concerned about a potential security threat
from China. Even though it has called China a 'strategic partner' and has been
enthusiastic for revenues from arms exports, Russia has tried to reduce the impact of
these transfers on its own security when supplying arms to China.
Russian Attempts to Influence the PLA 's Power Projection Vector
After examining the weapons sold to China, it is clear that air and naval weaponry
have accounted for most of Russian-Sino arms deals. (see Table 5) This trend
highlights China's intention of upgrading its power projection capabilities in air and
naval forces and of implementing coercive diplomacy strategies on the disputed
coastal islands.
An important objective of Russian arms transfers to China was to maintain the
of East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 5
January 1995, Beijing; with Dr. Niu Jun, Director of the U.S. Diplomacy Division, the Institute of
American Studies, CASS, 8 January 1998, Beijing; and with Colonel Xia Liping, Deputy Director,
Department of American Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 15 January 1998,
Shanghai.
72 The author's interview with Prof. Zheng Yu, 5 January 1995, Beijing.
Xie Meng-ru, 'Feibao sheji luowu shefeizhuangkuangpingp:ng' [The Design of Fei-bao Is Outdated.
Many Problems Happened in Test Flights], Chungkuo shihpao (Taipei), 8 October 1999. (author's
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PLA's military projection vector to focus towards the south. In an interview
conducted by the author on 7 July 1998, Russian military expert Dmitri V. Trenin
pointed out that Russia's objective interests resided in trying to channel China's
expansion towards Taiwan and the South China Sea with Russia acting as a third
party taking the sweepstakes. 74 In an unpublished paper, Trenin wrote:
A power solution to the Taiwan problem will not probably cause rejection
by Moscow which can try to gain some benefits from the tension between
Beijing and Washington (although a China-U.S. clash is unlikely). The
conflict in the South China Sea as well as tensions in the Taiwan Strait area
will naturally detract Chinese leadership's attention from the Northern
borders..
Tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea may increase China's needs
for Russian supplies of arms and spare parts, and lead China to seek further strategic
cooperation with Russia to counter U.S. support for Taiwan. To achieve this, Russia
has supplied modern, but not the most sophisticated, air and naval force equipment to
China.
The deal behind the Su-27SK (K for kommercheskiy or commercial) fighter
aircraft is a good example of this Russian attempt to influence China's power
projection. In a confidential interview with the author in China in January 1998, one
Chinese analyst revealed that, while selling Su-27s to China, Russia tried to 'push'
China's Su-27s projection vector to focus towards the south:
While it sold the Su-27 jet fighter to China, Russia demanded China not
deploy these aircraft fighters on the north side of the Yellow River. Russia's
intention is to push Chinese deployment of Su-27s towards the south part of
Chinese territories, and reduce the Chinese Su-27's potential threat to Russia.
Due to the fact that China has to deal with a probable clash that may break
out over coastal islands, China accepted the Russian proposal.76
translation)
' The author's interview with Dr. Dmitri Trenin, Deputy Director, Carnegie Moscow Center, 7 July
1998, Moscow.
" Dmitri Trenin, Russia's Chinese Problem, unpublished paper (Moscow Carnegei Center, 1998), p.16.
76 Confidential interview, Beijing.
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The first batch of Chinese Su-27s is deployed in the PLAAF's Number Three Aircraft
Division at Wuhu Air Base in Anhui Province, and the second batch at Suixi Air Base
in Guangdong province. Both air bases are situated such that Chinese Su-27s' combat
radius fails to reach Russia. On the other hand, the supply of a total of 50 finished
Su-27s could help China to create a potent tactical force that will reach most of the
South China Sea. (see Map 4)
Another example resides in the sale of two Sovremenny-class destroyers to
China. The Sovremenny is equipped with SS-N-22 'Sunburn' ship-to-ship supersonic
missiles and SA-N-17 'Grizzly' surface-to-air missile launchers. The acquisition of
Sovremenny-class destroyers could improve the PLAN's surface strike capabilities
and its ability to deploy over long distances. 77 U.S. military analysts have warned
that Chinese Sovremenny-class destroyers could act as a limited deterrent in a
probable crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In this view, the Chinese purchase of two
Sovremennys and their supersonic missiles was designed to 'make the American navy
- and Taiwan - feel more insecure'.78
The sale of two Kilo-class Type 877 and two Type 636 submarines to China is
also indicative. Kilo-class submarines are incorporated with modern noise reduction
devices, and have a range of 9,650 km with a duration to stay at sea for 45 days. The
acquisition of Kilo-class attack submarines could improve the PLAN's capability to
provide further protection for its surface combatants intending to operate in a tense
situation in the water areas of coastal islands. 79 The acquisition of these submarines
' 
'China Expands Reach with Russian Destroyers', JDW, 15 January 1997, P.5. For a detailed study on
the Sovremenny-class destroyer, see Steven J. Zaloga, 'Sovremeny: The Instrument of Eastern Power
Projection', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 9, no. 12 (December 1997), Pp.54 1-547.
iS Nigel Holloway and Charles bickers, 'Brothers in Arms: The U S. Worries about Sino-Russian
Military Cooperation', FEER, 13 March 1997, p.20.
'Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap', p.27.
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reflects China's objective to deter the U.S. Navy and keep it away from the probable
areas of Chinese military operations.8°
Map 4 Combat Reach of Chinese Su-27s
Source: Richard D. Fisher, China's Purcha.se.s ofRussian Fighters: A Challenge to the US.,
Asian Studies Center Backgrounder no. 142, The Heritage Foundation, 31 July
1996, Website http://www.heritage.org
 library/categories/forpol/ascl42m I .gif
° Yossef Bodansky, 'The PRC Formulates a New Military Strategy for Taiwan', Defense and Foreign
Affairs Strategic Policy (September 1997), p.9.
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Through the sale of modem air and naval force equipment to China, Russia
attempted to maintain the Chinese armed force towards focusing in the south and
projecting into the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. However, it is difficult for
Russia to prevent China from using these weapons against Russia in a crisis situation
between the two. As such, the sales of modern air and naval weapons may only meet
Russian short-term strategic and security interests. More importantly, Russian sales
of modem weapons have provoked concerns from other states in the region.8'
Continuous sales of modem air and naval equipment to China will bring increasing
diplomatic pressure from the USA against Russian arms transfers to China. (see 5 .E)
D) Existing Problems
Although Russia and China have concluded a great number of arms deals, many
problems have arisen in their arms transfer relationship. These have included three
major issues. First, China has suffered problems with integrating Russian weapons
into the Chinese armed forces. Moreover, arms exports to China have not been
profitable to Russian defence enterprises. Furthermore, disputes over the price of
weaponry have delayed arms deals. This section will address these issues in turn.
Chinese Problems in Absorbing Russian Weapons
Viewed from the perspective of the performance of weapons systems, Russian
weapons might help China to extend air and naval coverage to coastal islands. (see
81 Vladimir Skosyrev, 'Asia Scared About Expansion of Russo-Chinese Military Cooperation', h-vest iya
(Moscow), 9 November 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-216, 10 November 1993, p3; Vladimir Skosyrev,
'Beijing Shakes the Honest Hand of Ministry Leader Grachev', Izvestiya (Moscow), 16 May 1995, p.3,
in FBIS-SOV-95-094, 16 May 1995, pp.10-lI; Ikuo Kayahara, 'China as a Military Power in the
Twenty-first Century', Japan Review of International Affairs (Tokyo), vol. 12, no. I (Spring 1998),
pp.49-68.
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Map 4) However, so far the impact of Russian weapons on Chinese defence
modemisation has remained limited. The major reason is that at operational level, the
PLA has suffered problems with absorbing Russian weapons.
As stated earlier, one of factors encouraging China to purchase Russian weapons
was that the weapons might be easier for the PLA to absorb. However, after
importing military hardware from Russia, China has suffered reliability problems
with the weapons. This was reflected in Chinese acquisitions of the first two Kilo-
class submarines - Type 877 models. China took delivery of two Kilos in 1995;
however, they still were not operationally capable by 1999. Difficulties were
compounded when Russia translated only part of the technical document into Chinese,
a constraint resolved with the fourth Kilo delivery in late 1998.82 Chinese Kilo
submarines have suffered several breakdowns, electrical generator overload and
battery collapse. These have led to serious damages to these ships. Two of the Kilos
were out of service for lengthy spells. Along with problems of logistical support, the
PLAN has failed to integrate Kilo-class submarines into its submarine fleet
effectively. 83 A report of Jane's Defence Weekly on 18 August 1999 pointed out that
although additional training was undertaken, the PLAN still did not take the Kilos
below a depth of 50m. 84 In June 2000, China decided to send its Kilo submarines
back to Russia for repair.85
China has also had problems with flying the Su-27 jet fighter. Before deliveries
Robert Sae-Liu, 'Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme', JDW, 18 August 1999,
p.17.
83 Bodansky, 'The PRC Formulates a New Military Strategy for Taiwan', p.13; 'China Should Receive
Its Third "Kilo" by November', JDW, 30 July 1997, p.16; 'Two of China's "Kilos" Are No Longer in
Operation', JDW, 2 September 1998, p.17.
Sae-Liu, 'Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme', p.17.
'Russia Agrees to Repair Chinese Submarines', Russian news agency Agentstvo Voyennykh
Novostey web site, 28 June 2000, in SWB, SU 3880, 30 June 2000, p.S 1/2.
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of the first batch of Su-27s in 1992, about 200 military pilots from China were sent to
the Russian Serov Joint Technical Flying School in Krasnodar for six-month
training. 86
 Meanwhile, a group of military pilots from the Russian Far East military
district left for China to train Chinese pilots. 87
 According to some Russian pilots,
who had visited the PLAAF's training sites, 'the quality of Chinese pilots was rather
inferior'.88
 Another problem with Chinese pilots is that they have not become
accustomed to flying fourth-generation jets yet. In 1997, Kenneth Allen, a former
U.S. air attaché in Beijing, pointed out that Chinese pilots never trusted the radar of
the Chinese-made J-8 fighters they used to fly. As a result, they were reluctant to rely
on high-tech radar in those Russian advanced fighters as well, and only employed
visual detection of their targets.89
As importantly, many of the Chinese Su-27s were non-operational because of
poor maintenance. Two Chinese Su-27s have since been lost in training, and at least
17 were badly damaged by a typhoon in 1996. Russian specialists have reportedly
expressed their surprise at the level of damage to Chinese Su-27s, and considered that
the damage to three of them was too serious to be repaired. 9° The Chinese Su-27s
flew only 10 hours monthly, and Chinese pilots were not permitted to fly them
aggressively - a practice that had led to a low attrition rate. 9 ' According to a report of
86 
'Chinese Pilots Train on Su-27 Fighter Planes in Krasnodar', Russia's Radio (Moscow), 12 February
1992, in SWB, SU 1304, 14 February 1992, p.A3 2.
'Pilots to Train Chinese', Interfax (Moscow), 3 August 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-152, 6 August 1992,
p21.
Tso Ni, 'Chinese Pilots Will Be Trained in the USSR', Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), 1 May 1991, in
SWB, FE 1062, 3 May 1991, p.A2 1. According to a 1995 RAND report, Chinese pilots did not fly as
many hours as their Western counterparts. Chinese fighter pilots flew 100 to 110 hours per year while
the standard minimum training for fighter pilots in NATO was 180 hours per year. See Allen, Krumel,
and Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the 2/st Century, p.130.
89 Nigel Holloway, 'Revolutionary Defence', 24 July 1997, FEER, p.24.
9° 
'Sukai eshiqi huailiao yidapi' [Many Su-27s Are Damaged}, Lien f-to Pao (Taipei), 15 April 1997,
p.9. (author's translation)
Jonathan Brodie, 'China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships, and Submarines', JDW, 22
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Flight International in September 1997, the Chinese air forces had complained about
Russian Su-27s because of problems of poor engine reliability and lower time
between overhaul.92
Integrating Russian weapons into the Chinese armed forces has not been as easy
as China expected. In order to avoid an over-reliance on Russian weapons, China has
continued to develop military hardware indigenously. Given the operational
problems of the Kilos, China decided to continue the programme on the development
of Type 039 Song-class diesel-electric patrol submarines, with series production
forecasted to start in 1999. In addition, aided by its booming economy, China has
also pursued highly ambitious warplanes R&D projects. (see 6.B) In 1999, the
Chinese-made B-7 (FBC-1) strike bomber entered into service. The FBC-l's combat
radius can reach over 1650 km. It can help China to extend its air coverage to reach
the South China Sea and conduct missions similar to the Russian Su fighter.94
Administrative and managerial problems have restricted the absorptive capacity
of the PLA. It is a difficult process for China to integrate foreign weapons into its
armed forces. Many factors, such as wider cultural antagonism, insufficient training,
and the lack of information, have complicated this process. 95 If China fails to
overcome the problems with weaponry absorption, further Chinese purchases of
Russian weapons could be delayed. Moreover, Chinese efforts to improve indigenous
December 1999, p.13; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, 'China's Search for a Modem Air Force',
International Security, vol. 24, no. I (Summer 1999) p 87.
Paul Lewis, 'Russia Reviews Chinese Sales', Flight International, 17-23 September 1997, p.21.
Sae-Liu, 'Second Song Submarine Vital to China's Huge Programme', p.17.
Xie, 'The Design of Fei-bao Is Outdated.'; Sae-Liu, 'Su-3OMK Purchase on Chinese Agenda', p.12.
Chinese FBC-ls are powered by Rolls-Royce Spey engines. By 1998, seven FBC-Is had been built.
The aircraft was expected to carry Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship missiles. The PLAAF planned to
order up to three regiments or about 72 aircraft. See Bruce Dorminey, 'China Displays New (Old?)
Attack Fighter', AWST, 23 November 1998, pp.22-23.
° Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, SIPRI Research Report no. 11
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.106-107.
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design and manufacturing capability for new weapons could be another factor
affecting Chinese purchases of Russian arms. (see Chapter 6)
Unprofitable Barter Deals with China
Arms transfers to China were expected to lighten the Russian economic hardship and
improve the defence industry's fmancial crisis. Flexible arrangement of arms
payment was one of the commercial enticements for China to purchase weapons from
Russia. In 1993, the CMC Policy Research Office had suggested that China should
make use of Russian economic weakness to offer Russia light industry goods and
meats in exchange for purchases of Russian modern weaponry. (see 5.A) However,
under increasing financial pressures, barter for arms payment has failed to satisfy
Russian defence enterprises' long-term commercial needs. Russia has gradually
viewed barter trade as a less preferable choice since the mid-l99Os.	 This
development has led to problems in Russian and Chinese arms transfer relationship.
The sales of military hardware to China have been not profitable to Russian
defence manufacturers. In the deal concerning the first batch Su-27s in late 1992,
China only paid 35 per cent of this U.S.$ 1 billion contract in hard currency. The
remainder was paid in goods such as running shoes, parkas, canned meat, and other
consumer goods. 97 Russia found that those goods offered by China were very poor
quality, preventing Russia from finding a suitable market for them. Russian analysts
have argued that barter for arms payments paid by China seriously damaged Russian
interests.
Sergounin and Subbotin, 'Sino-Russian Military-Technical Cooperation', p.204.
Laskin and Glebova, 'Russian Defence Sales', p.49.
Ibid.; A. Kabannikov, 'We Swap SU's for Sausages. Who Controls Russian Arms Deliveries to
China?', Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 11 December 1992, p.3, in FBIS-SOV-92-241, 15
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By the mid-i 99 Os, given its successful sales of armaments to India and Malaysia,
(see Table 5) Russia obtained a more favourable position in the bargaining of arms
payment issues with China. Faced with the political reality of the West's arms
embargo, China had no choice but to accept Russia's demand to pay more hard
currency for its weapons. In September 1994, both sides concluded an agreement in
which China agreed to pay for a large part of Russian exports in hard currency and
not through barter. In 1994, in the deal to transfer Kilo-class submarines to China,
Russia had shifted the portion of hard currency and barter to 50:50. However, this
deal remained unprofitable to Russian defence manufacturers. After paying taxes and
commissions, the Krasnoye Sormovo plant reportedly could only earn 8-10 per cent
of the contract's value)00
In 1995, in the second batch Su-27s, 50-70 per cent of the purchase price was
paid in hard currency and the remainder through barter.'°' Barter payments for this
were mainly paid with canned pork from China. Given that foot and mouth disease
had spread through Chinese central provinces, Russia worried that it would receive
poor quality canned pork in these payments. To prevent this, Moscow sent a task
group to inspect the meat manufacture factories in the Chinese Szechwan province
even though this inspection activity led to some protests from Beijing)°2
Throughout the i990s, cheap Chinese commodities, such as towels, sheets,
blankets, bedspreads, and pillow, were used for payment to Russian defence
December 1992, p.13.
Mikhail Urusov, 'Chinese-Russian Talks End, Military and Economic Agreements Signed', Moscow
News, 9-15 September 1994.
'°° Sergounin and Subbotin, 'Sino-Russian Military-Technical Cooperation', p.203.
"'Made in China" Deal Is Forged for Su-27s', JDW, 6 May 1995, p.3.
2 
'Zhurou huan zhanji eguo you yiyi' [Swapping Fighters for Pork. Russia Expressed Its
Disagreement], Chungkuo shihpao (Taipei), 30 March 1997. (author's translation)
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enterprises. This provoked strong protests from these enterprises.' 03
 In 1998, the
Russian Accounting Office decided to inspect such deals, and the State Duma
prepared special hearings on these.'°4 It is significant that, compared to its arms sales
to other states, Russian arms exports to China have not been economically beneficial
to Russian defence manufacturers.'° 5 Given this, defence industrialists have insisted
that in the future an arms export contract can only be signed along with an agreement
on the method of payment so as to increase Russian influence on deciding the hard
currency portion of a deal and in selecting the Chinese goods accepted as barter.'°6
However, Russian desires to limit the amount of barter involved in arms deals
may place limitations on the amount of military equipment China is prepared to
purchase.'°7 This has been reflected in that China has intended to purchase only small
amounts of modern Russian weapons off the shelf and to enlist Russian assistance to
produce such equipment indigenously.' 08 This policy has created new controversies,
as Russia has insisted that the sale of production licences for advanced aircraft to
China be based on the precondition that China agrees to purchase large numbers of
aircraft. Debates over this issue have delayed the sale of licenced production for
103 Maria Bogatykh, 'Trading Russian Arms for Chinese Consumer Goods Suits Everyone Except the
Russian Producers', Segodnya (Moscow), 10 January 1998, pp.1,4, in CDPSP, vol. 50, no. 2 (11
February 1998), p.20.
'° Ibid., pp.20-21.
105 For example, in 1994, Russian sales of BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles and Smerch multiple
rocket launchers to Kuwait were paid in hard currency. In this year, Russia supplied Malaysia with 18
MiG-29 fighters. About 60 per cent of the value of this contract was paid in hard currency. The
remainder was paid in goods such as palm oil and textiles, which could contribute directly to revenues.
See 'Arms Sales to Kuwait "Most Profitable Deals", Izvesliya (Moscow), 11 August 1994, p.2, in
FBIS-SOV-94-157, 15 August 1994, p.10; Ian Anthony, 'Economic Dimensions of Soviet and Russian
Arms Exports', in Anthony (ed.), Russia and the Arms Trade, pp.90-91.
106 Sergounin and Subbotin's interview with Sergey L. Zimin, former Director of Volga Innovation
Company, Nizhniy Novgorod, 11 September 1995, cited in Sergounin and Subbotin, 'Sino-Russian
Military-Technical Cooperation', p.204.
107 Gill and Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, p.70.
108 Paul Lewis, 'Catching up', Flight International, 27 September - 3 October 1995, pp.34-35.
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Russian Su-30s.'°9
Given that China has not been a profitable arms customer, Rosvooruzheniye has
actively sought other arms buyers."° On 30 November 1999, Rosvooruzheniye
Deputy Director Aleksey Roshchin named Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Sri
Lanka as the most promising states of the APR from the viewpoint of arms trade."
Potential arms deals have included the sales of Su-30s, MiG-29s, and air defence
systems to Malaysia; the supplies of Su-30s, Mi-17 helicopters, 1-76 tanks and BTP-
80A combat vehicles to Indonesia; the export of air defence systems to Singapore;
and the deliveries of MiG-29s to Sri Lanka and the Philippines." 2 On the other hand,
while negotiating with China on arms deals, Russia has insisted on China paying the
full price for the weapons. This has led to disputes over weaponry pricing.
Disputes over Weaponry Pricing
Although Russia's weapons are cheaper than Western arms, Russia has insisted on
China paying the full price for weapons. In contrast, China has attempted to
negotiate lower prices. Disputes over the price of military hardware created tensions
between Russia and China. In June 1997, Russian Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin visited Beijing and sought to allay this situation."3
These different positions on arms pricing have even delayed certain arms deals.
The deal on the Sovremenny-class destroyers took more than three years because of
?09 Taoho Kim, Dynamics of Sino-Russian military Relations: An Asian Perspective, CAPS Papers no.
6 (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, 1994), p.'9.
'° 'Arms Company Targets Asia-Pacific Region', Interfax (Moscow), 30 November 1999, in SWB,




'Russia Expects to Increase Cooperation with China in Military Technology', Interfax (Moscow), 27
June 1997, in SWB, SU/2957, 28 June 1997, pp.B 10-11.
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tough negotiations over pricing. The Russian side complained that the difference in
expected prices between Russia and China amounted to nearly U.S.$ 100 million per
ship. 4 Due to Russia's insistence on the full commercial price, China eventually
agreed to purchase two destroyers at a combined cost of U.S.$ 800 million." 5 Other
arms deals have also been delayed because of disputes over pricing. In 1997, Russian
defence officials complained that China managed to cut prices on other Russian
military hardware, such as the BMP-3 armoured vehicle and Smerch multi-rocket
systems."6
Prolonged and tough bargaining on pricing highlighted the Russian insistence on
ensuring revenues from its arms transfers to China. During the Cold War, armaments
were supplied to foreign states at a lower price or by grant or credits to serve as a
symbol of support and friendly relations. While Russia has tried to use arms transfers
as a strategic tool to consolidate its relations with China, commercial profits have
clearly not been neglected.
Bargaining over weaponry pricing will continue to be a contentious issue
between Russia and China. Russian ambitions to promote its arms exports to Asia
were set back by the Asian economic crises in 1997." However, this crisis did not
have a serious impact on Russian arms exports." 8 In spite of this crisis, Russian arms
exports in the first six months of 1998 increased U.S.$ 300 million from the same
" Ibid
" 
'China Expands Reach with Russian Destroyers', p.5.
116 
'Russia Expects to Increase Cooperation with China in Military Technology', pp.B 10-Il.
Due to the 1997 economic crisis, many Asian states cut down their defence spending and suspended
defence modernisation projects. In January 1998, Indonesia announced to suspend a deal of
purchasing Su-30 fighters and Mi-Il helicopters from Russia. See Nate Thayer and Charles Bickers,
'Market Misfire: Arms Sellers Hurt as Asia Abandons Pricey Weapons', FEER, 5 February 1998,
pp.22-23.
Frank Umbach, 'Financial Crisis Slows but Fails to Halt East Asian Arms Race (II)', Jane's
Intelligence Review, vol. 10, no. 9 (September 1998), pp.35-36.
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period of 1997, and reached U.S.$ 4 billion by the end of l998." Until the West lifts
its arms embargo against China, it will be difficult for China to obtain a favourable
position in bargaining on weaponry pricing. Russian and Chinese disputes over
weaponry pricing have illustrated the fundamental tension between the Russian
eagerness to increase commercial benefits and the Chinese desires to modernise its
armed force through the acquisition of Russian weapons at lower costs.
E) Potential Uncertainties
The discussion so far has raised the important question about potential uncertainties
for Russian arms transfers to China. This section will evaluate the issue of each
state's 'leverage' on the other through addressing the alternatives available to China.
It will also explore 'reverse leverage' by examining probable armed clashes between
China and other Russian arms customers. Finally, it will address probable diplomatic
pressure from the USA against Russian arms transfers to China.
The Evaluation of Leverage: China's Alternative Sources for Arms Supplies
It has been argued that through arms transfers, suppliers may obtain leverage or
influence in their relationship with the 	 20 This concept has been referred to
as 'built-in control' by K. J. Hoisti. As the recipient imports weapons from the
supplier, it can not operate a force effectively unless the supplier is also willing to
provide the necessary training support, replacement parts, and maintenance. These
controls provide the supplier with a partial guarantee that the recipient will use their
"9 Aleksandr Sychov, 'Russia Is Boosting Arms Exports', Izvestiya (Moscow), 21 August 1998, p.3, in
CDPSP, vol. 50, no. 34 (23 September 1998), p.22.
12 Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982),
p.1 8.
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military forces in a manner compatible with the interests of the supplier.'2'
As China has experienced reliability problems with Russian modern weapons,
theoretically Russia could obtain leverage in its relationship with China. However,
the historical lessons of 1960 when the USSR withdrew its military specialists and
advisors has made China very vigilant about its dependence on foreign sources, and
in particular a single source, for supplies of arms and spare parts. In an interview
conducted by the author on 5 January 1998, Chinese analyst Zheng Yu commented:
At present, China does not have too many alternative sources for
modemising its military forces but through Russian weaponry. Over-
dependence on a single arms source will be very dangerous for China's
military modernisation projects.'22
Within the context of arms transfers, it has been argued that lasting leverage in
arms transfers relies on the condition that the recipient has limited ability to obtain
arms from other alternatives.' 23 Although the Chinese principle of 'self-reliance'
placed emphasis on the importance of modernising national defence capability with
Chinese own strength, it also stressed the need to selectively import advanced
equipment and technology from abroad. In order to increase alternative sources for
military equipment and technology supplies, China has lobbied European countries to
abolish the arms embargo against China. Russia's success in exporting arms to China
has led some Western states to change their arms export policies toward China in an
attempt to compete with Russia.'24
Some EU members have started to supply China with 'non-lethal military items'.
121 For the concept of 'built-in control', see K. J. Hoisti, International Politics: A Framework for
Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983), p.229.
" The author's interview with Prof. Zheng Yu, Head of the Section for Russian Studies, the Institute
of East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, CASS, 5 January 1998, Beijing.
' Holsti, International Politics, p.229; Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, p.! 8.
24 Christoph Bluth, 'Russia and China Consolidate Their New Strategic Partnership', Jane's
Intelligence Review, vol. 10, no. 8 (August 1998), p.21.
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For example, Britain has supplied China with radar surveillance equipment; France
has offered parts to Chinese helicopters; Italy has sold aircraft-radar and electronic
countermeasures equipment to China; and Germany has supplied engines for the
Chinese navy.' 25 Significantly, two EU members, Italy and Spain, have started to
question whether the embargo should be continued.' 26 At the same time, China has
called for the USA to abolish its export prohibition of arms and military technologies
to China.'27
More fundamentally, China has tried to avoid an over-reliance on Russia for
spare parts and training.' 28 For this reason, China has declined the services of Russian
instructor pilots. China stressed that pilot training would be handled by Chinese
instructors who had learned to fly the aircraft in Russian air force units.' 29 Meanwhile,
China has started to develop military cooperation with Ukraine - a country which may
be an alternative source of spare parts for Russian weapons.' 3° In 1997, China
125 Shada Islam, 'Comrades and Arms', FEER, 24 April 1997, p.25.
126 According to EU officials, 'the EU arms embargo against China could be formally ended by
unanimous consent or informally eroded by individual EU members' resumption of military trade with
China'. Among the 15 EU members, the Netherlands, Denmark and other Nordic nations still strongly
criticise China's human right violations, while France, German, Spain, and Italy focus on commercial
profits more. See Ibid; United States General Accounting Office, China: Military Imports from the
United States and the European Union since the 1989 Embargoes, p.3.
127 
'Junshou Beying oumeng kaolujiejin' [EU Considers to Abolish Arms Embargo on Beijing], Lien
Ho Pao (Taipei), 11 April 1997; 'Gongjun chuanjiang tiaozheng zhihuijiegou' [The Communist Army
Is Alleged to Adjust Its Command Structure], Lien Ho Pao (Taipei), 4 April 1998. (author's translation)
128 
'Bear Market: Russia Wants to Be the Top Arms Supplier to Asia', FEER, 4 September 1997, p.26.
129 Aleksandr Koretsky, 'China Will Build Russian Planes Itself, Kommersant-Daily (Moscow), 7
February 1996, pp.1,4, in CDPSP, vol. 48, no. 8 (20 March 1996), p.24.
130 During the period of the USSR, Ukraine had been one of the strongest areas for defence production.
To date, Ukrainian defence industries have already produced strategic missiles, transport aircraft,
helicopters, aero-engines, surface naval ships tanks, artillery and infantry weapons, radar and optical
systems. In 1993, Ukraine and Russia signed a package of documents to strengthen cooperation in
aircraft building, rocket and space technology, radio-electronics and the production of aircraft motors.
Besides Russia, Ukraine is the only former USSR republic which can nearly enjoy full self-sufficiency
in defence production. See Roy Allison, Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States, Adeiphi Paper
no. 280 (London: IISS, 1993), p.15 and p.44; S!PRI Yearbook 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997), p.259. In addition, Ukraine has successfully exported armament via Russia. For example,
Ukraine has supplied AA-10 Alamo air-to-air missiles for fighter aircraft sold by Russia to China,
Malaysia, Slovakia and Vietnam. See S/PR! Yearbook 1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),
p.275; and S/PR! Yearbook 1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.337.
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planned to purchase spare parts from Ukraine for its Su-27s in service.' 3 ' In 1997
also, Chinese armed forces sent personnel to the Academy of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine for militaiy training) 32 These developments could undermine Russian
attempts to deepen its relationship with the Chinese armed forces through arms
supplies. In 1998, Russian analysts had voiced their concern about the possibility of
the establishment of an intergovernmental commission on military-technical
cooperation between China and Ukraine.'33
Reverse Leverage: Probable Armed Clashes between China and Other States
Moreover, arms transfers can also give the recipients 'reverse leverage' over
suppliers.' 34 Christian Catrina has pointed out that 'as a consequence of arms
transfers the supplier may, without deliberate decision and against his will, become
involved in a recipient's war'.'35
China's security relations with other Asian states have been complicated. Many
of China's potential rivals are Russia's major arms customers. (see Table 5) To date,
China, Vietnam, and Malaysia, three of Russia's arms customers, have claimed
possession of the Spratly islands. More importantly, China and India - two countries
which accounted for about 60 per cent of Russian arms exports - have viewed the
other as a geopolitical rival since the early 1960s.' 36 Armed clashes or tensions
'' Lewis, 'Russia Reviews Chinese Sales', p.21.
132 
'Cooperation with Ukraine in Military Field Is Increasing, Chinese Offic,al Says', UNIAN news
agency (Kiev), 2 August 1997, in SWB, SU/2993, 9 August 1997, p.S1/4.
133 China and Ukraine have sought to strengthen their military ties. In 1998, an office of Chinese
military-industrial corporation Norinko was established at Ukrainian Dnepropetrovsk Machinery Plant,
which produced SS-class strategic missiles. See Pavel Spirin, 'Ukraine, China and NATO',
Nezavisimaya gazeta (Moscow), 17 December 1998, p.5, ,n CDPSP, vol. 50, no. 50(13 January 1998),
p.21.
'' Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, p.17.
135 Catrina, 'Arms Transfers and Dependence', p.72.
'Military Cooperation with China to Get Fresh Momentum', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 10 August
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between China and Russia's major arms customers in the region would pose serious
problems for Russia.' 37 In such a situation, three possible scenarios that place Russia
in a difficult position can be identified:
First, if Russia made use of its leverage in arms transfers to stop China's military
actions, China would disregard Russia as a reliable source for arms supplies, and
might seek other alternative sources such as Ukraine for spare parts supplies and
training cooperation. This development would damage the relationship between
Russia and China, and might terminate China's further purchases of Russian weapons.
Second, if Russia provided China's rivals with the necessary maintenance,
technology assistance, and spare parts in such a conflict, this would offend China and
also have a negative impact on the Russian-Sino relationship. According to Thomas
W. Zarzecki, of Pennsylvania State University, in the case that Russia has to make a
choice between arming India and arming China, India will win any such contest. In
his analysis, India's pattern of arms purchases is more economically beneficial to
Russia's defence industries than China's. Compared to China, India is a more
prosperous market for Russia's arms. In addition, Russian and Indian relations
historically have been cordial.'38
1998, in SWB, SU13303, 12 August 1998, p.S 1/2. En 1998, Chinese and Indian relations became tense.
For the first time in 10 years, China and India did not hold their annual joint working group meeting.
India accused China of assisting Pakistan in nuclear weapon project. Additionally, India has become
worried about China's enhanced military ties with Myanmar. In early 1998, India set up the Far
Eastern Naval Command on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to cope with China's growing naval
presence in the Indian Ocean region In this year, Indian Defence Minister Feorge Fernandes referred
to China as India's 'number-one enemy'. See Rahul Bedi, 'India's New Command to Take More
Control', JDW, 29 April 1998, p.14; Rahul Bedi, 'New Tensions Halt India-China Talks', JDW, 23
December 1998, p.16.
'"Thomas W. Zarzecki, 'Arming China or Arming India: Future Russian Dilemmas', Comparative
Strategy, vol. 18, no. 3 (July September 1999), p.272.
' Ibid., pp.274-275. In December 1998, then Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov visited India.
The Russian side planned to assist India in defence R&D and with military supplies that could be
worth as much as U.S.$ 16 billion. See Pushpindar Singh, 'Closer India-Russia Ties Alarm Pakistan',
AWST, 4 January 1999, p.34. For the potential arms deals between Russia and India, see 5.C.
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Third, if Russia did not offer China satisfying logistics support, China might still
no longer regard Russia as a reliable source for arms supplies. This problem occurred
in 1958, when Khrushchev refused to support Mao Zedong's military actions against
Kuomintang troops on the Quemoy islands. After this event, China began to distance
itself from the USSR. (see 2.B)
Given its increasing arms sales to China, Russia may become 'hostage' to China
in an armed conflict or a situation of tension between China and other major Russian
arms customers. Due to the sensitivity of logistical support, the Russian-Sino arms
transfer relationship will be deeply influenced by the development of politics in this
region.
US. Diplomatic Pressure
As stated earlier, Russia has attempted to reinforce the focus in China's force postures
towards the south. Tensions between China and the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait and the
South China Sea may be in Russia's short-term strategic interests. However, this
could become a source of U.S. diplomatic pressure against Russia to halt its arms
transfers China.
The U.S. cannot ignore a situation in which Russia helps China to upgrade its air
and naval forces to a level that could threaten the regional security in Asia. U.S.
analysts have voiced their concern about the threat of China's military modernisation
to regional security. As Zalmay Khalizad and David Ochmanek, of RAND, warned
in 1997:
The defining factor in [Asia's] regional security over the coming decades
will be the growth of Chinese economic and military power and, with it,
uncertainty about how Beijing might seek to pursue its interests in Asia and
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beyond.'39
Given Russian sales of Su-27s, Kilo-class submarines, and Sovremenny-class
destroyers to China, U.S. analysts and politicians have become worried about the
challenge posed by improved Chinese military forces. U.S. military officers have
accused Russia of 'helping turn China into a regional superpower with expansionist
inclinations'.' 40
 A 1994 report of the U.S. Congressional Research Service suggested
that the U.S. government should use its influence to curb Russian sales of sensitive
equipment to China.' 4 ' Some U.S. Congressmen have even asserted that the U.S.
should limit its loans and economic aid to Russia until it has restricted its arms
exports to Chrna.'42
In 1995, the U.S. govermnent noted that China was modernising its forces
slowly and with limited effect.' 43 However, the U.S. government has been aware of
the regional impact of Russian arms transfers. Thus, the U.S. has called upon China
to increase the transparency of its military programmes. On 9 October 1997, U.S.
Defence Secretary William Cohen stressed that it would be important to push China
for more military transparency.' 44 It is likely that Russia's continued assistance in
upgrading China's air and naval projection capabilities into the periphery areas will
result in stronger U.S. diplomatic pressure on Russia. In 1997, Dmitri Trenin and
Andrew J. Pierre concluded:
' 39 Zalmay Khalizad and David Ochmanek, 'Rethinking U.S. Defence Planning', Survival, vol. 39, no. I
(Spring 1997), p.54.
Skosyrev, 'Asia Scared about Expans,on of Russo-Chinese Military Cooperation', p.2.
'' Sutter and Kan, China as a Security Concern in Asia, p.CRS-25.
142 Vladimir Skosyrev, 'China May Delight Russian Defense Sector and Really Upset Washington',
Izvestiya (Moscow), 12 August 1994, p.3, in FBIS-SOV-94-157, 15 August 1994, pp.10-1 1; Qin
Yongchun, 'Guanyu zhonge zhanlue xiezuo huoban di jige wenti' [Some Topics on Sino-Russian
Partnership of Strategic Cooperation], Hoping yufazhan (Beijing), no.4 (1997), p.26.
' U.S. General Accounting Office, Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pac/Ic Region,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995), p.19.
' 'A U.S. Push for Chinese Military "Transparency", International Herald Tribune, 9 October 1997,
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Russian arms exports to China have yet to reach the amount and
technological level to induce serious U.S. anxiety, but as Russian sales
continue, Washington's concern is rising. While China's development as a
military superpower is years away, Russia's role in this process may prove
significant. China's use of Russian weapons in the Taiwan straits or the
South China Sea would create serious problems for Russian-American
relations.'45
In commenting on Russian arms transfers to China, Russian analyst Sergei
Troush called for a more cautious and balanced approach. He warned that arms sales
might push Russia into entering a closer military relationship with China. Such a
relationship might lead to a new global confrontation between blocs.' 46 Increasing
diplomatic pressure from the USA against Russian arms transfers to China would
force Russia to take a strategic decision between moving closer to China or distancing
itself from it. While suffering economic hardship, Russia has so far sought to
maintain a cooperative relationship with the USA. Diplomatic pressure from the
USA may hurt the arms transfer relationship between Russia and China.
F) Conclusions: The Fragile Nature of the Russian-Chinese Arms Transfer
Relationship
Russian-Chinese arms transfers have been motivated by the calculations of their own
state interests. Behind these transfers, demand-side factors have included limited
Chinese sources for arms supplies, Chinese ambitions to modernise its air and naval
forces, commercial enticements, and the convenience of integrating Russian weapons
p.10.
Dmitri V. Trenin and Andrew J. Pierre, 'Arms Trade Rivalry in the Future of Russian-American
Relations', in Andrew J. Pierre and Dinitri V. Trenin (eds), Russia in the World Arms Trade
(Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p.12 I.
' The author's interview with Sergei Troush, Senior Fellow, the Institute of USA & Canada Studies,
RAS, 8 July 1998, Moscow. Also see Sergei Troush, 'Prodazha rossiyskogo oruzhiya Kitayu: rezony I
opaseniya' [Russia's Arms Sales to China: Reasons and Doubts], Nezavisimoye voennoye Obozreniye,
addition to Nezavisimaya gazeta (Moscow), 25 April 1996, pp.6-7. (author's translation)
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into the Chinese armed force. Supply-side factors have included Russian attempts to
use arms transfers as an economic tool and to consolidate its relations with China.
However, many limitations on these transfers have arisen. These transfers have failed
to fully meet Chinese and Russian objectives in pursuing bilateral cooperation in this
area.
First, Russian policy on arms transfers to China has been based on the basic
principle of not hurting Russian security. Although it supplied arms to China, Russia
has still regarded China as a potential security threat. This has led Russia to not
supply China with its most sophisticated weapons. Russian arms transfers to China
have not reached the level of quality supplied to other Asian states. These
developments suggest clearly that Russia has tried to reduce the impact of these
transfers on its own security. The Russian refusal to supply China with latest
weapons has led to Chinese complaints. In these circumstances, China has continued
to develop weapons indigenously. Also, given its reluctance to rely on a single
source for arms supplies, China has sought alternative sources for arms and spare
parts. These developments could give rise to uncertainties in the Russian-Chinese
arms transfer relationship.
Russian weapons might serve as 'technology demonstrators' of the PLA.
However, the impact of Russian weapons on Chinese defence modernisation so far
has been more symbolic than substantial. China has suffered problems with
integrating the weapons into its armed force. Absorbing Russian weapon systems has
not been as easy as China expected. This could delay further Chinese purchases of
Russian weaponry.
Conflicts in commercial interests have been another uncertainty in the
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relationship. Throughout the 1 990s, the poor quality of Chinese goods paid for
Russian arms undermined Russian expectations that arms sales to China could help to
lighten the financial crisis in its defence industry. Given this, Russia has demanded
more hard currency for payments and insisted on the price of weapons which it sold.
This has weakened the Chinese desires to modemise its armed forces through Russian
weaponry at lower costs. Conflicts of commercial interests have led to frictions
between the two states, and have delayed and limited their arms deals.
It is doubtful that these transfers can contribute to a 'long-term' and 'stable'
relationship between China and Russia. For Russia, an important objective in the
supply of modem, but not the most sophisticated, air and naval force equipment to
China was to reinforce the PLA's power projection vector to focus to the south, so as
to ensure Russian own security interests. However, this could lead to armed tensions
between China and other Russian customers in the region, landing Russia in a
dilemma of logistical support. In addition, tensions between China and the U.S. in
the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea may result in stronger U.S. diplomatic
pressure on Russia, which could also impact the development of Russian arms
transfers to China.
The nature of Russian-Chinese arms transfer relationship has remained fragile.
These transfers have failed to fully meet Chinese and Russian objectives in setting up
an arms sales relationship. Behind these deals, Russia has still seen China as a
potential security threat. On the other hand, China has sought to avoid an over-
reliance on Russian arms, spare parts and training. An enduring sense of mutual
distrust and conflicts of commercial interests have restricted the deepening of the
Russian and Chinese arms transfer relationship. This relationship could be sharply
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reduced, if China could obtain modern military equipment from other sources or
improve indigenous design and manufacturing capability for new weapons.
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Chapter 6
China's Military Technology Acquisitions from Russia
Technology cooperation is another important component of Sino-Russian military
cooperation. The study of military-technical cooperation has been absent from the
general literature on this topic. From a long-term perspective, however, the significance
of military-technical cooperation can be more important than that of arms transfers. This
chapter focuses on Chinese efforts to upgrade its technological capability to develop and
design new weapons through Russian expertise. To reveal the development and limits of
Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation, this chapter first explores the rationales
behind their military-technical ties. It then examines three major routes by which China
has obtained defence technology from Russia: (1) legitimate routes; (2) dual-use
technology; and (3) illicit routes. In examining legitimate routes, this chapter
investigates Russian technical assistance to Chinese weaponry development and
production projects, including assistance in China's R&D projects on next-generation
warplanes, and the sale of the Su-27 production licence to China. In exploring Chinese
procurement of dual-use technology from Russia, it focuses on the cases of nuclear
power engineering and space science. Following this, it will address China's acquisition
of Russian defence technology through illicit routes. Finally, this chapter assesses the
effectiveness of each route. The conclusion outlines the nature and limits of Sino-
Russian military-technical ties.
A) Rationales for Sino-Russian Military-Technical Cooperation
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This discussion begins with an examination of the rationales behind Chinese and Russian
military-technical cooperation. It will address the priorities of Chinese defence
technology modernisation. In addition, it will explore Chinese and Russian interests in
military-technical cooperation.
Priorities of Chinese Defence Technology Modernisation
Since the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese defence industry has suffered many
technical, organisational, and managerial deficiencies. The termination of Sino-Soviet
military-technical ties in 1960 exacerbated the problems. In the mid-1980s, Karen
Bemey concluded that many problems obstructed the modemisation of the Chinese
defence sector. These included outdated technical know-how in microelectronics, poor
design-engineering and system-integration abilities, inadequate R&D, and ineffective
coordination between research and production.'
Iraq's swift defeat in the Gulf War in 1991 added to Beijing's sense of urgency in
obtaining advanced technology for military use, as much of Iraq's weaponry was
provided by China. According to Chen Mingshan, Deputy Commander of the PLAN,
this war taught China lessons on the importance of advanced weapons and technologies:
[The Gulf War] was the first high-tech, moderately intensive, modem local war
with global impact which has broken out since the end of the Second World
War. This war has not only had a great impact on international order but also
provided us with the latest material for studying modem warfare; it has taught
us many lessons about building up China's national defence..
Karen Berney, 'Aspects of Modernization', in Gerald Segal and William 1. Tow (eds), Chinese Defence
Policy (London: The Macmillian Press Ltd., 1984), pp.133-134. Also see John Frankenstein and Bates Gill,
'Current and Future Challenges Facing Chinese Defence Industries', The China Quarterly, no. 146 (June
1996), p.407.
2 Gordon Jacobs, Chinese Naval Developments post Gulf War', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 5, no. 2
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Since the Gulf War in 1991, military scientific research has vigorously pursued this
topic in the Chinese army. The Chinese military has published a vast number of research
reports - 700 books and 20,000 theses - on military science and theory. 3
 Due to global
competition over the technological revolution, China has stressed that technological
innovation will be a major challenge for the country's development in the future. 4
 Based
on this perception, the Chinese leadership has stressed that 'developing national defence-
oriented scientific and technological research is at once a technical issue and a strategic
issue bearing on China's prosperity and security'.5
The basic principle behind China's national defence modernisation has been to
integrate self-reliance with the import of advanced technology from abroad. 6
 Guided by
this, China has highlighted several priorities in an attempt to improve the Chinese
capability for a limited war under high-tech conditions. First, given that air power
played a key role in the 1991 Gulf War, Chinese military leaders have recognised that a
modem air force will be an important element in a limited war. In the words of then
CMC Vice Chairman General Liu Huaqing:
Modem air forces are capable of independently carrying out large-scale,
unremitting, and prolonged air attacks, so that air battles play a more important
(February 1993), p.81. This report is based on Jacob's interview with Chen Mingshan, Deputy Commander
of the PLAN.
'Army Makes Headway in Modemisation Drive', Beijing Review, 10-16 August 1992, p5.
Qimao Chen, 'New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy', Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 3 (March 1993),
pp.239-240.
Fan Juwei and Liu Cheng, 'Liu Huaqing Stresses Need to Further Raise Overall Level of Science,
Technology, and Industry for National Defence at National Conference of Directors of Offices of Science,
Technology, and Industry for National Defense', Jiefangjun Bao (Beijing), 23 December 1995, p-I, in
FBIS-CHL-96-008, II January 1996, pp.35-36.
6 Liu Huaqing, 'Unswervingly Advance along the Road of Building a Modern Army with Chinese
Characteristics', Jiefangjun Bao (Beijing), 6 August 1993, pp.1-2, in FBIS-CHI-93-158, 18 August 1993,
p.19.
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role in war that they did before.7
In order to promote its claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea, China has perceived
the need to gain air superiority over these areas. Yet, throughout the 1980s, the Chinese
aviation industry failed to develop a new, satisfactory jet fighter for the PLAAF. 8 The air
force was seen as the most backward armed service in the PLA. 9 In 1994, two analysts
of China's National Defence University pointed out that obsolete weapons systems and
limited combat radius had dramatically weakened the PLAAF's combat readiness. As a
result, China was in a threatening position with respect to enemy air strike.' 0 In the
1 990s, building a modem air force fleet was placed at the top of military priorities, and
the PLA's procurement budget was concentrated on upgrading air capabilities."
Second, the impact of the 1991 Gulf War highlighted for China the need to develop
information warfare.' 2 Concepts of information warfare have become important slogans
in the Chinese army: 'infonnation is combat effectiveness', 'command of information is
the priority target of high-tech warfare', and 'information will become the key factor in
the combat process and outcome'.' 3 In particular, command, control, communications
Ibid., pp.17-18.
Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the 2/st Century
(Santa Monica, C.A.: RAND, 1995), 'Appendix F: Fighter Aircraft Projection', pp.231-234.
By 1988, in the PLAAF, 48.8 per cent of aircraft, 53.9 per cent of aircraft engines, 42 per cent of radar
systems, 50 per cent of H-Q-2 surface-to-air missiles, and 42 per cent of HQ-2 missile guidance sites were
not operational. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, 'China's Search for a Modern Air Force',
International Security, vol. 24, no. I (Summer 1999), p.74.
ID Zhang Lihua and Qiu Daxiong, Gaokeyi tiaojian xia jubu zhanzheng: Zhanyi fankong zhanfaxi yanjiu
[Local Wars under High-Tech Conditions: On Battle Principles for Coping with Air-Strike] (Beijing:
National Defence University Press, 1994), p.12.
Tai-ming Cheung, 'Ties of Convenience: Sino-Russian Military Relations in the 1990s', in Richard H.
Yang (ed.), China's Military: The PLA in 1992/1993 (Taipei: Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies,
1993), p.64.
12 Niu Li, Tan Haitao, and Liu Jiangguo, 'Information Warfare Is Coming at Us', J:efangjun Bao (Beijing),
28 March 1995, p.6, in FBIS-CH!-95-124, 28 June 1995, pp.54-57.
" ibid
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and intelligence (C31) have been given the top priority for improvement.' 4
 In order to
establish an effective information net and gain superiority in a future limited war, the
Chinese military has viewed it as important to develop space-based technology for
conducting reconnaissance, radar jamming devices, and precision missiles.'5
Third, dual-use technology, which has legitimate commercial use and also
significant military applications, has been seen as an important means for obtaining
foreign advanced technology. While suffering under the West's arms embargo, imports
of dual-use technology from abroad were seen as a channel to help solve technological
problems crucial to research related to nuclear weapons, guidance systems, composite
materials, and satellite technologies. For this reason, in 1995, General Liu Huaqing
demanded that the Chinese military do its best to turn advanced technologies developed
for civilian use into technologies for military use so that the Chinese defence
technological level could be upgraded.'6
After the end of the Cold War, aided by its booming economy, China's investments
on military spending have increased, from U.S.$ 7.56 billion in 1991 to U.S.$ 11 billion
in l998.' Chinese funding for military R&D has been covered by various parts of the
state budget. This has included funding for the Commission on Science, Technology,
and Industry for National Defence, the State Science and Technology Commission, and
H Viacheslav A. Frolov, 'China's Armed Forces Prepare for High-Tech Warfare', Defense & Foreign
Affairs Strategic Policy (January 1998), pp.7-8.
Liu Lianxun, 'Information Warfare Sets New Topic for Study in Tactics, Jiefangjun Bao (Beijing), 7
November 1995, p.6, in FBIS-CHI-95-234, 6 December 1995, p.47.
16 Li Xuanqiang and Liu Yushu, 'Liu Huaqing Stresses Need to Accelerate Development of Defence
Science and Technology and Weaponry at Second National Conference on Cooperation and Coordination
Work in Defense and Military Industries', Jiefangjun Bao (Beijing), 15 January 1995, p.1, in FBIS-CHI-
95-0 19, 30 January 1995, p.30.
The Military Balance 1991 92 (London: IISS, 1991), p.1 50; The Military Balance 1998/99 (London:
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defence-related ministries and industries. In 1995, it was estimated that Chinese defence
R&D spending was between U.S.$ 0.9 and 1.7 billion) 8
 To boost the country's level of
defence technology, the Chinese government announced an increase in spending for
science R&D for the period of 1996 - 2000 from less than 1 per cent of Gross Domestic
Product to 3 per cent. The additional funds would offer both civilian and defence science
and technology organisations more financial resources for importing foreign advanced
technology through various channels.'9
Chinese and Russian Assessments of Interests
In seeking advanced foreign military technology, one major problem facing China was
that it had few alternative sources. Since 1989, Chinese military-technical ties with the
West have been terminated. Non-Western sources, such as Russia and Israel, have been
major sources for supplying China with modern defence technology. 20 (also see 5.A)
Several factors explain Chinese interests in Russian military technology. First, for
China, technology cooperation with the USA in the 1980s had been an unpleasant
experience. The Sino-U.S. 'Peace Pearl' programme, which was originally designed for
upgrading Chinese J-811 fighters, was terminated by the U.S. embargo against China after
1989. (see 2.D) China had smarted over the many conditions which were imposed by the
USA in that programme. China was not allowed to use the modified model against
IISS, 1998), p.178.
Richard A. Bitzinger, 'China's Defense Budget', International Defense Review, no. 28 (February 1995),
pp.35-37.
'Post-2000 Delays to China's Arms Goals', JDW, 21 January 1998, p.23.
20 P. R. Kumaraswamy, 'The Military Dimension of Israel-China Relations', China Report, vol. 32, no. 2
(1995), pp.235-249; Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, SIPRI Research
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Taiwan. The fire-control system offered by the USA for the J-811 did not exceed that of
Taiwan's F-5s. Moreover, the number of modified J-811s was only to be 55•21 The
Chinese side complained that Western partners were unreliable, as their military
technology transfer decisions usually let 'politics' get in the way. The failure of the Peace
Pearl programme was cited by Beijing as a major reason for why it has developed
military-technical cooperation with Russia.22
Moreover, since the 195 Os, the Chinese have had far more experience with reverse
engineering and copying Russian weapons systems rather than with Western military
technology. Russian defence technology has been seen as an effective and cheap way to
modernise outdated military hardware. As John J. Schulz, former editor of Arms Control
Today, commented in 1998:
The collapse of the Soviet Union has meant the sudden availability of high-
technology assistance (including production technology) at bargain basement
prices at a time when Russia is poor and eager and China is increasingly rich
and interested.. 23
On the Russian side, several factors have accounted for Russian interests in defence
technical cooperation with China. First, defence technical cooperation with foreign
states has been seen as a means for Russia to influence the recipient's subsequent
technological development and to push the recipient gradually into accepting Russia's
technical basis and technical support concepts.24 Developing defence technical
Report no. ii (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Bates Gill, 'Russia, Israel Help Force
Modernisation', JDW, 31 January 1996, pp.54-59.
21 Bin Yu, 'Sino-Russian Military Relations', Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 3 (March 1993), pp.305-306.
Gill, 'Russia, Israel Help Force Modemisation', p.56.
John J. Schulz, China as a Strategic Threat: Myths and Verities', Strategic Review, vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter
1998), p.12.
24 Lt. Col. A. L. Rybas, 'Military-Technical Cooperation and National Security', Military Thought
(Moscow), vol. 6, no. 5 (1997), p.3.
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cooperation with China could offer Russia the opportunity to influence the development
of Chinese defence modemisation. In an interview conducted by the author on 6 July
1998, Evgeny P. Bazhanov, Director of the Institute of Contemporary International
Studies at the Russian Foreign Ministry, commented:
If Russia refuses to develop cooperation with China in this area, China will
eventually obtain advanced technologies from other sources such as Western
Europe. In that case, Russia will face more uncertainties and more challenges
from China's military modernisation.25
Pursuing technical cooperation with China could also help to increase Russian
exports of military goods to China. In 1998, Alexandre Kotelkin, Director General of the
State Company Rosvooruzheniye, stated that the development of military-technical
cooperation with foreign countries on a long-term basis was the best means to strengthen
Russia's position in the arms markets.26
Moreover, earnings from technical cooperation with China could provide funds for
Russian defence industries to develop new weapon systems.27 This was illustrated in the
sale of the Su-27 production licence to China. On 25 July 1996, Mikhail Simonov,
General Designer of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, pointed out that one of the reasons why
Russia sold China the production licence was that the Sukhoi needed funds to develop
and produce the fifth-generation fighter - Su-37.28
Sino-Russian military-technical ties have been driven by their state interests; while
25 The author's interview with Prof. Evgeny P. Bazhanov, Director of the Institute of Contemporary
International Studies, the Russian Foreign Ministry, 6 July 1998, Moscow.
26 Alexandre Kotelkin, 'Russia and the World Arms Market', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 4
(1996), pp.34-35.
27 The author's interview with Prof. toceri Fedorov, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the
Russian Foreign Ministry, 8 July 1998, Moscow.
28 
'Russia: Business Russia Report on the Su-27 Sales to China', Moscow Russian Television Network
(Moscow), 25 July 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-147, 30 July 1996, p 8.
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China sought to modernise its armed forces with Russian expertise and technology,
Russia intended to earn commercial profits and influence China's subsequent
technological development. In December 1992, these two states signed a memorandum
on the principles of military-technical cooperation. 29
 In November 1993, the Defence
Ministers signed the 'Agreement on Military Cooperation for the Next Five Years'.3°
This provided a legal foundation for bilateral cooperation in the military technology field.
B) Legitimate Routes: Russian Technical Assistance to Chinese Weaponry
Development and Production Projects
This section investigates legitimate routes in Russian technical assistance to Chinese
weaponry development and production projects. Two major areas of bilateral technology
cooperation will be explored: Russian assistance to Chinese warplanes R&D projects;
and the sale of the production licence for Su-27 jet fighters to China. These two cases
are closely related to the upgrading of the Chinese air force. An examination of these
will provide insight as to whether these two states have trusted each other in the pursuit
of technological cooperation.
Russian Technical Assistance to Chinese Warplanes R&D Projects
After 1989, U.s. assistance in upgrading the PLA's jet fighters was terminated. In the
process of developing new jet fighters, China has suffered technological problems in
29 
'Full Text of Yeltsin's Address, and Answers to Questions, at Press Conference', ITAR-TASS (Moscow),
19 December 1992, in SWB, FE/1569, 21 December 1992, p.Al 4.
30 
'Russian and Chinese Defence Agreement Signed - (C)', Ostankino Channel I TV (Moscow), 11
November 1993, in SWB, SU/1845, 13 November 1993, p.S1 3.
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such areas as aircraft and airborne equipment, aircraft system design technology, aircraft
auto-control technology, radar technology, advanced materials, and manufacturing
technology. 3 ' In the 1990s, given the country's economic growth and its ambitions to
project its air force into peripheral areas, Chinese aviation industries sought to develop
highly ambitious warplanes R&D projects. Along with its purchases of Russian
weaponry, China started to introduce Russian technology into its existing R&D projects
on next-generation warplanes, including FC-1, J-811M, and F-1O fighters. Russian
technology has become the major technical support for Chinese R&D projects on next-
generation warplanes in many vital areas. (see Table 6)
In the process, many problems have arisen. First, in assisting China to improve the
design of its next-generation warplanes, Russia has tried to deepen Chinese dependence
on its technology and expertise. This was reflected in that Russian technicians
refurbished the analogue processor, exciter, power supply, and signal processor for the
Chinese-designed J-811M fighter. 32 The Russian Mikoyan Aero-Science Production
Group (MASPG) used its MiG-33 design to replace the existing central building block of
the FC-1 project, which was designed by Israel in the 1980s. 33 In addition, Russian
aerospace companies provided up to two-thirds of the required technical and design work,
including avionics and power plant, for refurbishing the Chinese F-lO's airframe.34
Given that Russia has refurbished Chinese-designed warplanes on a large scale, Russia
Tai Ming Cheung, 'China's Buying Spree', FEER, 8 July 1993, p.24.
32 
'Russian Radar for Chinese Fighters', Jane's International Defence Review, vol. 29 (January 1996) p.10;
'China's Export Mission for Multi-Role Fighter', JDW, 23 April 1997, p.29; 'Russia Helps China Upgrade
F-8', Flight International, 18-24 October 1995, p.25.
'Mikoyan Joins Chengdu on Fighter', Flight international, 21-27 June 1995, p.13; 'Russian Radar for
Chinese Fighters', p.10.
220
has had opportunity to influence the quality of Chinese next-generation warplanes.
Table 6 Russia's Technical Support for Chinese Warplanes Projects
Project	 Design Corporation 	 Russian Tech Support	 Production Licence
FC-1 Fighters	 Chengdu Aircraft 	 central building block,	 RD-33 turbofan
Industry Corporation	 Phazotron Komav radar, 	 (for Chinese Liyang
(CAIC)	 Klimov RD-33 turbofan	 Machinery)
fire-control radar
	
J-811M Fighters Shenyang Aircraft
	
the analogue processor,	 Zhuk-811 radar
	
Corporation (SAC)	 exciter, and power supply 	 (for Chinese Letri
Phazotron Zhuk-811 radar	 Avionics)
F-1O Fighters CAIC	 two-thirds of the required






Sources: 'Mikoyan Joins Chengdu on Fighter', p.13; 'Russian Radar for Chinese Fighters', p.10;
'China's Export Mission for Multi-Role Fighter', p.29; 'Russia Helps China Upgrade F-8',
p.25; Cheung, 'China's Buying Spree', p.24; 'Country Briefing: China. Making A
Modern Industry', JDW, 19 February 1994, p.28; 'Russians Pursue Engine and Radar on
Chinese F-b Fighter', Flight International, 22-28 November 1995, p.5; Gill, 'Russia,
Israel Help Force Modernization', p.54; 'First Flight for F-b Paves Way for Production',
JDW, 27 May 1998, p.'7.
However, despite the fact that Russia refurbished Chinese-designed warplanes in
various areas, it is still doubtful that Russia provided the most advanced technology for
the Chinese aircraft. This is illustrated in that Russia used its MiG-33 design, which was
rejected by the Soviet Air Force in the mid-1980s, to be the central building block of the
Cheung, 'China's Buying Spree', p.2'1, 'Country Briefing: China. Making A Modern Industry', .JDW, 19
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Chinese FC- i. 35 This policy highlights the Russian reluctance to release up-to-date
technology to China.
Moreover, while developing technical cooperation, Russia has tried to increase the
exports of military goods to China. To achieve this, Russia refurbished the Chinese-
designed jet fighters to fit Russian equipment. This led to a situation where Russian
turbofan, radar, and avionics equipment became the major equipment of Chinese next-
generation warplanes. (see Table 6) In this way, Russia can not only increase the exports
of its military goods, but also obtain the opportunity to control the quantity of Chinese
next-generation warplanes.
Although Russia made Chinese warplanes to fit Russian equipment, this has not
meant that the performance of Chinese warplanes was successfully upgraded. This was
illustrated in that Russian technicians modified the F-10 to fit the Russian single-Lyulka
AL-3 1 turbofan engine, two of which also powered the Chinese Su-27s. Yet, the
incorporation of the AL-3 1 engine into the F- 10 airframe has proven difficult. Technical
problems have delayed the development schedule of the Chinese F-10 project.36
Another conflict of interest between Russia and China has resided in their different
positions on the costs of warplanes R&D. As a technical supplier, Russia has been
interested in commercial profits earned from its technical cooperation with China. For
China, increasing spending on purchasing Russian technology and equipment has meant
February 1994, p.28.
Nick Cook, 'Lifting the Veil on China's Fighters', JDW, 31 January 1996, p.52. The FC-1 is being
developed with joint investments from Chinese CAIC and Pakistan's Aviation Integrated Company. The
aircraft is expected to replace the F-7 M/P fighters in service in the Pakistani Air Force. CAIC has sought
to persuade the Chinese air force to use the FC-1. See Hsiao Yu-sheng, 'China's New-Generation Main
Military Aircraft', Kuang Chiao Ching (Hong Kong), no. 278 (16 November 1995), pp.'7O-72, in FBIS-
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a higher cost for the production of its next-generation warplanes. Spending on Russian
technology has led China to incur at least an additional U.S.$ 500 million for the
development of the F-b. 37 This has increased production costs of the F-10, which are
even higher than that of Su-27s. Increasing production costs will force China to reduce
the production figure of the F-l0 from 100-150 to 50 a year in the future.38
Various fighter R&D projects suggest that the modemisation of the PLAAF's
outdated aircraft fleet has been put at the top of Chinese defence modernisation. To date,
Russia has participated in China's warplane projects in such technical areas as design and
production of airframes, fire-control radar, avionics equipment, and airplane turbofan.
(see Table 6) However, while China has attempted to build a modem air force fleet,
Russian concerns have been to ensure that its security and interests are not undermined.
Given the Russian intent to maintain the technological gap, and increased production
costs, the future development of official technical cooperation on Chinese warplanes
R&D projects faces uncertainties.
Licenced Production for the Su-27
Under a 1995 contract, Russia sold China a licence to build Su-27 jets worth a total of
more than U.S.$ 2 billion. The Su-27 production project was to be undertaken at China's
SAC, and China designated the SAC-produced version of Su-27s as the F-il (Jian-1
Commenting on this Russian sale, the general literature on this subject has focused on
CHI-96-02 1, 31 January 1996, pp.28-29.
'First Flight for F-b Paves Way for Production', p.17.
31 Cheung, 'China's Buying Spree', p.24; 'Country Briefing: China. Making A Modem Industry', p.28.
'First Flight for F-b Paves Way for Production', p.17.
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either Russia's incapability of controlling its arms exports, or the impact of the Chinese
Su-27 on regional security.40 In contrast, this discussion will examine this deal in an
attempt to reveal the problems of Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation.
This thesis argues that Russia has tried to ensure that Russian security and interests
are not undermined in this deal. A close look at the agreement on the Su-27 production
licence shows that Russia has taken deliberate measures to do so. First, the Russian sale
of Su-27s production licence to China was a copy of the original model of the aircraft.
This was designed to increase the Chinese aviation industry's dependence on Russian
technology in a step by step process. A report in the Russian newspaper, Kommersant-
Daily, on 7 February 1996 revealed:
As for leaks of military know-how, Kommersant was assured by experts in the
field of aircraft construction that any military hardware manufacture under
licence is a copy of the original and does not contain the most important
modification elements. In other words, according to this view, China's
purchase of a licence to manufacture Su-27s means that its Air Force will
become 'tied' to the Sukhoi Special Design Bureau. For Russia will be able to
receive additional money for every modification of the Chinese-made Su-
27s. ..'
For the sake of security and commercial interests, the 1995 contract of the licenced
production for the Su-27 stipulates that any changes to the Su-27 produced in the
Chinese SAC can be made only with the agreement of the Russian side. 42 This highlights
'Beijing Builds Su-27 Fighters from Russian Kits', JDW, 10 June 1998, p.12.
4° See, for example, Stephen J. Blank, Why Russian Policy Is Failing in Asia (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.
Army War College, 1997), pp.6-7; Nicholas D. Kristof, 'The Rise of China', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5
(November December 1993), p.66; Larry M. Wortzel, 'China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status',
Orbis, vol. 38, no. 2 (Spring 1994), p.170; Robert G. Sutter and Shirley Kan, China as a Security Concern
in Asia: Perceptions, Assessment and US Options, CRS Report for Congress 94-32s (5 January 1994),
p.CRS1O; Denny Roy, 'The "China Threat" Issue', Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 8 (August 1996), p.759.
' Alexandr Koretsky, 'China Will Build Russian Planes Itself', Kommersant-Daily (Moscow), 7 February
1996, pp.1, 4, in CDPSP, vol. 48, no. 8 (20 March 1996), p.24.
42	 Gears Up for Licence Production of Sukhoi Fighter Aircraft', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 11 February
224
Russian concerns to preserve a technological gap with China.
Second, the Chinese Su-27 production project was scheduled for a long-term period
of more than 15 years. According to this schedule, China would build 200 platforms in
total before the year 2015. Nevertheless, given that sophisticated technologies of the
Su-27's design and manufacturing were 15 years ahead when compared to capabilities of
the Chinese SAC, the Russian side planned to 'gradually' upgrade the SAC's
manufacturing sophistication, including both equipment and training. 44 This led to a
situation where the SAC could only initially assemble around 50 Su-27s from kits before
beginning partial production. In the case that SAC suffers technical problems and fails to
meet its annual production target of 10 - 15 aircraft, Russia's Su-27 facility in
Komsomolsk will provide China with substitute aircraft.45
Third, while it has sold the production licence, Russia has still retained control over
vital areas of technology. Unlike Russian technology assistance to Chinese-designed
warplanes, such as FC- 1, F- 10 and J-811M fighters, the Su-27 is the basic model for all
fourth-generation jet fighters in Russia. In order to ensure its own security, Russia has
tried to control the export of sensitive technology in this deal. China is only allowed to
produce 70 per cent of the aircraft. More importantly, the Sukhoi Design Bureau has
retained the right for China to produce the AL-3 I engine and radioelectronic equipment,
1999, in SWB, SU 3459, 15 February 1999, p.S1 3.
'Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap', JDW, 10 December 1997, p.28; 'Beijing Builds Su-27
Fighters from Russian Kits', p.12.
Hsiao, 'China's New-Generation Main Military Aircraft', p.30.
'Beijing Builds Su-27 Fighters from Russian Kits', p.12.
Ibid
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which are fundamental features to the design of the entire Su-27 family. 47
 This
arrangement underscores the Russian attempt to create permanent Chinese dependence
on Russia for supplying engine and electronic equipment for its Su-27s. 48 In addition to
security considerations, it would also help to prevent China from exploiting licencing
agreements to export cheaper versions of the Su-27 to other states. 49 At present, China
has been required to send the engine back to Russia for repair. These circumstances have
provoked angry protests from the Chinese military leadership.5°
Fourth, the Su-27 SK jet fighter has flight refuelling capabilities. 5 ' However, Russia
did not transfer these technologies to China. If Chinese Su-27 jets possess air refuelling
capabilities, after taking off from a Beijing airfield, they could reach Moscow in two and
a half hours with one mid-air refuelling. Given this, Russia has not provided Chinese Su-
27 jets with such offensive capability. 52 In contrast, in 1997, Russia offered India air-
refuelling technology and IL-78 tanker aircraft when it sold to it 40 Su-30 long-range
fighters.53
Finally, due to the fact that the Russian Sukhoi Design Bureau failed to ensure the
production of 'fifth-generation' fighter, Su-37s, Russia delayed the schedule of the
' Ibid; Koretsky, 'China will Build Russian Planes Itself, p.2'1; 'China Gears Up for Licence Production of
Sukhoi Fighter Aircraft', p.S1/3; 'Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap', p.28.
John Zeng, 'The New Sino-Russian Partnership: SU-27s the Icing on the Cake', Asia-Pac/lc Defence
Reporter (May June 1996), p.13; 'China Prepares for Local Production of Sukhois', JDW, 16 July 1997.
'Beijing Builds Su-27 Fighters from Russian Kits', p.12; 'Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap',
p.28.
5°'China-Assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flight', JDW, 24 February 1999, p.16.
Sergio Coniglio, 'The Sukhoi Su-27 Combat Aircraft Family', Militwy Technology, Special Supplement
1995, p.28.
52 Since the late 1980s, China has sought to develop the air refuelling capability with the assistance of
either Iran or Israel. China has planned to use the Y-8 or H-6 bomber as a tanker to refuel Chinese aircraft.
See Gill and Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, pp.126-127; Allen, Krumel, and Pollack,
China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century, pp.170-171.
Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman, 'Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons', in SIPRI
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delivery of Su-27s production line to China. According to a confidential interview
conducted by the author with one Chinese expert in 1998, by early 1998, the two parties
were still negotiating on the discharge of the contract. 54
 In February 1999, a report of
Jane's Defence Weekly revealed that a portion of the facilities of the production line for
Su-27s was still under construction. 55 In 1999, to assuage Chinese complaints about
delays in the production schedule, the Russian side supplied China with ready-made
components, assemblies and systems so as to 'build' two aircraft in China. 56
 The delayed
installation of Su-27s production line in China suggests again that Russia has attempted
to preserve a technological gap between the two states' air forces.
In legitimate routes for technical assistance in Chinese weaponry development and
production projects, Russia has tried to retain advanced technology and to maintain a
technological gap with China. This development has raised uncertainties for their
military-technical cooperation. In these circumstances, China has sought to acquire
Russian expertise and technology through other channels such as joint R&D projects on
dual-technology as well as illicit routes.
C) China's Acquisition of Dual-Use Technologies from Russia
As stated earlier, in order to extend access to foreign advanced technology, China has
placed emphasis on the interchangeability of civilian and military technology. In Russia,
Yearbook 1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.295.
Confidential interview, Beijing. On 28 June 1998, the first test flights of Su-37s were undergone at an
air base outside Moscow. Yet, it is believed that even though this programme is fully funded, the Su-37 is
still 8-10 years from service entry. See 'New-Generation S-37 Aircraft Undergoes Test Flights Near
Moscow', Russian Public TV (Moscow), 28 June 1998, in SWB, SU/3267, 1 July 1998, p.S1 2; 'Sukhoi's
S-37: Years Away from Production', Jane's International Defence Review, vol. 31 (January 1998), p.S.
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due to economic hardship, many formerly secret R&D institutions have sought
cooperation with foreign customers to finance new research activities. 57 These
circumstances have provided China with opportunities to gain access to Russian
advanced defence technology through developing joint R&D projects on dual-use
technology. This discussion will focus on China's procurement of dual-use technologies
in two vital technical areas, nuclear power engineering and space science.
Nuclear Power Engineering
To upgrade its nuclear technology, China has sought cooperation with Russia in the field
of nuclear power through commercial contracts and joint R&D projects. While
developing nuclear technical cooperation with foreign states, the Russian government has
faced a dilemma. In December 1992, in order to monitor exports of nuclear materials,
technology, and equipment, the Yeltsin government announced a list of 'dual purpose'
industrial equipment, materials and technologies that could be used for nuclear purposes.
Over 200 items, including pulsed lasers, supersensitive detonators, roots with sensor
control, machine tools with numerical programme control and chemical materials, were
allowed to be exported only on the basis of a licence.58
On the other hand, in circumstances of economic crisis, there has been a strong
commercial argument for nuclear power cooperation with foreign states. Commercial
profits have motivated the Russian government to support nuclear technological
" 
'China-Assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flight', p.16
56 Ibid; 'China Gears Up for Licence Production of Sukhoi Fighter Aircraft', p.Sl 3.
"Glenn E. Schweithzer, Moscow DMZ (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p.17.
'Russia to Restrict Export of Nuclear Technologies', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 23 December 1992, in
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cooperation with China for peaceful uses. 59 This development has made it difficult to
identify and monitor transfers of nuclear technology intended for military use without
hampering legitimate commercial trade.
When Yeltsin paid his first visit to China in December 1992, these two countries
signed an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power station in China. This set the
stage for a growing nuclear relationship. In accordance with this agreement, Russian
specialists would help to build a nuclear power station consisting of two power units with
water-moderated and water-cooled reactors with the capability of 1,000 megawatt each.
Russia also agreed to provide China with its experience and knowledge in the area of
nuclear power engineering.60
Another important agreement on cooperation in the use of nuclear energy was
signed in April 1996. According to Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian Minister for Atomic
Energy, about 30 areas of bilateral cooperation were covered in Sino-Russian
cooperation projects. 6 ' Based on security considerations, the Russian side demanded that
China guarantee that it could not use Russian nuclear technology in its military research
and development. 62 However, the Chinese emphasis on the interchangeability of civilian
and military technology has placed this guarantee in great doubt. China has gained
access to Russian nuclear technology that has secondary military applications. Russian
analyst A. Kabanrnkov warned in December 1992 that the nuclear power technology
SWB, SU 1572, 24 December 1992, p.A1 1.
'Shokhin on PRC Nuclear Power Unit', Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First
Program Network (Moscow), 18 December 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-245, 21 December 1992, p.13.
'Cooperation Planned with PRC on Nuclear Power Station', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 16 December 1992,
in FBIS-SOV-92-243, 17 December 1992, p.19.
61 
'Russia and China Sign Nuclear Cooperation Agreement', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 25 April 1996, in
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which China obtained could be highly usable in projects to create, for example, the
reactors of nuclear submarines.63
Additionally, the Chinese government has called for domestic units to create joint
research units with Russian counterparts so as to tap Russian technology in nuclear
industry. In 1992, the Sino-Russian Center for Nuclear Studies was set up in China's
Harbin city, and China planned to send its researchers to a well-known Russian nuclear
center in Dubna, near MOSCOW.0 In 1994, both sides further decided to build in China a
plant for the enrichment of uranium through centrifugal separation. 65
 This has provoked
concerns from Russian experts. The Russian military analyst Pavel Felgengauer warned
in 1997 that cooperation in this area would enable China to use enriched uranium for its
nuclear reactors and nuclear warheads:
Previously, the Chinese obtained enriched uranium for nuclear reactors and
weapons-grade uranium for warheads by means of an expensive and wasteful
gas diffusion method. Now the PRC has more effective technology for the
uranium enrichment process.
It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which nuclear technology obtained from
Russia has contributed to the accumulation of Chinese knowledge for innovating its
nuclear weapons. Yet, it is certain that, in order to achieve defence modemisation, China
SWB, SU/2596, 26 April 1996, p.B 6.
62 Ibid.
63 A. Kabannikov, 'We Swap SU's for Sausages. Who Controls Russian Arms Deliveries to China?',
Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 11 December 1992, p.3, in FBIS-SOV-92-241, 15 December 1992,
p.14.
Eugene Bazhanov, 'Russian Policy toward China', in Peter Shearman (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy since
1990 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1995) p.174.
65 Aleksandr Pashkov, 'People in Urals Perturbed that Chinese Will Construct Nuclear Plant', Izvestiya
(Moscow), 23 August 1994, p.2, in FBIS-SOV-94-164, 24 August 1994, p.15.
Pave! Felgengauer, 'An Uneasy Partnership: Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation and Arms Sales', in
Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri V. Trenin (eds), Russia in the World Arms Trade (Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p 94.
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has sought to make use of Russian economic difficulties to gain access to advanced
nuclear technology, which could be used for both civilian and military applications.
Space Science
Space science is closely related to the core of information warfare, particularly with
respect to navigation, intelligence, and communication. 67 In the words of a PLA expert
Liang Zhenxing: 'Information will be the primary tool for waging war... Controlling
space and seizing air and space superiority will be important contributing factors in
seizing the war initiative'. 68 Based on this perception, the Chinese military has claimed
that space industry is of strategic importance for the country's development and defence
modernisation.69
To fight a limited war under high-tech conditions, China has made every effort to
upgrade its capabilities in such fields as satellite-imaging systems, airborne early-
warning sensors, global-positioning systems for guiding missiles, and modern command-
and-control networks. 7° The Chinese government estimated that the country's overall
electronics demand would total U.S.$ 120 billion by the year 2000, much of it for
military use. 7 ' Meanwhile, the Chinese government has encouraged defence companies
to obtain military technology in such vital areas as C31 systems and electronics by setting
67 Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affafrs, Adelphi Paper no. 318 (London: IISS, 1998),
Chapter 4, pp.49-64.
'China in Transition: Chinese Strategist Sees Space as New Sphere of Military Rivalry', FEER, 12
February 1998, p.28.
69 
'Priority Urged for Growth of Space Industry', Xinhau news agency (Beijing), 16 January 1996, in FBIS-
CHI-96-012, IS January 1996.
Nigel Holloway, 'Revolutionary Defence', FEER, 24 July 1997, p.25; Frolov, 'China's Armed Forces
Prepare for High-Tech Warfare', pp.7-S.
Holoway, 'Revolutionary Defence', p.25.
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up joint ventures with foreign defence companies. 72
 In November 1992, China signed a
contract worth U.S.$ 100,000 with Russian enterprises to purchase certain advanced
components and systems for Chinese satellites. The systems included in the deal could
also be used to improve China's missile guidance capability.73
In addition, China purchased Russian manned craft docking units, life support and
rocket engines in an attempt to implement an orbit flight.74 A crewed flight will make
China the third state to launch a manned flight after the USSR and the USA. More
importantly, China has obtained Russian technical assistance in producing a heavy lift
booster, capable of placing 20,000 kg into Earth's low orbit. This has enabled China to
use Russian rocket engine technology to upgrade its missile delivery capabilities. 75 On
21 May 1996, U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry warned Russia that it would be 'a
significant mistake' to transfer SS-1 8 technology to China. Yet, he conceded that making
SS-18 booster rockets available for space launching could be the exception. 76 Clearly,
joint research on space exploration has offered China the opportunity to obtain Russian
SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) rocket engine technologies without
sanction from the USA.
Chinese cooperation with Russia has also covered the study and utilisation of space
science in broad fields. In December 1992, both sides signed an intergovernmental
agreement on outer space cooperation. The agreement embraced their cooperation in
12 
'Post-2000 Delays to China's Arms Goals', pp.2 I-22.
13 Kabannikov, 'We Swap SU's for Sausages', p.14; Tai Ming Cheung, 'Arm in Arm: Warming Sino-
Russian Military Ties Worry US', FEER, 12 November 1992, p.28.
14 Tim Furniss, 'Orbital Aspirations', Flight International, 22-28 April 1998, p.60.
15 Ibid.
16 
'Alleged ICBM Transfer from Russia to China', Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 6 (June 1996), p.45.
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such fields as studies of the solar system and cosmic matter, space medicine and remote
probing of the Earth. 77 According to Lurii Sergeevich Osipov, President of the Russian
Academy of Sciences (RAS), Chinese and Russian scientists have planned to launch two
spacecraft on missions to Mars to explore its climate and geology and search for
evidence of life. 78 Meanwhile, scientists from both states have made use of remote
sensing technology and high-altitude balloons to detect cosmic rays and the space
environment.79
China has sought to gain access to Russian space technology with secondary
military applications. Chinese purchases of Russian advanced satellite components can
be used to upgrade its missile guidance systems. Chinese cooperation with Russia in
production technologies for rocket engines may improve its missile delivery capability.
Joint space science research has enabled China to obtain advanced space technologies
such as satellite and airborne remote sensor systems. If the current level of space
research and cooperation is sustained, this will have a significant effect on China's
satellite sensor capability, C31 technologies, and missile delivery power. In 1999, Major
Mark A. Stokes, U.S. Assistant Air Attaché in Beijing from 1992-1995, stressed that
China had a wide variety of programmes which indicated its ambition to become a major
player in space in the 21 century. He concluded that the Chinese emphasis on dual-use
systems could provide significant value added benefits to future PLA operations.8°
'Space Agreement Provides for Joint Russian-Chinese Programme of Manned Flights, Mayak Radio
(Moscow), 18 December 1992, in SWB, FE11568, 19 December 1992, pAl 5.
'China Joins Russian Mission to Mars', Beying Review, 9-15 November 1992, p.8.
79Ibid.
80 Mark A. Stokes, China's Strategic Modernisation: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999), p.187.
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In 1998, the American analyst Richard D. Fisher also warned that China's ambition
to develop advanced space technology would pose a security threat to the USA:
Overall, China has demonstrated it has ambitious plans for military and civilian
use of space. It may seek Russian and Western assistance to build its radar
satellites, which, unlike regular imaging satellites that are limited by cloud
cover, can be used to follow U.S. naval forces in Asia in all weather conditions.
This capacity could be used to target U.S. forces with new ballistic and cruise
missiles or attack aircraft. China is developing an improved imaging satellite
and, like the United States, can be expected to use commercial imaging satellite
for military purposes.8'
If China can successfully apply its expertise and knowledge in the field of space science
to military uses, it may be able to surprise potentially hostile states, including Russia,
with an upgraded military space capability in a future international crisis.
D) China's Acquisitions of Russian Defence Technology through Illicit Routes
In addition to intergovernmental technical cooperation projects, China has also tried to
obtain advanced Russian military technology through illicit routes. This section will first
address different illicit routes by which China has acquired Russian defence technology.
It will then explore the difficulties facing Russia in preventing a brain drain. To
understand the implications of Russian technology for China's defence modernisation
programmes, this section will also examine the development of Chinese strategic and
cruise missiles, and its next-generation nuclear submarines.
Illicit Routes
Richard D. Fisher, Commercial Space Cooperation Should Not Harm National Security, Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder no. 1198 (26 June 1998), Website http: www.heritage.org/Iibrary/backgrounder
/bg/1 98es.html/
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China has argued that military technologies from abroad can be acquired in more ways
than by direct purchase, and may involve the hiring of foreign expertise and sharing of
technologies. 82 In its technical assistance to China, Russia has tried to preserve a
technological gap in an attempt to safeguard its security and interests. In these
circumstances, China has sought to gain access to Russian expertise and technology
through illicit routes.
First, China has recruited many Russian defence engineers and scientists to work in
China. Russian scientists specialise in broad fields of defence technology and could
assist China in overcoming its technological bottleneck in developing its next-generation
weapons. As Glenn E. Schweitzer, the First Executive Director of the International
Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) which was set up by the USA, Europe, and Japan
in Moscow to prevent a Russian brain drain into other states, pointed out:
the number of Russian specialists who developed and designed weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery systems and who should be of interest to the
ISTC was about 60,000... the 60,000 core specialists had many years of direct
hands-on experience in the laboratories and on the test ranges where
components and materials for thousands of real weapons were developed and
fired. Such experience was lacking in most other countries.83
Given that Russian specialists and technicians have had to subsist for months
without pay, presumably, these professional personnel have been vulnerable to foreign
recruitment . M
 China has allegedly offered salaries of around U.S.$ 1,000 - 2,000 a
month to Russian technicians and advisors. This might be considerably less than they
82 Bates Gill, 'Determinants and Doctrines for Chinese Weapons Imports', The Pacj/Ic Review, vol. 8, no. 2
(1995), p.363.
Schweithzer, Moscow DMZ, p 103.
Paul Mann, 'Reform Deficiencies Afflict Russian R&D', AWST, 26 May 1997, p.T3; Andrew Koch,
'Weapons Technology Transfers - at Growing Threat?', JDW, 22 December 1999, pp.23-26.
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could earn in Western countries, but a lot more than in Russia. 85
 It was estimated that the
number of Russian engineers and scientists who were secretly working for China was
roughly between 1,000 and 3,000.86 These Russian specialists were excellent in fields
such as aircraft construction, rocketry, anti-submarine warfare and air defence. Some of
them have been attached to research institutes under the Chinese Aeronautics Ministry to
assist China in R&D of new weaponry.87
Moreover, some Russian scientists visiting China for short trips have provided vital
information on military technologies to their Chinese counterparts. According to
Stephen J. Blank, the Chinese Military-Technical Cooperation Coordinating Centre
invited Russian weapons designers and other specialists to China for preliminary talks in
1996. At these talks, Russian scientists gave 'secret' lectures to their Chinese
counterparts. The defence information China received from Russian experts may have
helped to save 15-20 years of R&D and hundreds of millions of dollars. 88 Furthermore, it
was reported in 1997 that many Chinese specialists had maintained contact with their
Russian counterparts through computer networks. This channel enabled China to obtain
the latest information and knowledge on Russian defence technologies. 89 In the deal
regarding the production licence for Su-27s, China chose to buy only those plans
'PRC Foreign Ministry Denial on Russian Defense Experts', ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 2 June 1994, in
FBIS-SOV-94-107, 3 June 1994, p.1 1; Bitzinger, 'China's Defense Budget', p36.
86 Bitzinger, 'China's Defense Budget', p.36; Vladimir Skosyrev, 'Asia Scared about Expansion of Russo-
Chinese Military Cooperation', Izvestiya (Moscow), 9 November 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-216, 10
November 1993, p.2; 'Country Briefing. China. Making A Modem Industry', p.28.
Patrick E. Tyler, 'Arms Pact to Bring Russian Expertise to Beijing', International Herald Tribune, 10
November 1993; 'Country Briefing: China. Making A Modern Industry', p.28.
Stephen J. Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army
War College, 1997), p.10.
Nigel Holloway and Charles Bickers, 'Brothers in Arms: The U.S. Worries about Sino-Russian Military
Cooperation', FEER, 13 March 1997, p.21.
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necessary for the basic mainframe. The Russian side complained that the Chinese were
not interested in additional equipment, because they might have already obtained the
blueprints for these.9°
On 16 June 1994, Sergey Stepashin, Director of the Russian Federal Counter-
intelligence Service, warned that the Chinese intelligence services had been active in
Primorskiy Kray, involved in direct recruitment and military espionage.9 ' Russian
counter-intelligence departments have sought to prevent the leakage of defence
technologies to China. 92 In 1999, Russian security agents in Vladivostok seized illegal
defence technology in the process of being exported to China. The acoustic laboratories
of the Pacific Institute of Oceanography in Russia designed 'acoustic modules' for
China's Harbin Engineering University. After determining that the equipment had
military application, the acoustic laboratories were sealed pending further investigation.93
The theft of Russian defence technology has highlighted Chinese ambitions to upgrade
its military capacity through foreign advanced technology. It has also thrown a shadow
over 'mutual trust' between the two states.
The D4fflculties of Preventing a Russian Brain Drain into China
In Russia, the out-flow of defence technology has provoked concerns. Russian analysts
have called for a stricter control over the Russian defence sector and its personnel
9° Holloway and Bickers, 'Brothers in Arms', p.21.
91 
'Stepashin Says Russia to Take "Tougher Line" with PRC', Moscow Radio Network, 16 June 1994, in
FBIS-SOV-94-1 17, 17 June 1994, p.'0.
Aleksandr Shalnev, 'Russia Has Become a Proving Ground for "Exotic Intelligence Services", Jzvesz:ya
(Moscow), 9 June 1994, p.3, in FBIS-SOV-94-1 11, 9 June 1994, p.10.
9° 
'Russia Seizes Suspected Military Exports', JDW, 22 September 1999, p.20.
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disclosure of advanced technology. As A. Kabannikov commented on 11 December
1992:
In the present situation, when the defense industry, struggling for survival, has
independently made a dash for the foreign market, albeit under govermnent
supervision, the consequences of this unprecedented expansion inspire alarm.
Whereas it is somehow still possible to keep an eye on its finished products,
government structures are proving clearly incapable of monitoring the spread of
technologies.94
As a member of President Yeltsin's team negotiating with the Chinese leadership on
military-technical cooperation in December 1992, Russian Deputy Premier Aleksandr
Shokhin voiced his concerns on the issue by stating:
We do not want to go beyond the line that separates the sale of defensive and
offensive weapons, although many of our enterprises have made such proposals.
Moreover, we would like to preclude attempts to promote creeping,
uncontrolled arms trade and to transfer technologies. Unfortunately, there have
been cases when representatives of designing (sic) bureau and enterprises had
tried to reach corresponding agreements while on private visits. And although
such cases are not very numerous, especially as regards China, we would like to
establish a tougher control mechanism. It is necessary, apparently, to conclude
an agreement with all countries on the protection of intellectual property and to
stiffly control the transfer of know-how, patents, etc.95
A Russian brain drain into China has reflected the shift of national economic
strength between the two countries. Given the country's economic hardship, it was
difficult for the Russian government to prevent this drain. On 9 June 1994, Yuriy
Baturin, National Security Adviser to the Russian President, pointed out:
If our specialists were guaranteed more appropriate living conditions, there
would be no need for more active counter-intelligence activity, nothing would
find its way to China via these specialists, and they themselves would never
leave for China.96
Kabannikov, 'We Swap SU's for Sausages', p.14.
'Shokhin: Military Cooperation with PRC Purely "Defensive", LIAR-lASS (Moscow), 18 December
1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-244, 18 December 1992, p.9.
Shalnev, 'Russia Has Become a Proving Ground for "Exotic Intelligence Services", p.10.
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This development has attracted the West's concern. In 1993, to prevent a Russian brain
drain into other states, the ISTC was established by the USA, Western Europe, and Japan
in Moscow. This Centre provided financial support to Russian scientists, engineers, and
technicians who could develop and design weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems. The basic purpose has been to prevent these specialists from being
recruited by other states.97
However, many problems have arisen from this plan. In its first two years, the
ISTC allocated a total of U.S.$ 82 million to finance 199 projects. 98 In Russia, there
were about 60,000 specialists able to develop and design weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems. The number of Russian specialists financed by the ISTC was
inadequate. Moreover, the ISTC became operational in 1993, and its financial support
mainly went to those Russian specialists residing in Russia with no intention of
emigrating.99 No evidence suggests that those Russian specialists who were recruited by
foreign states before 1993 had returned to Russia because of the establishment of the
ISTC.
The ISTC has admitted the difficulties of controlling Russia's brain drain.
According to Glenn E. Schweitzer, the First Executive Director of the ISTC:
At the same time, we witnessed the emergence of a variety of new channels for
transferring abroad technical information originating in Russia. Many
weaponeers were making short-term visits to other countries. Foreign
For further discussion, see Schweithzer, Moscow DMZ.
'Russian-American Cooperation on Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Their
Proliferation', International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 42, no. 3 (1996), p.37.
As early as 1992, the International Science Foundation was established to provide long-term grants for
Russian basic scientists. However, weapons developers were not included in this programme. See
Dorothy S. Zinberg, The Missing Link?: Nuclear Proliferation and the International Mobility of Russian
Nuclear Esperts, UNIDIR Research Paper no. 35 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research, 1995), p.31.
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representatives in Russia with undisclosed home affiliations increased. Also of
great significance, electronic communications from remote locations in Russia
to other countries developed quickly.'°°
According to the ISTC, Russian nuclear experts might provide the Chinese with special
in-depth experience to refine their approaches and help to assess their capabilities and
shortcomings)°' A Russian brain drain into China has important implications for the
innovation of China's strategic forces.
The Implications of Russian Expertise for China's Strategic Forces
In the Chinese military's view, ballistic missiles can influence a war situation in a crucial
way. In this view, ballistic missiles possess over-all depth strike capabilities, surprise
and speedy attack capabilities, amazing strike effects, and can have decisive influence on
the result of a war.'°2
Western sources have pointed out that China has obtained the components, engine
and guidance technology of Russian SS-l8, tie core of Russian nuclear arsenal.'° 1 In
addition, China has sought to obtain technologies from the Russian SS-24 or SS-25 to
improve the mobility and accuracy of Chinese land-based and single-warhead nuclear
missiles - the CSS-4. 104 The SS-24 multiple targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) missiles
can be rail-mobile or silo based. The single-warhead road-mobile SS-25 has a range of
'°° Schweithzer, Moscow DM7, p.101.
101 ibid.
102 Ye Ming-lan, Kong/ian zhanchang yu dandao feidan di yunyong [Space Battle Field and Ballistic
Missile Operations] (Beijing: The PLA Press, 1994), pp.71-73. (author's translation)
103 Joseph C. Anselmo, 'China's Military Seeks Great Leap Forward', A WST, 12 May 1997, p.70; 'One
Arrow, Three Stars: China's MIRV Programme', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 9, no. 6 (June 1997),
p.267. For China's acquisitions of components and booster rockets of Russian SS-18, see 6.C.
104 Alan George, 'China Uses Russian Know-how on ICBM', Flight International, 22 December 1993 - 4
January 1994, p.5.
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over 10,000 km and pinpoint accuracy. The successful integration of Russian SS-24 and
SS-25 technology into Chinese nuclear missiles would enable Chinese strategic forces to
carry more warheads and be more mobile and accurate)°5
In addition, China has viewed new-generation nuclear submarines as crucial for
ensuring its mastery of the sea in modem warfare, and is trying to build a survival, sea-
based nuclear retaliatory force.'°6 China has planned to develop a new generation Type
093 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic-
missile submarine (SSBN) in order to replace its outdated nuclear submarine fleet after
the year 2000.107 The Type 093 SSN was built in China's Huludao shipyard with the
technical assistance of Russian engineers from the Rubin Design Bureau in St.
Petersburg. It has been reported that the project otf Type 093 SSN, which was based on
Russia's 'Victor III', would be completed in 2001)08
Russian technicians have assisted China in developing a new nuclear propulsion
system for powering its new generation nuclear submarines.' 09 These technicians also
assisted Chinese SSNs in coating their hulls to improve noise insulation. The noise
problem was a particular vulnerability of Chinese Han-class SSNs, and enabled the USA
'° Ibid
' °6 Yu Chuanxin and Zhang yuping, Kexue jishu yu weilai wuqi zhuangbei [Science Technology and Future
Arms Equipment], (Beijing: National Defence University Press, 1997), p.13. (author's translation) Also
see 'Nuclear Submarines - The Decisive Force in Gaining Sea Supremacy', Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and
Merchant Ships] (Beijing), no. 9 (8 September 1995), pp.8-9, in FBIS-CHI-96-019, 29 January 1996,
pp.27-29.
101 
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submarine had to surface in order to launch its missiles, thereby risking detection and destruction by hostile
aircraft. Along with problems of high internal radiation, the PLAN decided to discontinue the Hans. The
single Xia SSBN was essentially a modification of the Han SSN. See John Jordan, 'The People's
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and Japanese navies to detect Hans with sophisticated anti-submarine warfare systems.
The successful development of a new noise insulation system will enable new-generation
nuclear submarines to approach closer to hostile states' fleets and place them under direct
threat from the Chinese navy." 0 Moreover, the Chinese hull-mounted sonar system was
developed in the 1950s and had a very limited detection range. China has expressed an
interest in the Russian towed array sonar system - which has omnidirectional detection
with a maximum effective range of 80 km - and the multi-target torpedo control system
for its SSBNs."
If it can successfully integrate Russian advanced technology into its new-generation
SSNs and SSBNs, China will have a more reliable sea-based deterrence capacity. The
new-generation nuclear submarines could sow doubts in the mind of any state
contemplating a pre-emptive nuclear strike against China. These circumstances have
worried Russian defence planners. In an interview conducted by the author on 6 July
1998, Vasiliy I. Krivokhizha, the First Deputy Director of Russia's Institute for Strategic
Studies, stressed:
From the view of geopolitics, Russia has to take account of a potential security
threat from China. Given the decline of the country's economic strength,
Russia may be not able to maintain an effective conventional force. In case of a
tension or conflict with China, Russia will need to count on strategic forces
whose survival capability and precision are more superior than those of China
to deter China's military actions."2
With the assistance of Russian scientists, China has pursued the upgrading of its strategic
°'Russia Helps China Take New SSNs into Silent Era', JDW, 13 August 1997, p.14.
Ryoichi [-Lamamoto, 'Source on Bid to Buy Russian Naval Weapon Systems', Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo),
13 March 1995, p.5, in FBIS-CHI-95-049, 14 March 1995, p.S.
" The author's interview with Dr. Vasiliy 1. Krivokhizha, First Deputy Director, Russia's Institute for
Strategic Studies, 6 July 1998, Moscow.
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forces. The development of China's new-generation nuclear submarines, coupled with
MTRV missile systems, could pose a challenge to Russia's security, at the least
complicating the situation for Russian decision-makers in a crisis situation between the
two countries.
E) Assessment of the Three Routes
In order to access the effectiveness of each route, it is necessary to understand three
major flows of knowledge and technology." 3 (see Table 7) As shown in the Table 7,
Flows A and B, production knowledge and know-how, can contribute to the development
of the recipient's weapons production capacity. China's right to produce the Su-27 jet
fighter and to assemble the RD-33 engine for the FC- I and the Zhuk-8 II radar for the J-
811M under Russian production licences should be listed in technologies of Flows A and
B. Under these contracts, the Russian side may agree to partly supply China with the
knowledge and know-how which were related to blueprint specifications or production
and maintenance procedures.
However, it should be noted that it is the knowledge in Flow C - important scientific
principles and engineering skill - that can fundamentally assist a recipient in developing
technological capabilities to design new weapons by itself. To preserve a technological
gap between them, Russia has constricted transfers of Flow C technology and knowledge
to China. This has been reflected in that, despite its urgent need for funds, Russia has
still refused the Chinese proposal to participate in joint development and share funding of
The following discussion is based on the ideas of Erik Baark. See Erik Baark, 'Military Technology and







Project 1-42, a fifth-generation multi-role fighter that Russia touted as a counter to the
U.S. planned F22.H4
Table 7 Three Flows of International Technology Transfers
Product designs I specifications
Materials I component specifications
Process designs and blueprints
Production procedures I schedules and organization
Production / organization know-how
Operating / managing skills
Maintenance skills and procedures
Flow C Know-why	 Process / production design and engineering know-why,
skills, procedure and experience
Product / market design and engineering data skills
Project management I engineering procedures and
expertise
Technology development and research skills, data,
procedures etc.
Source: Baark, 'Military Technology and Absorptive Capacity in China And India:
Implications for Modernization', p.91.
In legitimate routes of technical assistance, Russia has retained sensitive technology
and knowledge. Although Russia has refurbished Chinese-designed warplanes and
helped to resolve its technical problems, Russia has not transferred Flow C technology
and knowledge to China. Given this, 'dual-use technology' and 'illicit routes' became the
major means for China to obtain Russian technologies of Flow C and to improve its
weaponry design capabilities. In the name of peaceful use, China has developed joint
Capacity and the Risk of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1997), pp.88-92.
"4 Barbara Opall-Rome, 'Economics, Russian Reluctance Slow PLA Arms Drive', Defense News, 8
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research projects with Russia on dual-use technology. This has enabled China to obtain
knowledge and technology of Flow C for nuclear power engineering and space science
that have application for military uses.
Additionally, China has made efforts to gain access to Russian advanced defence
technology through illicit routes. It has enabled China to obtain advanced military
technologies not open to export by the Russian government. One example of this is that
Russia has refused to export advanced air-to-air missiles to China. Yet, Russian
engineers have assisted China in the development of anti-radar missiles under private
contracts."5
The recruitment of foreign expertise can be an easy way to upgrade a country's
military technological potential. The USSR's acquisition of German expertise and
technology on missile guidance systems in the 1950s is a good example. After the end of
the Second World War, a number of German experts, led by Helmut Grottrup, began to
help the Soviet Union to develop its ballistic missile programme. By the 1950s, based on
the theoretical aspects of German navigation technology, the Soviet Union had laid the
basis for a purely Soviet R&D effort in this field and surpassed the German level."6
This point has been illustrated in the development of cruise missiles, which are
viewed as 'the paradigmatic weapon of the RMA', in China." 7 In 1993, China recruited
February 1999, p.9.
' 'China Raises Arms Muscle with Anti-Radar Missile Work', JDW, 23 September 1998 p.15.
116 Donald A. MacKenzie, The Soviet Union and Strategic Missile Guidance: Technology Transfer,
Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control, PICT Policy Research Paper no. 8 (Swindon: Economic and Social
Research Council, 1989), pp.10-1 1.
117 Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, p.70.
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an entire cruise missile R&D team from Russia to work in China's Shanghai city."8
According to Chong-pin Lin, who was a research fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute and now is Vice-Chairman of Mainland China Committee at the Taiwanese
Executive Yuan, with the assistance of Russian technicians, Chinese cruise missiles have
entered the test firing stage. Chinese satellites are now able to provide sufficient
topographical information for inputting target data into the missile's memory." 9
 The U.S.
Pentagon also pointed out that, due to technological assistance from Russia and Israel,
Chinese cruise missiles would be air-launched from bombers, with a sea-launched
variant possibly following. The first of the Chinese cruise missiles will probably be
operational early after 2000.120
Russian scientists might also provide China with the expertise and technology that
had been restricted by the Russian government, and help China to create an indigenous
design and manufacturing capability for new weapons systems. All of these are ongoing
secretly and a real picture of the situation is unavailable. However, the Chinese
recruitment of Russian specialists can undermine the development of official technical
cooperation between the two states. It can also reduce the Russian government's
leverage in official technical cooperation with China.
Lu Te-yung, 'Mainland Military Expert Visiting U.S. Discloses That Mainland Has Invited Experts of
Former Soviet Union To Develop Cruise Mssiles', Lien Ha Pao (Hong Kong), 30 July 1995, p.8, in FBIS-
CHI-95-167, 29 August 1995, pp.33-34. Also see Vasiliy Golovnin, 'Russian Defense Minister Goes to
China. Beijing Attempts to Pit the Russians Against the Americans on the Chinese Arms Market',
Segodnya (Moscow), 9 November 1993, p.1, in FBIS-SOV-93-216, 10 November 1993, p.4.
Ibid.
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F) Conclusions: The Unstable Nature of Sino-Russian Military-Technical
Cooperation
The nature of Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation is unstable. Enduring distrust
and conflicts of interest have obstructed the furthering of these relations. This
examination of Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation has thrown light into two
areas not covered in the general literature.
First, while it provided assistance to Chinese weaponry development and production,
Russia has sought to protect its own security and commercial interests. Russia has not
been a reliable source for technological supplies as China had expected. In the process
of providing technological assistance to Chinese next-generation warplanes, Russia has
tried to deepen China's dependence on Russia's technical basis and equipment supply, in
an attempt to control both the 'quality' and 'quantity' of China's next-generation
warplanes. In addition, despite the fact that Russia has sold China the production licence
for the Su-27, it has taken deliberate measures to safeguard Russian security interests.
Russia's efforts to maintain a technological gap with China has underscored Russian
concerns about a security threat from China. Also, Russian technical assistance to
warplanes R&D projects has increased Chinese production costs, which could create
uncertainties for the modernisation of the Chinese air force.
Second, given Russia's reluctance to release up-to-date technologies to China in
legitimate routes, China has sought to gain access to advanced defence technologies
through dual-use technology and illicit routes. Russia's economic weakness has offered
120 Anselmo, China's Military Seeks Great Leap Forward', p.70.
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China opportunities of access to Russian dual-use technology in such areas as nuclear
power engineering and space science through joint R&D projects. Ties between Chinese
civilian and military departments are close. According to China's official news agency,
Xinhua, Chinese civilian firms have actively participated in various areas of national
defence R&D such as nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines, guidance missiles, satellites,
and materials.' 2 ' In the context of joint R&D projects on dual-technology, China has
been an ambitious partner, trying to make use of Russia's economic hardship to achieve
its ambition of becoming a credible military power.
China's illicit acquisition of Russian defence technology has raised deep questions
about the future of official defence technical cooperation. China's access to Russian
advanced technology through illicit routes could render the Russian arms and military-
technical exports control mechanism and procedures ineffective, and might help China to
upgrade an indigenous design and manufacturing capability for new weapons systems.
This development will have important implications for the relationship between the two
states. As stated by Russian military expert Dmitri Trenin in 1998, 'Russia may lose its
military technology edge on China, which so far is its most important advantage before
its neighbor in the field of defence'.' 22 Combined with territorial disputes and
demographic tensions and given China's growing economic strength, China's increasing
military potential could be a direct threat to Russia's security.
121 
'Civilian Firms Help in Military Hardware Production', Xinhua news agency (Beijing), 12 January 1995,
in FBIS-CHI-95-016, 25 January 1995, p.24.




After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China and Russia have sought to develop
cooperation in various fields and announced a 'partnership'. In 1997, Rajan Menon
described this relationship as one of 'strategic convergence', involving multifaceted
cooperation and a convergence of views and interests on important issues.' In
contrast, this thesis suggests that the development of this relationship has remained
strained. This has been illustrated in the limits of Sino-Russian military cooperation.
During the post-Cold War period, China and Russia have sought to develop
military cooperation at two levels to achieve their own state interests. First, these
states have sought to defuse remaining points of tension through CBMs. Second,
they have developed new areas of cooperation, including arms transfers and military-
technical cooperation. Compared to the past, progress has been made in improving
bilateral military-security relations. However, many problems and limits have
remained. Mutual distrust and conflicts of interest have obstructed the development
of Chinese and Russian military cooperation, including CBMs, arms transfers and
military-technical cooperation. As a result, the nature of Chinese and Russian
military cooperation has remained fragile. This conclusion will underline the
limitations on Sino-Russian military cooperation and highlight the persistent
challenges in this relationship.
A) Limitations on Sino-Russian Military Cooperation
Rajan Menon, 'The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China', Survival, vol. 39, no. 2
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Chinese and Russian military cooperation has been motivated by the calculations of
their own state interests. For China, arms trade and military-technical cooperation
with Russia was to promote its defence modemisation, which was viewed by the
Chinese leadership as an important strategic goal in the new era. In China's view,
Russian economic difficulties offered the opportunity to swap light industry goods
and foods for purchases of Russian military equipment and technology. This could
expand the export of Chinese commodities, and save Chinese spending on purchases
of modem armaments.
For Russia, the strategic objective of military cooperation with China was to
consolidate its relations with China. In 1992, Yeltsin declared that 'we [Russia and
China] are prepared for cooperation in all fields, including the most sophisticated
weapons and armaments'. 2 Such political pledges showed Russia's intention of using
its military cooperation with China as a symbol of their friendly relations. Military
cooperation with China was also seen as a means to increase Russian influence over
China's defence modemisation. In addition, commercial enticements gave cause for
Russia to pursue arms trade and military-technical cooperation with China. Russia
expected that bilateral cooperation in these areas could help to lighten the financial
crisis in its defence industry.
This thesis concludes that many problems and limits have arisen while China
and Russia have attempted to pursue military cooperation. After examining the
main components of Chinese and Russian military cooperation, this study argues that
(Summer 1997), p.101.
2 Bruce Shu, 'Defense Ministries Work on Pact', AFP (Hong Kong), 18 December 1992, in FBIS-SOV-
92-245, 21 December 1992, p.9.
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mutual distrust and conflicts of interest have obstructed the development of their
bilateral cooperation.
First, Chinese and Russian desires to have more stable bilateral relations led to
the possibility of their cooperation on CBMs. Within the context of Sino-Russian
military cooperation, CBMs have sought to increase mutual trust to enable both sides
to resolve lingering problems in the military-security field. Although cooperation on
CBMs has helped to normalise bilateral relations, the level of trust has remained
weak.
In order to have a peaceful external environment for domestic economic
development, China and Russia have adopted major types of European CBMs -
communication measures, transparency measures, constraint measures, and
declaratory measures - to achieve confidence-building. Through these, significant
progress has been made to lessen military tensions in the border areas and to avoid a
surprise attack from the other.
However, viewed from the perspective of the 'procedure' dimension of
confidence-building, which focuses on the content and objective of CBMs, many
insufficiencies have remained in Chinese and Russian CBMs. 3 Unlike the European
model that developed a comprehensive instrument applying to military developments
anywhere in the territories of the parties, Sino-Russian CBMs have merely focused on
the reduction of military tensions in the land border regions. This has led to the
situation where, beyond the alleviation of military tensions in these areas, both sides
James Macintosh, 'Confidence- and Security-building Measures: A Sceptical Look', in UN
Department for Disarmament Affairs (ed.), Confidence and Security-building Measures in Asia (New
York: The United Nations, 1990), pp.83-84.
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have failed to promote mutual trust in the wider military and security field.
For example, while pursuing transparency measures, China did not disclose
defence spending, thus preventing Russia from tracing China's wider military
development and modernisation. Also, the lack of elaborate procedures for
verification has highlighted the weak level of trust between China and Russia. More
importantly, given unequal geographic conditions, Russian worries about the
vulnerability of its unpopulated Far East areas have remained. This was illustrated
in that while these two parties pursued force limitations within the 100-km border
zone, two important Russian cities in these areas, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, were
excluded from the reductions. This development has clearly suggested that the sense
of distrust has remained. Bilateral cooperation on CBMs has failed to create an
outcome in which China and Russia eliminate enduring perceptions of mutual threat.
Second, although these states have undertaken arms transfers and military-
technical cooperation, Russia has remained concerned about a potential security threat
from China when supplying arms and technologies to China. Lingering mutual
distrust has restricted bilateral cooperation in these two areas.
In contrast to its political pledges, Russia has tried to safeguard its security and
has not supplied China with the most sophisticated weapon systems. Unlike what
Stephen Blank claims, Russian arms transfers to China have been cautious.4 Russia
has sought to maintain tight controls over the types of weaponry supplied to China.
Stephen Blank, 'Challenging the New World Order: The Arms Transfer Policies of the Russian
Republic', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (June 1993), pp.253-254; Stephen
Blank, Why Russian Policy in Failing in Asia (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997),
pp.6-7; Stephen J. Blank, The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army
War College, 1997), pp.5-9; Stephen J. Blank, 'Russia-Chinese Military Relations and Asian Security',
Issues and Studies, vol. 33, no. 11 (November 1997), p.60.
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Russian arms transfers to China have not reached the level of quality it has supplied
to other Asian countries. This has underscored Russian concerns about the potential
risks of an enhanced Chinese military capability.
Russian policy on arms transfers has provoked Chinese complaints. While
selectively importing advanced military equipment and technology from abroad,
China has been vigilant against dependence on a single external source. To prevent
this, China has sought to develop alternative sources of spare parts from Ukraine for
its Su-27s and has lobbied Western states to lift their arms embargoes against China.
An enduring sense of distrust has restricted the further development of Chinese and
Russian cooperation in this field.
Mutual distrust has also obstructed Chinese and Russian military-technical
cooperation. While China attempted to import Russian expertise and technology to
promote its defence modemisation, Russia has been reluctant to release up-to-date
technologies to China in legitimate routes of technical cooperation. The sale of the
Su-27 production licence to China is an example that weakens the case for the
existence of 'mutual trust'. The Russian plan to upgrade Chinese SAC's
manufacturing sophistication was scheduled for 15 years, and China could produce
only 70 per cent of the fighter. Russia has retained the rights for assembling the
sophisticated AL-3 1 engine and electronic equipment, and China has been required to
return the AL-3 I engine to Russia for repair. As the Russian Sukhoi Design Bureau
failed to ensure the production of fifth-generation fighter, Su-37s, Russia has delayed
the schedule of the delivery of Su-27 production line to China. As such, Russia has
attempted to preserve the technological gap between the Russian and Chinese air
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forces so as to protect its own security interests. These policies have provoked anger
from the Chinese military.
Given Russian measures to maintain the technological gap with China, military-
technical cooperation with Russia, in particular, through legitimate routes, has failed
to fully meet Chinese aims of achieving technology innovation. Guided by the
principle of integrating self-reliance with the import of advanced technology from
abroad, China has tried to obtain Russian expertise and technology through joint
R&D projects on dual-technology as well as illicit routes. Most importantly, China
has recruited Russian scientists and engineers to improve indigenous design and
manufacturing capability for new military equipment. This development has
reduced Russian leverage in its relationship with China and undermined Russian
efforts to retain sensitive defence technology in its arms trade and military-technical
cooperation with China. This has also raised questions about 'mutual trust' forged
by these two countries.
Third, the sales of military hardware to China have not been profitable to Russia.
The fundamental tension between the two states is that while China has intended to
make use of Russian economic hardship to offer it light industry goods and foods in
exchange for purchases of Russian modem weaponry, Russia has sought to ensure
revenues from these transfers.
Throughout the 1 990s, cheap and poor quality Chinese commodities were used
for payment to Russian defence enterprises. This undermined the Russian objective
of lightening the financial crisis in its defence industry through arms exports to China.
On the other hand, increasing Russian demands for more hard currency for arms
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payments and its insistence on appropriate weaponry pricing has increased costs for
China to modemise its armed forces through Russian weapons. Disputes over these
issues have even delayed arms deals. These developments have failed to fully meet
commercial enticements behind these transfers, and have heightened the fragile nature
of this relationship.
Additionally, in order to ensure sufficient revenues from its military-technical
cooperation with China, Russia has tried to push China into accepting its technical
basis and technical support concepts. This was illustrated in that Russia had made
the Chinese-designed warplanes to fit Russian equipment, even though the
incorporation of certain equipment into Chinese warplanes airframe had proven
difficult. Spending on Russian technology and equipment has increased the
production costs of Chinese next-generation warplanes. Also, while it sold China
the licenced production for the Su-27 in the 1995, Russia provided China with a copy
of the original Su-27 that did not contain the most important modification elements.
Russia's aim was to tie the Chinese aviation industry to the Sukhoi Design Bureau
and to receive additional money for every modification to the Chinese-made Su-27s.
Given conflicts of commercial interest, and increased production costs, the
development of official technical cooperation on Chinese combat aircraft
development and production projects has faced uncertainties.
In brief, after the end of the Cold War, calculated self-interests motivated China
and Russia to pursue CBMs, arms transfers and military-technical cooperation. It is
significant that, while these states attempted to consolidate their relations and to
create an atmosphere of mutual trust through military cooperation, they have still seen
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the other as a potential security threat. A gap has existed between their political
pledges and the reality of cooperation. A sense of mutual distrust has remained, and
conflicts of security and commercial interests have arisen. These factors have
underscored the fragile nature of Sino-Russian military cooperation after the end of
the Cold War.
B) Persistent Challenges
For China and Russia, reciprocal threats against each other are deeply rooted in
historical, geopolitical, and national security dimensions. The deep-rooted sense of
distrust constituted a significant barrier to the furthering of their military cooperation.
Historically, China and Russia have been hostile neighbours. Throughout the
Cold War period, their military relations were unstable. The friendly relationship
between them only lasted for seven years, from 1949 to 1956. The termination of
military ties, armed clashes in the border areas, China's claims on Soviet territory,
military build-up along the common border, China's preparation for a war against the
USSR, and Soviet military containment against China sharpened the sense of mutual
distrust between these two neighbours. As a result, both sides perceived the other as
a genuine security threat.
From the point of view of history, these two states' military relations have
reflected changes in their political relations and the wider political environment. For
these two states, any change in the political relationship will influence the
development of their military relations. After the Cold War, China and Russia have
announced a 'strategic partnership' and sought to develop cooperation in various fields.
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However, bilateral cooperation in the realms of international diplomacy, regional
security, and economic affairs has been limited. In particular, strained cooperation
in counter-balancing U.S. hegemony, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance, and NATO
enlargement has highlighted Chinese and Russian divergent geopolitical and security
interests. In contrast to what Menon argues, limited cooperation in these fields can
hardly be portrayed as a favourable strategic circumstance or a solid political
foundation conducive to the deepening of Chinese and Russian military cooperation.5
Many Russian political elites have cast doubts on the necessity for a 'strategic
partnership' with China. The future develqpment of the relationship remains
uncertain.
More importantly, many problems, which result from contradictions of
geopolitical and security interests, could deepen the sense of distrust between these
states. These will remain as uncertainties for the future of Sino-Russian military
relations. First, historical legacies such as territorial disputes remain lurking sore
points in Sino-Russian relations. In the 1990s, the Yeltsin leadership sought to
conduct border demarcation with China. However, disputes over the ownership of
the islands off Khabarovsk and the Argun River still exist. In 1997, the Chinese side
had admitted that Yeltsin had played an important role in the process of demarcating
the Sino-Russian common border, and voiced its concerns about the future of the
border demarcation after Yeltsin stepped down.6
On 31 December 1999, Yelstin resigned and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was
Menon, 'The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China', p.101 and pp.104-107.
Zhao Huasheng, 'Guanyu zhonge guanxz changqi wending fazhan di sikao' [Thoughts on the Long-
term Steady Development of Sino-Russian Relations], Guoji wenhi luntan (Shanghai), no. 3 (1997),
p.57.
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appointed Acting President. In the presidential election in March 2000, Putin was
elected Russia's president. 7
 Although Putin is not an ultra nationalist, it has not
meant that potential Chinese and Russian frictions on unsettled islands can be
removed. The question here is not whether a future Russian leadership takes a
cooperative approach toward border demarcation with China, but if it will be able to
reconcile domestic opposition against territorial concessions to China. While Russia
has suffered a marked loss of regional and international status, maintaining territorial
integrity has been seen as important to preserve this country's pride. Russian
regional authorities and the military have been particularly concerned about border
demarcation with China. Their resistance to territorial concessions to China may
become an obstacle to a final resolution of the two countries' territorial disputes.
Any friction over territorial issues will exacerbate Chinese and Russian military and
security relations, even though some of CBMs have helped to reduce military tensions
in the border areas.
Second, with an obvious shift in power relations between China and Russia,
demographic tensions have added significant uncertainty to their security relationship
and may become more serious in the future. Given its growing economic strength,
China has shown more confidence in dealing with its relations with foreign states,
including Russia. Since the 19th century, for the first time, China perceives itself as
a great power, even a quasi superpower. Historically, the Chinese leaderships have
complained about unequal border agreements and the Russian occupation of Chinese
Natalya Kalashnikova and Aleksei Makarkin, 'Acting President Elected in First Round, But Not
Decisively Enough to Avoid Having to Make Deals v. ith Communists, Governors (He Gets 52
Segodnya (Moscow), 27 March 2000, p.1, in CDPSP, vol. 52, no. 13 (26 April 2000), p.1.
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territories. After the Cold War, given the growing number of Chinese immigrants in
Russia's Far Eastern regions, Russian anxieties about Chinese 'ethnic expansion' and
ambitions toward Russian territory have increased. The Russian military expert
Dmitri Trenin has warned that by mid-21 century Chinese could become the second
largest ethnic group in Russia. Potential inter-ethnic friction between Chinese and
Russian peoples in Russia's Far East cannot be ruled out. 8 Demographic tensions
can be a source of potential conflict in the Sino-Russian relationship.
Third, although China and Russia have shared common concerns about regional
stability in Central Asia, there still exists potential competition between them for
political influence and economic resources in this region. The Russian military has
voiced its concerns about China's arms supplies to Central Asian states. Also,
China's intentions of using its economic strength to increase its influence in Central
Asia could lead to Russian anxiety over growing China's presence in this region.
Russia has viewed Central Asia as part of its sphere of influence. If China's political
influence in Central Asia grows with its military and economic involvement, Sino-
Russian competition in this region may arise. Future competition in Central Asia
could sharpen the sense of mutual threat between China and Russia, and may have a
negative impact on the development of their military cooperation.
Another source of tension resides in the increasing Chinese intention and
capacity to act as a military great power in the APR. This development will deepen
Russian fears of security threats arising from China. While pursuing arms trade and
military-technical cooperation with China, Russia has tried to preserve the
8 Dmitri Trenin, Russia's Chinese Problem, unpublished paper (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center,
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technological gap between the two states. However, in order to upgrade its military
capability, China has sought to obtain Russian advanced defence technology, such as
missile guidance systems, rocket engine production technologies, and satellite and
airborne sensor technologies, through joint projects on dual-use technology. Also,
China has tried to acquire advanced technology by illicit routes and to recruit Russian
engineers to improve the Chinese capacity for developing new weapons, including
strategic forces. Despite the Western arms embargo, China has made efforts to
introduce high-tech machine tools into its defence factories and to 'steal' advanced
defence technology from the West. 9
 China has also boosted its defence technology
ties with Israel. 1 ° These could, if they have not already, narrow the technological
gap between China and Russia. This would have two important implications for the
future of Sino-Russian military cooperation. First, the Chinese need to pursue
1998), p.1 6.
In September 1994, the U.S. government granted McDonnell Douglas licences to export 19
sophisticated machinery to China to produce civil-aircraft parts in China. However, China installed
six of the machines at Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company to produce Silkworm missiles.
This prompted the U.S. government to tighten its controls over the export of high-tech machine tools,
which have military applications, to China. For further details on this case, see Nigel Holloway,
Playing for Keeps', FEER, 8 February 1996, pp.14-16. On 25 May 1999, U.S. Congressman
Christopher Cox issued an investigation report, accusing China of stealing advanced defence
technology from the U.S.. See Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, House Report 1 05-851, Website
http: //www.heritage.org/features/coxreport.html/. In response, the Chinese government stressed that
this report 'is a great slander against the Chinese nation and is typical racial prejudice'. See Zhao
Qizheng, 'Cox Report Undermines Sino-US Relations', Be(/ing Review, 14 June 1999, pp.9-1 1. The
Cox Report has led to controversies between the Clinton Administration and Congressmen. The
Clinton government agreed with the Committee on the need to take effective measures to prevent the
diversion of U.S. technology and prevent unauthorised disclosure of sensitive military information.
However, the Clinton government emphasised that not every allegation was a proven fact. The U.S.
intelligence community has concluded that classified information obtained by China probably
accelerated its programme to develop future weapons. But they are not sure whether any weapon
design documentation or blueprints were acquired and they cannot determine the full extent of
weapons information obtained. For controversies associated with the Cox Report findings, see 'U.S.-
China Relations: Spring Brings A Chill', Foreign Policy Bulletin, vol. 10, no. 5 (September October
1999), pp.53-82.
'° P. R. Kumaraswamy, 'The Military Dimension of Israel-China Relations', China Report, vol. 32, no.
2 (1995), pp.235-249.
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military cooperation with Russia would be reduced. Second, Russian fears of a
'China threat' would be deepened. These circumstances would impact severely upon
bilateral military cooperation.
Lastly, there are two external factors that may create uncertainties for the
development of Sino-Russian military cooperation: first, in the case of the West's
lifting the arms embargo against China, and second, as a result of U.S. diplomatic
pressure. Russian success in exporting arms to China has led some Western states to
change their arms export policies toward China in an attempt to compete with Russia.
Some European states have started to offer China 'non-lethal military items'.
Chinese interests in Western military equipment have mainly focused on advanced
'force multipliers' and technologies, which can improve Chinese patrol and
reconnaissance capabilities, and air and sea defence." China may not purchase a
great number of heavy weapons from the West. However, lifting the arms embargo
against China would increase Chinese alternatives for military equipment, such as air
defence and missile systems and C31 technology. In these circumstances, Chinese
and Russian arms transfers and military-technical cooperation might be negatively
influenced.
The second external factor which might influence Chinese and Russian military
cooperation is that of U.S. diplomatic pressure. An important objective of Russian
arms transfers to China was to maintain the PLA's power projection vector to focus
towards the south. This may lead to tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South
China Sea. Such a development may result in increasing diplomatic pressure from
"Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad, SIPRI Research Report no. 11
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the USA against Russian arms trade and military-technical cooperation with China.
This also might impact upon the development of Russian arms transfers to China.
C) A Summing Up
After the end of the Cold War, calculated self-interests have encouraged China and
Russia to pursue military cooperation. In spite of all the progress in the
development of military cooperation, there remain potential conflicts in this
relationship. In the process of pursuing military cooperation, lingering mutual
distrust and conflicts of interest have obstructed the furthering of their bilateral
cooperation. It is significant that, while China has sought to modernise its armed
forces, Russia has tried to ensure that its security and interests are not undermined.
This has resulted from contradictions of geopolitical and security interests between
these two neighbours. In the short term, CBMs, arms transfers, and military-
technical cooperation may create a less hostile political atmosphere and underline the
existence of a limited cooperative security relationship. In the long term, however,
reciprocal threats against each other's territories, and China's increasing ambitions and
capacity to act as a great military power in the APR, could eventually become major
sources of tension in the Sino-Russian military relationship.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.122.
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Appendix: List of Interviewees
I. People's Republic of China
1. Beijing
(1) Shi Ze (7 January 1998)
Vice President, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), the Chinese
Foreign Ministry
Senior diplomat of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow
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Head of the East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, CIIS, the
Chinese Foreign Ministry
Senior diplomat of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow
(3) Prof. Guo Zhenyuan (12 January 1998)
Member of Executive Board, Deputy-Chief of the International Strategy and
Security Division, China Center for International Studies, the Chinese State
Council
(4) Xin Qi (4 January 1998)
Research Fellow, Center for Peace & Development Studies, General Political
Department of the PLA
(5) Prof. Zheng Yu (5 January 1998)
Head of the Section for Russian Studies, the Institute of East European, Russian
& Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
(6) Dr. Niu Jun (8 January 1998)
Director, the U.S. Diplomacy Division, the Institute of American Studies, CASS
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(7) Prof. BaoxuZhao (6 January 1998)
School of International Studies, Peking University
Vice President, The Chinese Association of Political Science
Chief Editor, China Studies
(8) Dr. Zhu Feng (4 January 1998)
Department of International Politics, Peking University
2. Shanghai
(9) Prof. Chen Qimao (15 January 1998)
President, Shanghai Society for International Relations
President Emeritus, Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS)
(10) Dr. Yang Jiemian (15 January 1998)
Director, Department of American Studies, SIIS
(11) Prof. Bao Shifen (15 January 1998)
Senior Research Fellow, Department of European Studies, SIIS
(12) Colonel Xia Liping (15 January 1998)
Deputy Director, Department of American Studies, SIIS
(13) Chen Dongxiao (15 January 1998)
Junior Research Fellow, Department of American Studies, SIIS
(14) Prof. Feng Shaolei (17 January 1998)
Vice President, Shanghai Society for International Strategy Research
Vice President, Shanghai Europe Studies Society
3. Hong Kong
(15) Prof. Byron S. J. Weng (21 January 1998)
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Chairman, Department of Government and Public Administration, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong
II. Russia
(16) Prof. Evgeny P. Bazhanov (6 July 1998)
Director, the Institute of Contemporary International Studies (ICIS), the Russian
Foreign Ministry
Vice President of the Diplomatic Academy, the Russian Foreign Ministry
(17) Prof Vladimir F. Li (6 July 1998)
Deputy Director, ICIS, the Russian Foreign Ministry
(18) Dr. Dmitri Trenin (7 July 1998)
Deputy Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
(19) Dr. Vasiliy I. Krivokhizha (6 July 1998)
First Deputy Director, Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS)
(20) Dr. Dmitry G. Evstafiev (6 July 1998)
Leading Research Fellow, RISS
(21) Prof Iurii Fedorov (8 July 1998)
Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Russian Foreign Ministry
(22) Sergei M. Troush (8 July 1998)
Senior Fellow, the Institute of USA & Canada Studies, Russian Academy of
Sciences (RAS)
(23) Dr. Alexander G. Larin (1 July 1998)
Senior Researcher, the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, RAS
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Institute of Far Eastern Studies, RAS
(25) Peter V. Vlassov (10 July 1998)
Correspondent, ITAR-TASS news agency and Expert magazine
III. Taiwan (Republic of China)
(26) Dr. Chi Su (22 December 1997)
Deputy Secretary-General, Office of the President
(27) Dr. Ting Shou-chung (22 December 1997)
Former Chairman of National Defence Committee, the Legislative Yuan
(28) Dr. Hu Wei-jen (7 January 2000)
Deputy Secretary-General, National Security Council, Office of the President
IV. U.K.
(29) Dr. Roy Allison (15 October 1997 / May 1998)
Head of the Russia and Eurasia programme, The Royal Institute of International
Affairs (RIIA)
(30) Dr. Keun-Wook Paik (21 February 1997 / 27 November 1997)
Senior Research Fellow, RIIA
(31) Prof. Margot Light (22 July 1997/27 April 1998)
Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and
Political Science (LSE)
(32) Prof. Michael B. Yahuda (22 September 1997 / 25 November 1997 / 25 March
1998)
Department of International Relations, LSE
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